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# Police-Community Relations in Cincinnati

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Sponsored by the City of Cincinnati



Safety and Justice

A RAND INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM

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## Preface

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This is the fourth annual report that the RAND Corporation has produced on police-community relations in Cincinnati. The reports have been a part of the collaborative-agreement process to assess whether the process is achieving its goals of improving police-community relations in Cincinnati. The collaborative agreement was reached in 2002 when the Cincinnati Police Department joined with other agencies and organizations (collectively referred to here as *the parties*) to enact a series of reforms and initiatives intended to improve police-community relations in the city.

This report should be of interest to policymakers and community members in Cincinnati and elsewhere in Ohio. This report may also prove useful to residents and officials in other jurisdictions in which similar issues are being confronted. The City of Cincinnati funded this project on behalf of the parties to the collaborative agreement. Reports from earlier years are freely available from RAND's Web site. Other, recent and related RAND works that may be of interest to readers of this report include the following:

- *Analysis of Racial Disparities in the New York Police Department's Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices* (Ridgeway, 2007)
- *Evaluation of Firearm Training and Discharge Review for the New York City Police Department* (Rostker et al., 2008)
- "Assessing the Effect of Race Bias in Post-Traffic Stop Outcomes Using Propensity Scores" (Ridgeway, 2006)
- "Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops from Behind a Veil of Darkness" (Grogger and Ridgeway, 2006).

## The RAND Center on Quality Policing

This research was conducted under the auspices of the RAND Center on Quality Policing within the Safety and Justice Program of RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment (ISE). The center conducts research and analysis to improve contemporary police practice and policy. The mission of ISE is to improve the development, operation, use, and protection of society's essential physical assets and natural resources and to enhance the related social assets of safety and security of individuals in transit and in their workplaces and communities. Safety and Justice Program research addresses occupational safety, transportation safety, food safety, and public safety—including violence, policing, corrections, substance abuse, and public integrity.

Questions or comments about this report should be sent to the project leader, Greg Ridgeway ([Greg\\_Ridgeway@rand.org](mailto:Greg_Ridgeway@rand.org)). Information about the Safety and Justice Program is available online (<http://www.rand.org/ise/safety>), as is information about the Center on Quality Policing (<http://cqp.rand.org>). Inquiries about research projects should be sent to the following address:

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# Summary

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## Introduction

In 2002, the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD), the Fraternal Order of Police, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) joined together in a collaborative agreement to resolve social conflict, improve community relations, and avoid litigation in Cincinnati. The collaborative agreement requires the parties (that is, the participants in the agreement) to undertake collective efforts to achieve these goals. Specifically, the agreement requires CPD to implement a variety of changes in pursuit of five primary goals:

- Ensure that police officers and community members become proactive partners in community problem solving.
- Build relationships of respect, cooperation, and trust within and between police and communities.
- Improve education, oversight, monitoring, hiring practices, and accountability of CPD.
- Ensure fair, equitable, and courteous treatment for all.
- Create methods to establish the public's understanding of police policies and procedures and recognition of exceptional service in an effort to foster support for the police (*In re Cincinnati Policing*, S.D. Ohio, 2003, pp. 3–4).

Evaluation is a stipulated component of the agreement. RAND was chosen as the evaluator in 2004 to aid the parties in understanding progress toward the agreement's goals. RAND will conduct the

evaluation for five years, with the results published annually in a report available to the public. The evaluation has used a variety of methods, including the following:

- two surveys of citizen satisfaction with CPD (one in 2005 and another in 2008)
- a survey conducted in 2005 of citizens who have interacted with the police through arrest, reporting a crime or victimization, or being stopped for a traffic violation
- a survey conducted in 2005, 2006, and 2008 of CPD officers about their perceptions of support from the community, working conditions, and other factors related to job satisfaction and performance
- a survey conducted in 2005, 2006, and 2008 of officers and citizens involved in a sample of citizen complaints against the officers and the department
- an analysis of motor-vehicle stops occurring between 2003 and 2007 for patterns of racial disparity in various aspects of the stop
- periodic observations conducted in 2005 of structured meetings between citizens and representatives of CPD
- a review of CPD statistical compilations of CPD data from 2004 to 2007
- analysis of a sample of videotaped interactions between citizens and officers during motor-vehicle stops that occurred between 2005 and 2007
- analysis of CPD staffing, recruitment, retention, and promotion patterns in 2005.

Under the terms of the evaluation protocol, this year 4 report consists of an analysis of a follow-up wave of surveys of the community, officers, and those involved in the complaint processes. The report also includes the review of statistical compilations, analysis of motor-vehicle stops, and analysis of videotaped citizen-police interactions during vehicle stops. This report contains our final assessment of the progress toward the goals of the collaborative agreement. The remaining report,

to be released in 2009, will contain only an analysis of motor-vehicle stops.

## A Review of Findings, 2003–2008

Six years have passed since the signing of the collaborative agreement and the many reforms initiated before the start of our evaluation. Since we began analyzing the data and studying the issues in 2005, our analyses indicate that police-community relations in Cincinnati have improved in a number of ways. Relative to the community's long history that precipitated the collaborative agreement, three years is not a long time to expect substantial improvement in police-community relations, but the trends are promising. Cincinnati's black residents reported improvements in perceived police professionalism, although their level of trust in the police is still significantly<sup>1</sup> below that of white residents. Although the city's black residents believe that police often use race in deciding their course of action, the perception of racial profiling is on the decline. We also found that, when comparing stops of black drivers to stops of similarly situated nonblack drivers, racial differences in search rates and the durations of traffic stops that we observed for 2003–2005 did not occur in 2006 and 2007. Finally, we observe some improvement in the communication of CPD officers during traffic stops.

There are a number of potential causes for the observed changes. In this report, we do not aim to determine appropriate attribution for the improvement but wish to point out that many forces have been at work in the past several years.

First, the department has adopted numerous policy changes. Equipping every officer with a TASER® electronic control device (ECD) starting in 2004 has completely changed police use of force in the city. While CPD reports about one ECD incident per day on average, some of those incidents are cases that, prior to 2004, might

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<sup>1</sup> In this document, *significant* is used in the statistical sense, denoting a change or difference that is unlikely due to chance. This is its common usage in the social sciences.

have concluded with more-serious force. CPD has also implemented the Employee Tracking Solution (ETS), which monitors and reports on officer performance. In addition, RAND researchers have developed and deployed a system at CPD that assesses quarterly whether any officers are stopping a disproportionate fraction of nonwhite drivers. All patrol cars now have mobile video recorders (MVRs), providing the community with assurances that interactions with police are correctly documented. There are numerous other changes in policy, practice, and training, but these highlight some major changes that have had great impact on policing in Cincinnati.

Second, external monitoring by plaintiff attorneys and court-appointed monitors has also prompted changes. The monitoring team closely reviewed use-of-force incidents, monitored policy changes, and spurred CPD's adoption of problem-oriented policing.

Third, the community in Cincinnati shows signs of improvement. Animosity toward the police, which peaked in 2001, is likely declining as the years progress. Crime has decreased substantially, especially in the historically high-crime areas of the city, such as Over-the-Rhine. As crime decreases, the risk of problematic interactions between the community and the police naturally decreases. The longer this trend continues, the greater the trust that can be built between the community and the police.

This report does not aim to determine appropriate attribution for the observed improvements in police-community relations. In this report, we merely document the trends, showing both areas in which we observe improvement and areas that will continue to exacerbate the perception of racial bias.

While we do observe improvements in a number of areas, blacks and whites in Cincinnati experience differences in policing. However, as we note in our previous reports, those differences were based on when, where, and why their stops take place rather than on the driver's race. Nonetheless, these differences can undermine police-community relations. Reducing these differences will likely require a close alignment between police practices and community priorities, the implementation of policies to ensure that white and black officers police black neighborhoods in a similar manner, and efforts by individual officers

and citizens to minimize the inconvenience and irritation caused by traffic stops. For example, the high-crime neighborhoods may want more police assistance with drugs and violent crime, but perhaps they end up feeling like they get more tickets for expired registrations, more time having their passengers investigated, and more instances of being patted down in public. The ongoing challenge to effective policing everywhere is to identify methods of targeting the specific offenses that are a concern to the community while minimizing the impact on community members who are not involved in those offenses.

A critical component of the evaluation is to understand the context of policing in Cincinnati. To that end, CPD provides RAND with statistical compilations that detail arrest and citation activity, calls for service, and crime patterns. These compilations provide insight into how crime and, thus, the allocation of law-enforcement resources vary across neighborhoods. The compilations also feed into other analyses conducted as part of the evaluation.

### **Crime and Calls for Service**

Overall, crime, the associated enforcement activities, and calls for service remained highly clustered in specific portions of the city. Overall crime rates have declined citywide by 9 percent since 2005. Downtown and Over-the-Rhine continue to post large reductions in crime, a 31-percent decrease in downtown and a 37-percent decrease in Over-the-Rhine since 2005. Some areas experienced increases; Fairview, just north of Over-the-Rhine, experienced a 20-percent increase in the same period.

In 2006, we reported that crime rates in Over-the-Rhine dropped by 13 percent after April 2006, when the Over-the-Rhine task force (later renamed Vortex) embarked on a zero-tolerance approach to policing in that neighborhood.

### **Use of Force**

The rate of use-of-force incidents per arrest has remained constant since 2005: approximately 14 uses of force per 1,000 arrests. However, the number of arrests has declined substantially, resulting in much fewer use-of-force incidents than in previous years. ECDs continue to be the

single most commonly used force option, with 394 incidents in 2007. In 90 percent of ECD uses, the device is used in dart mode, the mode that incapacitates the subject's motor abilities, the preferred mode for that reason. Drive-stun mode, accounting for 10 percent of ECD uses, uses pain rather than incapacitation to induce compliance. We found no racial differences in the type of force used or the ECD mode used. Black subjects are involved in 75 percent of use-of-force incidents, nearly matching their representation among arrestees (73 percent). These rates are similar to the rates of arrest and use of force from 2004 to 2006.

## **Analysis of Vehicle Stops**

Our analysis of vehicle stops assessed whether there is a department-wide pattern of bias against black drivers in the decision to stop a vehicle; determined the fraction of CPD officers who disproportionately stop black drivers compared to other officers patrolling the same neighborhoods at the same time; and investigated whether there are racial biases in post-stop outcomes, including citation rates, stop duration, and search rates.

### **Department-Level Stop Patterns**

If CPD officers were actively targeting black drivers, we would expect stops of black drivers to represent a greater share of stops during daylight hours, when race is reasonably visible, than after dark, when race is less visible. Racial differences between stops during daylight and those after dark may also be due to differences in racial differences in drivers on the road at various times of day. To account for this each year, we have closely examined evening stops that occur near the switches to and from daylight saving time (DST). Examining these stops allows us to contrast stops that occur at exactly the same clock time with those during DST occurring during daylight and those during standard time occurring in darkness.

Table S.1 shows the results accumulated in 2003–2007 for stops occurring within four weeks of a change to or from DST. The odds ratio indicates how many times more likely daylight stops are to involve a

**Table S.1**  
**The Odds That a Stop in Daylight Involves a Black Driver Relative to a Stop After Dark, Controlling for the Clock Time**

Year	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval
2003	1.02	(0.70, 1.47)
2004	1.19	(0.80, 1.77)
2005	1.10	(0.81, 1.51)
2006	0.71	(0.51, 1.00)
2007	1.17	(0.87, 1.60)
Combined	1.00	(0.86, 1.16)

NOTE: Includes all stops occurring within 30 days of the spring or fall DST change during evening hours.

black driver than are nighttime stops. Combining across all five years indicates that the accumulated data show no evidence of a racial bias in the decision to stop. Even excluding the 2006 data, which had a much lower odds ratio than any other, yields a combined odds ratio of 1.07 and still remains not statistically different from 1.0.

Additional analysis that included stops from throughout the year (rather than just those stops occurring near a change to or from DST) yielded the same result. Therefore, we conclude that there appears to be no evidence of a department-wide practice of targeting black drivers for stops.

### **Individual-Level Stop Patterns**

While we found no evidence of a department-wide practice of disproportionately stopping black drivers, each year, our analysis flagged three to five officers with a disproportionate fraction of stops of black drivers. CPD has just more than 1,000 officers; 25 percent of those officers make more than 50 stops per year. We focused our analysis on these officers, who regularly interact with drivers in traffic stops. We compared the stops that these officers made with stops made by other officers at the same times and places and in the same contexts. The

flagged officers were substantially more likely to have stops involving black drivers than the similarly situated stops made by other officers. Table S.2 summarizes our findings for the past four years.

RAND, restricted by federal human subject–protection laws, does not provide identifiers of the officers that the analysis flags. Since 2007, CPD has been using a RAND-designed system to regularly repeat this analysis internally and including the results as part of officers’ regular reviews.

**Group-Level Stop Patterns**

In our 2007 report (Schell et al., 2007), we conducted analyses in addition to those focusing on department-wide patterns and stop patterns of individual officers. In the 2006 stop data, we examined the stop patterns of a particular group of officers—those involved in Operation Vortex, a “highly visible proactive unit that has a zero tolerance approach to street crimes, drug trafficking, and quality of life issues. The focus of this unit is to seek out and physically arrest both minor and major criminal offenders by enforcing every law available and using every tool at our disposal to inconvenience criminals” (Green and Jerome, 2006, p. 7). The crime-reduction strategy provides saturation patrols to areas with the greatest problems with crime. Our 2006 analysis of this group’s practices (Schell et al., 2007, pp. 46–48) found that Vortex officers were more likely to stop vehicles with black drivers than were other non-Vortex officers patrolling at the same times and places (71 percent versus 65 percent). Another analysis found that Vortex decreased crime in Over-the-Rhine

**Table S.2**  
**Findings on Individual Officers**

Year	Number of Officers Flagged as Overstopping Black Drivers	Number of Officers Flagged as Understopping Black Drivers
2004	4	4
2005	5	1
2006	3	2
2007	3	1



13 percent more than would be expected, given the crime trends at the time (Schell et al., 2007, p. 9).

This presents a challenging dilemma for police-community relations. A program that appears to be responsible for a substantial decrease in crime consequently results in an increase in stops that involve black drivers. Since black residents exhibit the least trust of policing in Cincinnati, the deployment of programs—even ones that are successful with respect to crime reduction—that result in greater exposure of black residents to police require careful management to avoid deterioration of police-community relations. In spite of this approach, survey respondents from the Over-the-Rhine neighborhood reported that they perceive greater professionalism from CPD in 2008 than they did in 2005.

### **Post-Stop Patterns**

When comparing all stops of black and nonblack drivers, the stops of black drivers take longer on average and black drivers are more likely to be searched. However, much of these differences appear to be driven by the location and time of the stop, the type of stop, whether the driver was a Cincinnati resident, and whether the driver had a valid driver's license. To assess whether race may play a role in officers' post-stop actions, we compared the stops of black drivers with the stops of similarly situated nonblack drivers—that is, white, Hispanic, or other nonblack drivers who were stopped in similar locations, at similar times, and for similar reasons as black drivers.

Comparing black drivers to similarly situated nonblack drivers, Table S.3 shows that both had nearly the same chance of having a stop lasting less than 10 minutes. In 2006 and 2007, the percentage was exactly the same. Similarly, we found that black and nonblack drivers had an almost equal chance of having a stop last more than 20 minutes (9 percent for black drivers and 10 percent for similarly situated nonblack drivers).

Table S.4 shows that black drivers received citations less frequently than did similarly situated nonblack drivers (57 percent, compared with 61 percent in 2007). This pattern has persisted in nearly all of the study years.

**Table S.3**  
**Percentage of Stops Lasting Less Than 10 Minutes for Black Drivers and a Matched Set of Nonblack Drivers**

Year	Black Drivers	Nonblack Drivers (Matched)
2003	40	43
2004	40	44
2005	45	47
2006	47	47
2007	56	56

**Table S.4**  
**Citation Rates of Black Drivers and of a Matched Set of Nonblack Drivers (%)**

Year	Black Drivers	Nonblack Drivers (Matched)
2003	75	75
2004	69	70
2005	68	71
2006	63	67
2007	57	61

Between 2003 and 2005, we found that CPD officers were more likely to search black drivers than similarly situated nonblack drivers (see Table S.5). However, in 2006, we found higher search rates for nonblack drivers, and, in 2007, search rates were nearly equal. Based on the two most recent years of data, we find no evidence of racial bias in the selection of stops resulting in searches.

High-discretion searches, such as searches in which the suspect gives consent, are most at risk for racial bias. However, when officers conducted high-discretion searches, they were equally likely to recover contraband, such as weapons or drugs, from black and nonblack drivers (Table S.6). The similarity of these hit rates indicates that there

**Table S.5**  
**Search Rates of Black Drivers and a Matched Set of Nonblack Drivers (%)**

Year	Black Drivers	Nonblack Drivers (Matched)
2003	5.9	5.4
2004	6.7	6.2
2005	6.1	5.2
2006	6.1	6.7
2007	5.3	5.5

**Table S.6**  
**Hit Rates for High-Discretion Searches, by Year and Race (%)**

Year	Black Drivers	Nonblack Drivers
2003	28	22
2004	29	27
2005	29	27
2006	23	24
2007	20	21

does not seem to be a racial bias in their selection of which drivers to search.

Even though we found no racial disparities in the hit rates, officers conducted 1,318 high-discretion searches of black drivers in 2007 that recovered no contraband. Such stops, which the motorist likely views as being made for no good reason, disproportionately affect the black community, since more than 1,000 black residents experienced such searches in 2007, nearly twice the number for nonblack drivers. This can contribute to blacks' perceptions of unfair policing that were identified in last year's report (Schell et al., 2007). While recovery of contraband from high-discretion searches, such as 29 weapon and 448 drug recoveries, can have a social benefit for the Cincinnati community, there is a societal cost for searches that result in no recovery of contraband.

## Analysis of Videotaped Police-Motorist Interactions

We analyzed a stratified random sample of 325 video records of traffic stops from 2007 to analyze the objective characteristics of the stop (e.g., duration, infraction type, time of day) as well as measures of the communication between the driver and the police officer. The video analysis is not designed to determine whether racial inequalities are uniquely attributable to racial profiling. Instead, the analysis is designed to look for differences that community members are likely to perceive as evidence of racially biased policing, regardless of the actual reason for those differences. This approach highlights the factors that are barriers to improved police-community relations, but it cannot determine whether any differences occur because of race.

This analysis revealed two key differences associated with the officers' and drivers' races: (1) Black drivers were more likely to experience proactive policing (such as asking passengers for identification or searching the vehicle) during the stop, resulting in longer stops that were significantly more likely to involve searches, and (2) white officers were more likely than black officers to use proactive police tactics in incidents involving black drivers.

As noted previously, nonblack drivers stopped at the same times, places, and contexts as the black drivers had equal search rates. The first finding from the analysis of the recordings notes that Cincinnati's black drivers are stopped in times, places, and contexts in which CPD officers are more proactive and take a more investigative approach. Regardless of whether this is good policing strategy, it points out that black drivers in Cincinnati are more likely than nonblack drivers to have a protracted negative interaction with the police.

We continue to find significant evidence of more-intensive policing of black motorists by white officers than by black officers. Again, this may or may not be caused by racial bias but could reasonably lead some black drivers to believe that they are treated with greater suspicion. It may be useful for CPD to investigate how white and black officers are being assigned to, and are conducting, their duties so it can more effectively reduce or eliminate the appearance of racial differences in officer behavior.

These results are largely consistent with the findings in our earlier reports (Riley et al., 2005; Ridgeway et al., 2006; Schell et al., 2007). As noted in earlier reports, these findings cannot answer whether racial bias does or does not exist, but they do help explain why black Cincinnati residents perceive that it does, which may lead to a more negative attitude in future interactions with the police. It is therefore critical to take efforts to ensure that white and black officers act similarly when stopping motorists, so that improvements in relations between CPD and the black community are possible.

In addition to these findings, we found one significant difference over time that is unrelated to the race of the officer or driver: The communication quality of CPD officers has improved between 2005 and 2007. Specifically, officers displayed better listening to what the drivers say, as well as greater evidence of patience and helpfulness. This difference occurs for both white and black officers and for stops involving both white and black motorists. While the causes of this change are unknown, it could be a product of the broader reduction in tensions between CPD and the community, an improvement in police training, or an adaptation to the fact that traffic stops are now videotaped and monitored.

## **Police-Community Satisfaction Survey**

To examine changes in police-community relations in the city of Cincinnati, we conducted a follow-up to the 2005 survey of Cincinnati residents. We conducted a phone survey of 3,000 Cincinnati residents in 2005 and again in 2008.<sup>2</sup> The results suggest that the relationship between the community and the police is headed in the right direction (see Table S.7).

Black respondents reported greater perceived police professionalism in 2008 than in 2005. Nonblack respondents generally reported

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<sup>2</sup> We obtained a 42-percent response rate in 2005 and a 45-percent response rate in 2008. For both years, we reweighted the responses to match the city's representation by neighborhood, age, race, and sex.

**Table S.7**  
**Summary of Community-Survey Responses**

Survey Scale	Race	Average Response by Year	
		2005	2008
Police professionalism	Black	2.35	2.50
	Nonblack	2.92	2.94
Active policing	Black	1.61	1.62
	Nonblack	1.50	1.50
Perception of racial profiling	Black	2.88	2.79
	Nonblack	2.15	2.08

NOTE: The three scales reported here are the result of averaging several survey questions. Scales range from 1 to 4, with higher values indicating greater professionalism, more-active policing, and greater perceived racial profiling.

CPD’s professionalism as “Good,” and that rating was unchanged between 2005 and 2008. Black respondents, on average, gave significantly lower ratings than nonblack respondents, rating CPD’s professionalism between “Fair” and “Good,” but these ratings were significantly higher than they were in 2005.

Both black and nonblack respondents reported statistically significant decreases in the perception of the use of racial profiling by CPD officers. Black respondents still report that CPD officers treat blacks and whites somewhat unequally and usually use race in deciding how to police, more so than do nonblack respondents. However, the percentage of black residents holding this belief declined.

**Police Officer Survey**

A key objective of the evaluation was to obtain information from CPD officers whose duties entail significant interactions with citizens. The information was obtained through a survey that asked officers about personal safety, working conditions, morale, organizational barriers to

effective policing, fairness in evaluation and promotion, and attitudes of citizens in Cincinnati.

There were fairly low rates of participation in the survey. Of 300 surveys distributed to officers at their in-service training, only 40 returned completed surveys. As a result, these findings may not correctly reflect the views of those CPD officers who did not respond.

Of the officers who responded to the survey, their responses to questions about good policing practices were generally consistent with the principles of community policing. For example, the overwhelming majority of officers who responded to the survey believe that residents' input is critical to solving neighborhood problems. However, these officers did not express a great deal of confidence that cooperation is likely. Furthermore, few officers (15 percent) reported being aware of the Community Police Partnering Center. Officers generally felt that proactively stopping cars and "checking people out" were components of good police work. Such practices, though, taken to the extreme, may tax the relationship between the police and community members.

Officers who responded to the survey reported experiencing a great deal of stress on the job, including significant disrespect, suspects using physical force to resist arrest, and feelings of serious danger from physical violence. They generally gave high marks to the training that CPD gives them but do not feel that they get sufficient feedback about their performance. Despite the problems that the officers identified, they expressed a high level of commitment and derive personal satisfaction from their jobs. These responses were generally consistent with the responses to our 2006 officer survey (Ridgeway et al., 2006).

## **Satisfaction with the Complaint Process**

We also fielded a survey to assess the perceived fairness of the complaint process, the level of input that citizens and officers had in the process, and justifications for the final resolution. Additionally, the survey asked for input from officers and citizens on improving the internal complaint process. We distributed surveys to each officer and each citizen complainant involved in each complaint handled through the Citizen

Complaint Resolution Process (CCRP) or Internal Investigations Section (IIS) and the Citizen Complaint Authority (CCA). Surveys were mailed with the findings upon closure of the investigations.

Few officers and citizens responded to the survey in 2008, although we received more than in 2006 (23 officer and 12 citizen surveys in 2008, compared to 11 officer and eight citizen surveys in 2006).

Of primary importance, respondents who responded to the survey reported that the complaint-review process is working, in that respondents indicated that investigators followed up on a majority of complaints (100 percent of police officers and 92 percent of complainants).

Officers and citizens who responded to the survey had disparate views on the honesty of the investigators; three-quarters of the officers (but only two-fifths of the citizens) thought that the investigators were honest. These officers and citizens felt that the process allowed them to tell their side of the story, but only half of them thought the investigators understood the facts of the case.

Officers tended to have more-favorable opinions of the investigation than complainants did. Three-quarters of the officers felt that their views were considered and that they were treated with respect and dignity, while only a third of complainants felt their views were considered, and half reported being treated with dignity and respect. Officers were more satisfied with the complaint process and outcome than citizens were. Most complaints generally appear to favor the officer, which is certainly associated with satisfaction with the process.

## Summary and Conclusions

### Progress Toward the Goals of the Collaborative Agreement

As initially noted, CPD is not the same as the department that policed Cincinnati in 2001. Policy changes, oversight, and a variety of reforms have produced a department that polices differently than it had in 2001. At the same time, the community has also changed, most notably with respect to large decreases in crime, particularly in the Over-



the-Rhine neighborhood. This reduces the risk of problematic interactions between the community and the police.

These developments have produced evidence of small but positive changes in the community's perception of the department. Black residents are reporting greater perceived police professionalism than they had three years ago. In addition, our analysis found no evidence of racial bias in traffic stops, such as in the decision to stop or in the decision to search. Overall, however, black residents still maintain significantly more negative views of the police than white residents do.

That said, there are several ways in which police interactions with the community can exacerbate and perpetuate the perception of racial bias. Every year, our analysis flags three to five officers who stop a disproportionately high number of black drivers relative to other officers patrolling in the same times, places, and contexts. CPD has set up a system to monitor such outliers, and it will be important to investigate and act on outliers as appropriate.

Blacks continue to bear a disproportionate share of the impact of policing services by virtue of the clustering of crime, calls for service, and policing in predominantly black neighborhoods. While we found no evidence that the police systematically or deliberately treat blacks differently, blacks nevertheless experience a different kind of policing from that experienced by whites. In particular, blacks experience more policing and, particularly, more of the proactive policing exemplified by Vortex. While it may not be possible to field a proactive enforcement strategy that is racially neutral, much of CPD's interaction with the citizenry comes through vehicle stops. The quality, tenor, and tone of such stops are largely under police control. CPD should continue to evaluate the intensity of traffic stops (both volume and degree of scrutiny), especially in the high-crime neighborhoods, to ensure that the intensity level balances the investigative and public-safety benefits of the stops with the risks of negative interactions with residents.

Our analysis of the video recordings of traffic stops consistently finds that white officers are more investigative of black motorists and passengers than are black officers. This difference in approach to traffic stops can certainly fuel the perception among stopped black drivers that their race played a role in the stop. The department should thus

pay special attention to training to ensure that these interactions are conducted in a consistent, courteous, and professional manner.

While the trends appear positive, without a concerted effort to ameliorate the disparate impact of these policies, it seems likely that black Cincinnati residents will remain less satisfied with policing services than will their white counterparts.

## Acknowledgments

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We gratefully acknowledge the comments of two independent reviewers and the parties to the collaborative agreement. John Eck from the University of Cincinnati has, over the past four years, consistently helped us sharpen our focus and presentation. Lois Davis, a senior policy researcher at RAND, helped us clarify several sections of this report. Our thanks also go to the graduate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who served as coders for this study. Their hard work and dedication allowed us to carefully examine everyday interactions between CPD officers and the community they serve.

In addition, the parties' comments provided valuable insights about local context. We also thank our colleague Terry Fain at RAND, who coordinated the data acquisition and human subjects protection review.

Although we benefited from these reviews, the authors alone remain responsible for errors and omissions in this analysis.



# Abbreviations

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ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
ANCOVA	analysis of covariance
ANOVA	analysis of variance
CAD	computer-aided dispatch
CAT	communication accommodation theory
CBD	Central Business District
CCA	Citizen Complaint Authority
CCRP	Citizen Complaint Resolution Process
CPD	Cincinnati Police Department
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DST	daylight saving time
ECD	electronic control device
ETS	Employee Tracking Solution
fdr	false-discovery rate
FOP	Fraternal Order of Police
GED	General Educational Development
IIS	Internal Investigations Section

ISE	RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment
LAAW International	Liability Assessment and Awareness International
MOA	memorandum of agreement
mph	miles per hour
MVR	mobile video recorder
RDD	random-digit dialing
SUV	sport-utility vehicle

## Introduction

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### The Collaborative Agreement

In 2002, the City of Cincinnati and other parties (collectively, *the parties*) entered into a collaborative agreement that sought to achieve the following goals:

- Ensure that police officers and community members become proactive partners in community problem solving.
- Build relationships of respect, cooperation, and trust within and between police and communities.
- Improve education, oversight, monitoring, hiring practices, and accountability of the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD).
- Ensure fair, equitable, and courteous treatment for all.
- Create methods to establish the public's understanding of police policies and procedures and recognition of exceptional service in an effort to foster support for the police (*In re Cincinnati Policing*, S.D. Ohio, 2003, pp. 3–4).

An independent team monitored the collaborative agreement and a separate memorandum of agreement (MOA) between CPD and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on the use of force. The monitor team, headed by Saul Green, tracked the parties' implementation of necessary reforms, changes, and procedures. A U.S. magistrate conciliated disagreements between the monitor team's judgments and the parties.

## Evaluation of Progress Toward the Collaborative Agreement's Goals

Under the terms of the collaborative agreement, the parties are required to evaluate the agreement's impact. Indeed, the collaborative agreement itself notes, "this Agreement is outcome oriented, putting great emphasis on objective measures of police-citizen relations and police effectiveness" (*In re Cincinnati Policing*, p. 4). RAND was retained in July 2004 to conduct the required evaluations and assist the parties with measuring progress toward the goals of the collaborative agreement. RAND combines the evaluation's individual elements, referred to as *tasks*, into an annual report. RAND's fourth annual report was due in draft form to the parties on November 3, 2008, and in final form in January 2009.

This is the fourth of five annual reports that will be produced as part of the evaluation. Table 1.1 provides information about the content of past, current, and future reports. This, the year 4 report, provides an analysis of the outcomes and characteristics of motorist stops. In addition, the book analyzes data from audio and video recordings of motor-vehicle stops. We also report on the results of a community-satisfaction survey (a follow-up to our 2005 survey), a survey of officers, and surveys of officers and citizens involved in the complaint process. As always, the book uses as context statistical compilations provided by CPD about crime, arrests, and other issues. This latter task is not reflected in Table 1.1.

### Statistical Compilations

The statistical compilations address a range of topics, including arrests and reported crimes by neighborhood; vehicle stops and citation, search, and arrest rates by neighborhood; use-of-force incidents by neighborhood; and calls for service by neighborhood. We review the compilations each year to help establish the context of policing in Cincinnati, including how CPD allocates resources, the demand for police services, and how these factors vary relative to the racial composition of Cincinnati's neighborhoods.



**Table 1.1**  
**Schedule of Reports and Content**

Task	Report Year				
	1	2	3	4 <sup>a</sup>	5
Incident year covered by CPD data <sup>b</sup>	2003 <sup>c</sup> –2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Community-satisfaction survey	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Traffic-stop data	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Audio and video analysis	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
CPD staffing	Yes	No	No	No	No
Problem-solving processes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Police-citizen interaction survey	Yes	No	No	No	No
Complaint process	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Officer survey	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No

NOTE: Shaded cells indicate future reports.

<sup>a</sup> The reporting year covered by this document.

<sup>b</sup> CPD provides data on statistical compilations, staffing, and motor-vehicle stops, as well as tapes of motor-vehicle stops. RAND collected all other data directly in the year of the report.

<sup>c</sup> Both 2003 and 2004 data were used for the motor vehicle–stop task only.

In this way, the statistical compilations provide important inputs into other tasks of the contract. For example, the compilations reveal that crime tends to be clustered in specific parts of the city at certain times of the day and week. In turn, this means that law-enforcement presence is going to be clustered in space and time in a way that correlates with the crime patterns. Other tasks, such as the traffic-stop analy-

ses, must take these clustering patterns into account, since the risk of exposure to law enforcement is not uniform over time and space.

### **Traffic-Stop Analysis**

The analysis of traffic-stop patterns investigates whether racial biases influence police activities in the decision to stop, cite, and search vehicles in Cincinnati. We conducted this analysis in each year of the contract. First, we assess whether there is evidence of racial profiling in the decision to initiate a stop. Second, we develop and apply internal benchmarks to assess whether individual officers exhibit patterns of racial disparity. Lastly, we assess whether racial disparities exist in stop outcomes, including such factors as the rates at which officers give citations, stop durations, and the rates at which officers initiate vehicle or personal searches. The traffic-stop analyses are conducted through analysis of data that CPD provided to RAND. This section of the evaluation did not require the collection of any original data through surveys or other means.

### **Evaluation of Video and Audio Records**

We analyze audio and video recordings from cameras mounted in CPD patrol cars to shed light on the origins of police-community conflict and dissatisfaction. Analysis of the video and audio recordings allows us to understand how verbal and nonverbal cues are interpreted and misinterpreted and, in turn, identify opportunities to train officers (and, to a much lower extent, citizens) on how to spot relevant cues and reduce misinterpretation of benign cues. For each year of the evaluation contract, we aim to sample 300 videotapes of motor-vehicle stops.

### **Community-Satisfaction Survey**

We document the findings from a survey of the community's satisfaction with policing. This survey was first fielded in 2005, and we compare the responses from this year's survey to the 2005 baseline measurement. In particular, we assess measures of perceived police professionalism, active policing, and racial profiling.

### **Survey of CPD Officers**

We report results from a survey of CPD officers whose duties entail significant interaction with citizens. We asked officers about personal safety, working conditions, morale, organizational barriers to effective policing, fairness in evaluation and promotion, and their ability to effectively work with the citizens in Cincinnati. This is a follow-up survey to the 2006 survey we fielded.

### **Citizen and Officer Satisfaction with the Complaint Process**

We report results from a survey of participants in the official complaint process. We distributed surveys to each officer and each citizen involved in each complaint handled through Internal Investigations Section (IIS) and the Citizen Complaint Authority (CCA). The survey assessed the perceived fairness of the complaint process, the level of input that citizens and officers had in the process, and justifications for the final resolution. Additionally, the survey asked for input from officers and citizens on improving the internal complaint process.

### **Structure of This Book**

The balance of this book is organized around the tasks presented in the preceding section. Chapter Two reviews the statistical compilations that Cincinnati provided, including their relevance for the other tasks of the evaluation. Chapter Three presents the findings from the traffic-stop analysis. In Chapter Four, we assess the results of the videotaped interactions of police and motorists. Chapter Five documents the results of the 2008 community-police satisfaction survey and compares the responses to the 2005 survey responses. Chapter Six reports the results of the police officer survey, and Chapter Seven reports the results of the complaint-process survey. Chapter Eight integrates the material from the preceding chapters to highlight issues relevant to the collaborative agreement.



## The Context of Policing in Cincinnati: Crime, Arrests, and Use of Force

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### Overview

CPD has slightly more than 1,000 sworn officers responsible for policing the city of 330,000 residents. CPD administers police services through five districts, which are further subdivided into neighborhoods, for a citywide total of 53 neighborhoods.

This chapter describes the relationship between demand for police services, law-enforcement activity, and the racial composition of neighborhoods. CPD spends much of its law-enforcement effort, as measured by such actions as arrests and citations, on a few neighborhoods. These neighborhoods also have the greatest demand for policing, as measured by calls for service and reports of crime. The residents of these areas, such as Over-the-Rhine and Pendleton,<sup>1</sup> are predominantly black. This leads Cincinnati's black residents to be more exposed to both crime and aggressive (even if necessary) police tactics, which can lead to a negative perception of the police.

Using data from CPD on calls for service, reported crime, arrests, and use-of-force incidents, this chapter sets the context for the remainder of the report, providing a description of the spatial distribution of incidents, the concentration of law-enforcement effort, and crime in particular neighborhoods.

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<sup>1</sup> Over-the-Rhine and Pendleton are two neighborhoods adjacent to and just north of Cincinnati's downtown.


The key findings of this chapter are as follows:

- Calls for service decreased in Cincinnati by 5 percent in 2007 compared with 2006. Calls for service in Over-the-Rhine have declined 16 percent since 2006 and 20 percent since 2005.
- Overall crime rates declined by 9 percent since 2005. Rates in Downtown and Over-the-Rhine decreased by 31 percent and 37 percent, respectively. Crime in Fairview, just north of Over-the-Rhine, has increased by 20 percent since 2005.
- Following two years of intensive policing and high arrest rates in Over-the-Rhine, the number of arrests in Over-the-Rhine has decreased by 35 percent since 2006, lower than 2004 levels. Over-the-Rhine does not have a disproportionate share of reported crimes or calls for service, as might be expected due to the high volume of arrests. However, it is unclear to what degree this is due to residents' resistance to report crimes or to CPD's enforcement efforts.
- The rate of use-of-force incidents per arrest has remained constant since 2005, at 14 uses of force per 1,000 arrests.
- There was no relationship between the type of force used and the subject's race.
- ECDs continue to be the most commonly used form of force recorded, in 66 percent of use-of-force incidents. In 10 percent of those cases, the device is used in drive-stun mode, which, as opposed to dart mode, is intended to induce compliance with pain rather than incapacitation of motor control. There are no racial differences in the rate at which officers use drive-stun mode.
- The race of the officer involved in use-of-force incidents also appears to be unrelated to the subject's race.

## **Calls for Service and Serious Crimes**

Figure 2.1 shows the number of calls for service by neighborhood for 2007. The Over-the-Rhine neighborhood accounted for 18,372 calls for service, 16 percent fewer than in 2006 and 20 percent fewer than in

**Figure 2.1**  
**Calls for Service, by Neighborhood, 2007**




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2005. The total number of calls for service citywide in 2006 decreased by 5 percent. Westwood continues to have an increasing rate of calls for service, with a 19-percent increase since 2005. Other neighborhoods with large increases include East Westwood (27 percent since 2005), Pleasant Ridge (24 percent since 2005), and Fairview (23 percent since 2005).

Figure 2.2 shows the number of part 1 crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and automobile theft) by neighborhood for 2007. Overall, part 1 crimes are down 9 percent since 2005. Some neighborhoods had large reductions in crime, including Downtown and Over-the-Rhine by 31 percent and 37 percent, respectively. East Price Hill, which experienced a 10-percent increase in reported crime in 2006, returned to 2005 levels. As with calls for service, Fairview is experiencing a trend in increasing crime, 20 percent since 2005.

**Figure 2.2**  
**Part 1 Crimes, by Neighborhood, 2007**



### **Stops, Citations, Arrests, and Reported Crimes**

Table 2.1 shows the number and percentage of arrests, reported crimes, and calls for service by neighborhood. Reported crimes may include part 1 crimes but also include reports of harassment, domestic-violence misdemeanors, and public indecency. The first seven neighborhoods listed in the table comprised 53 percent of CPD arrests and 35 percent of Cincinnati’s reported crimes. The largest share of arrests occurred in Over-the-Rhine, Central Business District (CBD)/Riverfront, and East Price Hill. Table 2.1 indicates that Westwood has 60 percent more reported crimes than Over-the-Rhine but Westwood’s arrests are one-third of Over-the-Rhine’s. From the available data, we cannot discern the degree to which this is due to differences in the residents’ willingness to report crimes to the police or differences in CPD enforcement efforts.



**Table 2.1**  
**Arrests, Reported Crimes, and Calls for Service, by Neighborhood, 2007**

Neighborhood	Arrests		Reported Crimes		Calls for Service	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Over-the-Rhine	6,447	15	2,242	5	18,372	6
CBD/Riverfront	5,057	11	1,928	5	15,839	5
East Price Hill	2,833	6	2,411	6	16,346	5
Avondale	2,407	5	2,002	5	13,999	5
Westwood	2,330	5	3,628	9	22,078	7
Clifton	2,290	5	910	2	6,960	2
West End	2,160	5	1,306	3	10,952	4
Walnut Hills	1,727	4	1,813	4	12,203	4
West Price Hill	1,703	4	2,422	6	14,965	5
South Fairmount	1,022	2	986	2	7,033	2
Northside	983	2	1,493	4	11,078	4
Madisonville	956	2	951	2	7,607	3
Evanston	928	2	954	2	7,685	3
Fairview	790	2	1,078	3	7,145	2

Table 2.1—Continued

Neighborhood	Arrests		Reported Crimes		Calls for Service	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Corryville	698	2	694	2	5,676	2
Bond Hill	643	1	772	2	7,013	2
Mount Auburn	621	1	851	2	5,797	2
North Avondale	582	1	656	2	5,197	2
Millvale	560	1	390	1	2,301	1
Oakley	558	1	753	2	5,769	2
Lower Price Hill	552	1	371	1	3,295	1
Roselawn	538	1	719	2	5,503	2
Mount Airy	528	1	944	2	6,507	2
Fay Apartments	517	1	484	1	2,654	1
Clifton/University Heights	481	1	699	2	5,382	2
College Hill	434	1	1,196	3	8,377	3
Camp Washington	427	1	423	1	4,775	2
Paddock Hills	372	1	191	0	1,793	1

Table 2.1—Continued

Neighborhood	Arrests		Reported Crimes		Calls for Service	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Winton Hills	347	1	798	2	4,452	1
East Westwood	339	1	341	1	2,483	1
North Fairmount	313	1	274	1	1,600	1
South Cumminsville	309	1	133	0	1,195	0
Mount Washington	302	1	619	2	4,452	1
Pendleton	269	1	269	1	1,787	1
Hyde Park	265	1	508	1	3,843	1
Queensgate	254	1	289	1	3,504	1
Pleasant Ridge	243	1	524	1	4,147	1
Spring Grove Village <sup>a</sup>	238	1	465	1	2,920	1
Mount Adams	217	0	147	0	1,408	0
English Woods	209	0	272	1	1,725	1
East End	204	0	311	1	1,959	1

**Table 2.1—Continued**

Neighborhood	Arrests		Reported Crimes		Calls for Service	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Kennedy Heights	200	0	271	1	2,736	1
Mount Lookout	169	0	223	1	1,473	0
Carthage	165	0	336	1	3,113	1
East Walnut Hills	162	0	407	1	2,550	1
Sayler Park	160	0	297	1	1,687	1
Hartwell	157	0	407	1	2,954	1
Sedamsville	145	0	197	0	1,355	0
Columbia/ Tusculum	131	0	184	0	1,660	1
Riverside	90	0	231	1	1,269	0
Linwood	49	0	84	0	810	0
O'Bryonville	31	0	58	0	382	0
California	13	0	52	0	495	0

SOURCE: Calculated from CPD data sources.

NOTE: The numbers in the percentage columns indicate that neighborhood's share of the city total.

<sup>a</sup> Spring Grove Village is referred to as Winton Place in previous reports.

Following two years of intensive policing and high arrest rates in Over-the-Rhine, the number of arrests in Over-the-Rhine has decreased by 35 percent since 2006, lower than 2004 levels.

Table 2.2 shows the number of motor-vehicle stops and the citation, search, and arrest rates of those stops by neighborhood. The number of stops depends on many factors, including the number of police, the volume of traffic, and the rate of offending in the neighborhood. The first six neighborhoods on the list, all adjacent to one another, have high rates of arrest following traffic stops. Over-the-Rhine continues to have a large number of arrests (6,447, as shown in Table 2.1), a large number of traffic stops (3,220), a large number of arrests following traffic stops (644), and a high arrest rate following traffic stops (20 percent). Only I-75 exceeds the Over-the-Rhine neighborhood in the number of traffic stops. Citation and search rates varied widely across the neighborhoods—41 percent to 91 percent for citation rates and 2 percent to 32 percent for search rates.

## Use of Force

Many of the points in the collaborative agreement and the DOJ MOA pertained to use of force. These included restructuring CPD's use-of-force policies, training, documentation, and investigations. RAND obtained data on use-of-force incidents occurring in 2007. Our analysis assumes that these records are a complete inventory of use-of-force incidents. TASER® electronic control device (ECD) incidents are electronically recorded on the device so that a complete accounting of ECD discharges is easy to verify. Some incidents may not be reported, but several policies and practices (e.g., mobile video recorders [MVRs] in all cars, a rigorous civilian complaint process) reduce the risk of incidents going unreported.

For each incident, data included the incident date, the incident location (address or intersection), race and sex of the individual involved, identifiers for the officers involved in the incident, the officers' races, the reason or charge that led to force, and the type of force used. The data we received derive from CPD's Employee Tracking

**Table 2.2**  
**Motor-Vehicle Stops and Citation, Search, and Arrest Rates, by**  
**Neighborhood (sorted by arrest rate)**

Neighborhood	Number of Stops	Citations (%)	Searches (%)	Arrests (%)
English Woods	226	58	30	35
Fay Apartments	592	52	27	32
South Cumminsville	424	55	32	28
North Fairmount	367	55	25	28
East Westwood	703	51	21	26
Millvale	825	58	27	26
Winton Hills	328	66	24	24
South Fairmount	2,603	55	19	24
East Price Hill	2,170	52	23	22
Mount Airy	954	64	19	21
Over-the-Rhine	3,220	53	30	20
Camp Washington	943	59	19	19
Northside	1,872	64	19	19
Madisonville	862	58	25	19
Paddock Hills	257	61	16	18
West Price Hill	1,683	55	18	18
Mount Auburn	489	54	25	18
Evanston	1,253	53	19	18
Avondale	2,102	58	28	18
Bondhill	804	68	15	18
Westwood	2,732	56	14	17
Kennedy Heights	123	41	24	17
Carthage	329	71	9	17

**Table 2.2—Continued**

Neighborhood	Number of Stops	Citations (%)	Searches (%)	Arrests (%)
Roselawn	536	66	11	17
Spring Grove Village	646	66	13	17
College Hill	1,136	62	16	17
West End	1,661	53	21	16
Pendleton	245	44	29	16
North Avondale	796	62	20	15
Corryville	643	64	18	15
Walnut Hills	1,637	65	22	15
Clifton/ University Heights	1,111	55	13	14
Fairview	815	60	14	13
Pleasant Ridge	358	73	13	12
East Walnut Hills	293	47	10	12
Oakley	425	60	22	12
Lower Price Hill	1,216	67	12	12
California	19	58	5	11
Hyde Park	367	50	11	10
Hartwell	280	70	4	10
Clifton	1,314	72	8	10
Queensgate	599	67	10	9
Sayler Park	216	74	8	9
O'Bryonville	63	62	3	8
CBD/Riverfront	1,673	67	9	8
East End	732	80	6	7
Sedamsville	481	79	6	7

**Table 2.2—Continued**

Neighborhood	Number of Stops	Citations (%)	Searches (%)	Arrests (%)
Mount Washington	181	61	8	7
Mount Lookout	147	63	4	6
Columbia/ Tusculum	423	70	7	5
Riverside	605	79	3	3
Mount Adams	690	83	2	2
Linwood	215	78	4	2
Expressways				
I-71	2,985	88	3	2
I-74	1,173	83	4	3
I-75	4,628	86	5	5
I-275	227	91	2	2
I-471	29	79	17	7
Red Bank Expressway	22	64	9	14
Sixth Street Expressway	267	80	3	4
SR-126	5	80	20	20
SR-562	110	89	11	14
Total	54,832	35,528	8,551	7,927

SOURCE: 2007 CPD contact cards.

Solution (ETS) and records the severest type of force according to a hierarchy. We excluded accidental firearm discharges (3), shootings of dogs (2), using ECDs against dogs (5), and self-inflicted injuries to suspects (127) (e.g., swallowing drugs, car crashes). We also received data on all canine deployments but report as uses of force only those incidents resulting in a bite (slightly less than 3 percent of all canine deployments). We recategorized some stops based on readings of the



incident descriptions. Uses of chemical irritants recorded in injury-to-prisoner incidents have been recoded as chemical-irritant incidents (3). Descriptions of incidents labeled in the ETS as “use-of-force investigations” were recoded to the type of force described in the incident (six firearm-discharge incidents, 12 hard-hand incidents—i.e., takedowns, palm strikes—one chemical irritant, and five ECD incidents).

New in this year’s analysis, we broke ECD usages into two categories, based on whether the device was used in dart mode or drive-stun mode. In dart mode, the electrical contacts should be spread far enough apart so that the charge sufficiently overrides the subject’s motor abilities so as to incapacitate the subject. Drive-stun mode, on the other hand, does not distribute the charge over a wide enough part of the subject’s body to have an incapacitation effect, so the primary product is pain.

CPD policy promotes drive-stun mode in certain circumstances: “Chemical irritant or the X26 TASER (in the drive stun mode) is the primary response to prevent persons from swallowing evidence or contraband” (CPD Procedure 12.545, p. 4). However, CPD policy generally indicates drive-stun to be of secondary preference: “If the X26 Taser deployments do not make contact or are ineffective, it may be used in the drive stun mode” (CPD Procedure 12.545(A4), p. 9). Proposed model policies discourage the use of drive-stun mode. The Liability Assessment and Awareness International (LAAW International) model policy notes:

The use of an ECD [electronic control device] in “drive-stun” mode will not reliably or foreseeably incapacitate the subject. Officers will not use ECDs in drive-stun mode if they reasonably believe that discomfort will not cause the subject to be compliant with the officers, e.g. ECD use in drive-stun mode on a drug induced highly pain-resistant subject. (LAAW International, 2006, p. 2)

Given that drive-stun mode has no incapacitation effect and is generally discouraged (though, in certain cases, may be a reasonable force option), we wanted to assess whether there were racial differences in its use and whether the rate of drive-stun use appeared excessive.

In 2007, there were 613 use-of-force incidents in Cincinnati. Table 2.3 summarizes the number of use-of-force incidents, by type and race, that occurred in 2007. ECD discharges are the most commonly used type of force and account for 64 percent of the incidents. Drive-stun mode accounts for 10 percent of the ECD usages. When targeted by an ECD, black and white subjects were equally likely to be targeted in drive-stun mode. More generally, in use-of-force incidents, the type of force used was unrelated to the race of the suspect (p-value = 0.36). Black suspects are 76 percent of the subjects of use-of-force incidents, nearly the same percentage of 2007 arrestees who are black (73 percent).

There were more firearm discharges in 2007 than there have been in recent years. All six involved black subjects. The CCA has conducted a more complete evaluation of those incidents (CCA, 2008). In all of the cases, the subject had a gun (a BB gun in one case). All officers were

**Table 2.3**  
**Use-of-Force Incidents in 2007, by Race of Suspect Involved**

Type of Force	Race of Suspect Involved						Total
	Black		White		Other		
	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Chemical irritant	14	3	5	3	0	0	19
Firearm	6	1	0	0	0	0	6
Hard hands	128	28	50	35	2	29	180
Canine bites	10	2	4	3	0	0	14
ECD: dart mode	275	59	75	52	5	71	355
ECD: drive-stun mode	30	6	9	6	0	0	39
Total	463	100	143	100	7	100	613

exonerated; the CCA found that their firearm discharges were consistent the law and with department policy.

Table 2.4 shows the number of use-of-force incidents, broken down by type and neighborhood. Over-the-Rhine has the largest number of use-of-force incidents with 92, accounting for 15 percent of Cincinnati's total. However, Over-the-Rhine also had a large number of arrests, and its rate of use of force per arrest matches the citywide average.

Table 2.4 also shows the rate of uses of force per 1,000 arrests. Citywide, there were, on average, 14 use-of-force incidents per 1,000 arrests. Since 2005, CPD has maintained a rate of 14 use-of-force incidents per arrest, indicating that no changes within the police department or in the suspects they encounter have affected changes in police use of force. The decline in the total number of use-of-force incidents appears to be a result of the decline in arrests rather than a reduction in use of force.

The table orders the neighborhoods by the rate of use of force per 1,000 arrests; however, statistically, the ordering is very sensitive to random changes, so, year to year, these rankings have varied greatly. Several neighborhoods have rates that greatly exceed the citywide rate; however, most of these neighborhoods had few arrests, so the rates are highly sensitive to small changes in the number of use-of-force incidents and arrests. Avondale had a large number of both arrests (2,407) and use-of-force incidents (36).

Table 2.5 compares the distributions of the officers' and subjects' races. For example, in 61 percent of the use-of-force incidents involving black subjects, the officer was white. For use-of-force incidents involving white subjects, the prevalence of white officers is 62 percent. Since the rate at which white officers are involved in use-of-force incidents essentially does not vary by the subject's race, this suggests that there is no evidence that white officers use force more frequently against black suspects than against white ones. That is, the races of the officers involved in incidents do not appear to differ for black and white subjects ( $p\text{-value} = 0.75$ ).

**Table 2.4**  
**Use-of-Force Incidents, by Neighborhood and Type**

Neighborhood	Chemical Irritant (n)	Firearm (n)	Hard Hands (n)	Canine Bites (n)	ECD: Dart Mode (n)	ECD: Drive-Stun Mode (n)	Total Number of Incidents	Neighborhood Share of Incidents (%)	Number of Arrests	Use of Force per 1,000 Arrests	95% Confidence Interval on the Rate of Use of Force per 1,000 arrests
Mount Adams	0	0	6	0	10	2	18	3	217	83	(52, 133)
Riverside	0	0	1	1	1	1	4	1	90	44	(16, 121)
East Walnut Hills	1	0	2	0	4	0	7	1	162	43	(20, 92)
College Hill	0	0	5	1	10	0	16	3	434	37	(22, 61)
English Woods	0	0	3	0	4	0	7	1	209	33	(11, 106)
Mount Lookout	0	0	2	0	3	0	5	1	169	30	(12, 72)
Millvale	0	0	5	0	8	1	14	2	560	25	(15, 43)
Queensgate	0	0	3	1	0	2	6	1	254	24	(10, 53)
East Westwood	0	0	4	0	4	0	8	1	339	24	(12, 48)

Table 2.4—Continued

Neighborhood	Chemical Irritant (n)	Firearm (n)	Hard Hands (n)	Canine Bites (n)	ECD: Dart Mode (n)	ECD: Drive-Stun Mode (n)	Total Number of Incidents	Neighborhood Share of Incidents (%)	Number of Arrests	Use of Force per 1,000 Arrests	95% Confidence Interval on the Rate of Use of Force per 1,000 arrests
Mount Airy	0	0	2	0	9	1	12	2	528	23	(13, 40)
Pendleton	1	1	1	0	3	0	6	1	269	22	(10, 50)
Pleasant Ridge	0	0	0	0	4	1	5	1	243	21	(8, 50)
Winton Hills	0	0	1	1	4	1	7	1	347	20	(9, 43)
Kennedy Heights	0	0	1	1	2	0	4	1	200	20	(7, 54)
Sayler Park	0	0	1	0	2	0	3	1	160	19	(11, 32)
Clifton/ University Heights	0	0	4	2	3	0	9	1	481	19	(10, 36)
Walnut Hills	1	0	7	3	21	0	32	5	1,727	19	(13, 26)
Hartwell	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	1	157	19	(6, 61)
Fairview	0	0	7	0	6	2	15	3	790	19	(12, 31)

Table 2.4—Continued

Neighborhood	Chemical Irritant (n)	Firearm (n)	Hard Hands (n)	Canine Bites (n)	ECD: Dart Mode (n)	ECD: Drive-Stun Mode (n)	Total Number of Incidents	Neighborhood Share of Incidents (%)	Number of Arrests	Use of Force per 1,000 Arrests	95% Confidence Interval on the Rate of Use of Force per 1,000 arrests
Northside	0	0	7	0	12	0	19	3	983	19	(6, 59)
Roselawn	0	1	2	0	5	1	9	2	538	17	(9, 33)
Madisonville	0	0	6	0	7	2	15	3	956	16	(9, 29)
Corryville	0	0	6	0	5	0	11	2	698	16	(9, 26)
West End	3	2	11	1	13	3	33	5	2,160	15	(11, 22)
Avondale	2	1	7	0	23	3	36	6	2,407	15	(5, 48)
Oakley	1	0	5	0	2	0	8	1	558	14	(8, 24)
Sedamsville	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	145	14	(7, 29)
West Price Hill	3	1	6	1	12	1	24	4	1,703	14	(9, 21)
Westwood	0	0	9	0	20	3	32	5	2,330	14	(3, 57)
Over-the-Rhine	3	0	19	0	61	9	92	15	6,447	14	(9, 20)

Table 2.4—Continued

Neighborhood	Chemical Irritant (n)	Firearm (n)	Hard Hands (n)	Canine Bites (n)	ECD: Dart Mode (n)	ECD: Drive-Stun Mode (n)	Total Number of Incidents	Neighborhood Share of Incidents (%)	Number of Arrests	Use of Force per 1,000 Arrests	95% Confidence Interval on the Rate of Use of Force per 1,000 arrests
Evanston	0	0	4	0	8	1	13	2	928	14	(10, 20)
South Fairmount	0	0	4	0	8	1	13	2	1,022	13	(7, 22)
Carthage	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	165	12	(3, 50)
East Price Hill	1	0	9	1	19	1	31	5	2,833	11	(8, 16)
Mount Auburn	0	0	1	0	6	0	7	1	621	11	(5, 24)
North Fairmount	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	1	313	10	(2, 40)
South Cumminsville	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	1	309	10	(5, 23)
Fay Apartments	0	0	2	1	2	0	5	1	517	10	(4, 24)
North Avondale	1	0	1	0	4	0	6	1	582	10	(3, 30)

Table 2.4—Continued

Neighborhood	Chemical Irritant (n)	Firearm (n)	Hard Hands (n)	Canine Bites (n)	ECD: Dart Mode (n)	ECD: Drive-Stun Mode (n)	Total Number of Incidents	Neighborhood Share of Incidents (%)	Number of Arrests	Use of Force per 1,000 Arrests	95% Confidence Interval on the Rate of Use of Force per 1,000 arrests
East End	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	204	10	(3, 31)
Bondhill	0	0	0	0	5	1	6	1	643	9	(4, 21)
Camp Washington	0	0	3	0	1	0	4	1	427	9	(3, 25)
CBD/Riverfront	0	0	15	0	21	2	38	6	5,057	8	(5, 10)
Hyde Park	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	265	8	(1, 56)
Columbia/Tusculum	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	131	8	(3, 21)
Lower Price Hill	0	0	1	0	2	0	3	1	552	5	(2, 17)
Paddock Hills	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	372	5	(1, 22)
Spring Grove Village	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	238	4	(1, 31)



Table 2.4—Continued

Neighborhood	Chemical Irritant (n)	Firearm (n)	Hard Hands (n)	Canine Bites (n)	ECD: Dart Mode (n)	ECD: Drive-Stun Mode (n)	Total Number of Incidents	Neighborhood Share of Incidents (%)	Number of Arrests	Use of Force per 1,000 Arrests	95% Confidence Interval on the Rate of Use of Force per 1,000 arrests
Mount Washington	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	302	3	(0, 24)
Clifton	0	0	3	0	2	0	5	1	2,290	2	(1, 5)
Outside Cincinnati	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	—		
I-75	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	—		
Total	19	6	180	14	355	39	613	100	44,125	14	(13, 15)

**Table 2.5**  
**Distribution of Officers’ Races, by Subjects’ Races**

Subject’s Race	Officer’s Race (%)				Total
	Black	White	Black and White	Other	
Black (n = 463)	27	61	9	2	100
White (n = 143)	22	62	13	3	100
Other (n = 7)	29	71	0	0	100
Overall (n = 613)	27	61	10	3	100

**Summary**

As we noted in our previous reports, patterns of calls for service, reported crime, arrests, and police use of force are geographically clustered in Cincinnati. Neighborhoods that are afflicted by a high volume of crime are also more likely to have a high volume of arrests and police use-of-force incidents. Over-the-Rhine, Avondale, West End, Downtown, East Price Hill, and Walnut Hills appear to be neighborhoods that crime and police interventions (e.g., stops, arrests, and use of force) disproportionately affect. As a result, these neighborhoods’ residents are likely to be exposed to negative interactions with police, either personally or by witnessing an arrest or use-of-force incident in their neighborhood.

## Analysis of Vehicle Stops

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### Overview

This chapter examines data on traffic stops from 2007 to assess whether the data indicate racial profiling on the part of CPD officers. Our approach involves three phases: (1) an assessment of whether there is a department-wide pattern of bias against black drivers in the decision to stop a vehicle; (2) an assessment of the fraction of CPD officers who disproportionately stop black drivers compared to other officers patrolling the same neighborhoods at the same time; and (3) an assessment of racial biases in post-stop outcomes, including citation rates, stop duration, and search rates.

Note that, in this chapter, each of the analyses removes the effect of other plausible explanations for differences. This includes adjustments for when, where, and why stops occur. The aim is to isolate race's effect from that of other factors on the decision to stop, cite, and search vehicles. Even though these analyses find few differences between black and similarly situated nonblack drivers, this should not minimize the fact that black drivers in Cincinnati are exposed to more policing and are more frequently stopped in situations that are more likely to result in longer stops, searches, and generally negative interactions. Nonblack drivers in those same areas may be treated identically, but, across the city, black and nonblack drivers collectively will have different experiences. The analysis of videotaped interactions in Chapter Four more directly studies those differential experiences.

The key findings are as follows:

- The quality of the traffic-stop data has greatly improved over the course of the study period. Critical stop features, such as driver's race and stop location, were rarely missing, less than 0.7 percent in 2007 compared to 7 percent in 2004. The exception to the improvement in data quality is that dispatch logs reported 12,380 stops occurring in District 1, yet District 1 submitted 10,896 contact cards. Such differences are not observed in other districts.
- An analysis of stops occurring near the changes to and from daylight saving time (DST) found that, in 2007, black drivers were more likely to be stopped during daylight, when drivers' races are more visible, though there is considerable statistical uncertainty surrounding the estimate. Aggregating five years of data, from 2003 to 2007, we find no evidence of racial profiling in officers' decisions to stop drivers.
- Three officers appear to be stopping significantly more black drivers than officers patrolling at the same times and places and in the same contexts. One officer appears to be stopping substantially fewer black drivers than are found in similarly situated stops made by other officers. CPD now has the analytical capacity to replicate these analyses and complete more-extensive reporting on these cases.
- Black and similarly situated nonblack drivers had an equal chance of having a stop last less than 10 minutes (56 percent). Furthermore, there was no racial difference in the percentage of stops lasting more than 20 minutes.
- Black drivers were less likely to receive a citation than similarly situated nonblack drivers (57 percent versus 61 percent).
- Officers were equally likely to conduct a high-discretion search, such as a consent search, of black and similarly situated nonblack drivers (5 percent of stops).
- When searched, black and nonblack drivers were equally likely to be found in possession of contraband (20 percent).

## Introduction

This chapter investigates whether racial biases influence police activities in the decision to stop, cite, and search vehicles in Cincinnati. We develop this assessment in three stages. The first stage assesses whether a racial pattern exists at the department level in initiating vehicle stops. The second stage assesses whether individual officers appear to have racial biases in their decisions to stop. The third stage assesses whether there are racial disparities in the outcomes of stops (citation, duration, searches).

First, to assess bias in the decision to stop, we took advantage of a natural experiment, comparing stops made during darkness to stops made during daylight. If there is a racial bias, that bias will be most prevalent during daylight hours, when drivers' races are most visible. In the absence of racial bias, we expect the percentage of black drivers among drivers stopped during daylight to equal the percentage of black drivers among those stopped in darkness. Since the racial composition of the driving population may change between daylight and darkness, we compare stops immediately before and immediately after changes to and from DST. On one Monday, it is light at 6:30 p.m., and the following Monday, it is dark at 6:30 p.m. Such comparisons help account for the changes in the racial distribution of the driving population throughout the day. As a result, it does not require explicit information on the characteristics of drivers at risk of being stopped.

Second, we implemented an internal benchmark, comparing each officer to other officers who patrol the same neighborhoods at the same times and with the same assignment. This method selects an officer, identifies stops that other officers made in the same time and same neighborhood, and compares the racial distributions of the stopped drivers. Since the officers are patrolling the same areas at the same times, the racial distributions should be the same (assuming that the officers are on the same assignment). We report estimates of the percentage of officers who appear to stop drivers of one race disproportionately.

Third, we analyzed stop outcomes, citation rates, stop durations, search rates, and search outcomes to assess racial bias in actions taken post-stop. To isolate the effect of racial bias in the stop outcomes, we

statistically removed the effects of when, where, and why the stops took place.

## **Data**

### **Contact Cards**

CPD's investigatory-stop policy requires officers to complete Form 534, a citizen-contact card, for all motor-vehicle stops. In addition, for any passenger detained separately, the officer must complete a separate Form 534. The contact cards include information on the vehicle (license plate, car make, and year), the driver (race, age, driver's license), passengers, and the stop (stop location, stop reason, whether a search occurred, stop outcome, stop duration). CPD officers also completed contact cards for some pedestrian stops, collecting information on the individual detained and on stop attributes. Our analyses rely primarily on the data from a database that CPD created from these contact cards for the 2007 calendar year.

### **Stop Location**

CPD records the policing block in which the stop occurred and implements rigorous checks on address validity. Policing-block numbers correspond to one of 504 small geographic areas of the city. For any stop that occurred on a highway (interstates 275, 471, 71, 74, and 75, SR-126 [Ronald Reagan Cross County Highway], SR-562 [Norwood Lateral], the Red Bank Expressway, and the Sixth Street Expressway) we coded as unique locations, replacing their policing-block labels with highway identifiers. All but two stops had valid policing blocks.

### **Completion Rates and Missing Entries**

We received data on 58,035 stops in 2007 (54,832 stops for motor-vehicle violations). For closer inspection of the completion rates, we obtained computer-aided dispatch (CAD) logs from CPD. These CAD logs indicate the date and time of stop initiation, the stop's completion time, the stop location (address, policing block, and district), disposition, and an incident number. In 2007, CPD recorded 63,377 traffic


stops in CAD. In 2007, Hamilton County Sheriff's deputies were also actively policing in District 1, and the CAD logs record their stops, but the deputies do not complete traffic-stop contact cards. The CAD system in use for most of 2007 does not provide an easy method of identifying whether the stop was made by a CPD officer or a sheriff's deputy. Based on a review of CAD records for June and December 2007, we estimate that sheriff's deputies conducted 5,574 stops in 2007, all of which occurred in District 1. Therefore, we estimate that CPD officers conducted 57,803 stops.

For every traffic stop, CPD officers radio dispatch indicating that they are involved in a traffic stop and unavailable to be redeployed elsewhere. All traffic stops that CPD officers conducted appear in CAD and should have an associated contact card (Form 534) giving additional stop details. We utilized the CAD-log data to check whether incident numbers in the CAD logs had matching contact cards.

In 2007, there were 5 percent more traffic stops recorded in CAD than contact cards. This translates into 2,971 traffic stops that apparently occurred but were not documented with a contact card.

Figure 3.1 summarizes the comparisons between CAD records and contact cards. The results are consistent with prior years, particularly that reporting rates appear to be lowest in District 1. In District 1, CAD records document 12,380 traffic stops, but contact cards were completed for 10,896, suggesting that 12 percent of traffic stops in that district might not be documented. Several stops recorded in CAD are marked as occurring outside the city or on a highway or have an unknown or invalid address. Even if all of these stops were attributable to District 1 officers, the percentage of stops without contact cards would still be 10 percent. In some districts, there are more contact cards than stops recorded in CAD. This is likely due to stops that did not occur within a CPD district or differences in how stops near district boundaries are documented. About 1,700 stops recorded in CAD as a traffic stop might not warrant a contact card, as some stops are the result of calls for assistance. The number of these stops, 500 of which occurred in District 1, is still not large enough to explain the observed difference between the number of contact cards and the number of stops recorded in CAD. Some officers, particularly those on

**Figure 3.1**  
**Number of Stops Documented in CAD Records Compared with the Number of Stops Documented in Contact Cards, by District**



NOTE: The original CAD records in District 1 (star) included stops that sheriff deputies made. The 12,380 figure shown here is an estimate of the number of stops that CPD officers made.

RAND MG853-3.1

foot patrols in District 1, will call for dispatch to run a check on license plates of parked cars that the officers intend to cite. Those checks can be marked in CAD as traffic stops and might provide an explanation for the observed difference.

**Quality of Recorded Data and Missing Attributes of Documented Stops**

Items from the contact cards were missing at times. In 2007, 0.7 percent of stops were missing at least one of the following: stop location, date, or time or driver age, race, or sex. This is essentially unchanged from 2006. Table 3.1 gives some more specific information on the types of fields that are important for our analyses. Table 3.1 also includes a comparison with prior years.



**Table 3.1**  
**Missing Basic Stop Information from Motor-Vehicle Violations**

Stop Feature	Missing (2007)		Missing Information (%)		
	n	%	2006	2005	2004
Date	0	0.0	0.0		
Time	76	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.6
Duration	267	0.4	23.8	20.0	7.5
Location	1	0.0	0.1	0.7	1.7
Officer	1	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.6
Driver race	247	0.3	0.0	0.7	6.0
Driver sex	18	0.0	0.0	0.9	6.1
Driver age	39	0.1	0.0	1.7	6.9

NOTE: n = 54,832 stops for motor-vehicle violations.

## Using a Natural Experiment to Assess Racial Disparities in the Decision to Stop

The difficulty in assessing a racial bias in traffic stops is in developing a reasonable expected rate, often known as the *benchmarking problem*. Census data from 2007 report that 44 percent of Cincinnati's residents are black (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). In 2007, 52 percent<sup>1</sup> of the stops involved black drivers, and, of those stops involving a Cincinnati resident, 62 percent involved a black driver. These differences say little, if anything, about unequal treatment. For example, in the same data set, we found that 67 percent of the drivers stopped were male. Even though this figure differs greatly from the residential rate of 47 percent, we believe that much of this difference is due to men driving in the city more often and being more likely to break traffic laws when they drive rather than being due to officers targeting men—although this too is

<sup>1</sup> This is nearly the same as the rates in 2003, 2004, and 2005 (48, 49, and 47 percent, respectively).

possible. We must reason in the same fashion when dealing with race rather than sex. We must ask whether something besides racial profiling can explain the difference between the observed rate at which black drivers are stopped and the stop rate expected if there were no bias.

We must account for three factors when comparing the racial distribution of stops. We do not know whether any of the following factors was true in Cincinnati, but the analysis must be able to separate them to assess racial biases:

- *Driving behavior might vary by race.* That is, black drivers may be stopped more often because they may be more likely to commit some kind of traffic infraction. This may include expired license plates, speeding, or mechanical violations. Some studies have shown differences by race in speeding (Lange, Blackman, and Johnson, 2002) and seatbelt use (Hallmark, Mueller, and Veneziano, 2004), but we do not know whether this is the case in Cincinnati.
- *Exposure to law enforcement might vary by race.* Black drivers may be stopped more often because they are more likely to be exposed to law enforcement. They may drive more often or, more likely, in regions with greater police presence, so that any infraction they make would be more likely to be noticed.
- *Police might be practicing racially biased policing.* Black drivers may be stopped more often because officers are actively seeking black drivers to stop. When officers observe vehicles involved in some traffic infraction, they might be more likely to stop the vehicle if the driver is black.

Any method that aims to assess a racial bias in the decision to stop a vehicle must be able to account for or rule out differences resulting from the first two items. Comparisons to the residential census are inadequate, since they do not account for either of the first two reasons. Also, a large fraction of motorists do not even reside in the neighborhood in which police stopped them. In 2007, 23 percent of the drivers stopped in Cincinnati were not Cincinnati residents. Several proposed methods aim to assess the racial distribution of drivers on

the streets either by posting observers on street corners or by using surrogate measures, such as racial distribution of not-at-fault car crashes. While these methods might adjust for differential police exposure, they do not adjust for different rates of offending. Instead, such methods require the assumption that drivers of each racial group have equal rates of offenses, which may or may not be true. Studies have shown that almost all drivers have some vehicle-code violation while driving (Lamberth, 2003); however, police do not stop vehicles for all violations and are expected to use discretion when selecting certain offenses and certain vehicles for a traffic stop. We aim to assess whether this discretion differentially affects black drivers.

## Methods


To assess racial bias in the decision to stop, we use the veil-of-darkness method described in Grogger and Ridgeway (2006). Fridell (2004, p. 123) also discusses this method, describing it as one for “benchmarking with data from ‘blind’ enforcement mechanisms.”

In its basic form, our analysis compares the racial distribution of stops made during daylight to the racial distribution of stops made at night. If there were a practice of targeting black drivers, the effects of this practice would be most pronounced during daylight, when driver race is most visible. While the race of some nighttime drivers might be visible, the rate of police knowing driver race in advance of the stop must be smaller at night than during daylight. An overly simplistic analysis compares the percentage of black drivers among those stopped during daylight with the percentage of black drivers among those stopped at night. However, things might be different during daylight from how they are at night. For example, even if there were no racially biased practices, we still may observe differences in the prevalence of black drivers among those stopped, daytime versus nighttime, if the mix of black and white drivers who are on the road changes over the course of the day. Differences in work schedules can cause changes in the mix of black and white drivers (Hamermesh, 1996). However, every spring and fall, Cincinnati switches between Eastern DST and Eastern standard time. Around the time these changes occur, on one Monday, it is daylight between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., while the fol-

lowing Monday, it is dark between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. During both of these periods, the authors hypothesized that the mix of black and white drivers on the road would not drastically change, the kinds of drivers who commit offenses for which police make stops would not change, and the patterns of police allocation would not change. The major difference between these two periods is the officers' ability to identify race in advance of the stop. In practice, for such an analysis, we use several weeks of data on either side of the transitions to and from DST. Within short time slices, we compared the prevalence of black drivers among all stopped drivers, daylight versus darkness.

In Figure 3.2, we consider stops occurring between 5:46 p.m. and about 8:07 p.m. During this period, stops may occur in either daylight or darkness depending on the season. Stops before this time window always occur in daylight; after this time window, they are always in darkness. This time window is the *intertwilight period*, and the focus of the analysis is on these stops. The intertwilight period is shifted to

**Figure 3.2**  
**Stops of Black and Nonblack Drivers, by Darkness and Clock Time (fall and spring 2007)**



NOTE: Numbers within the bands indicate the percentage of drivers stopped in that time period who were black.

later in the day in spring, due to differences between spring and fall in the scheduling of DST changes.

Figure 3.2 shows two time windows. Within these intervals, we computed the percentage of stopped drivers who were black. At 8:00 p.m., for example, 46 percent of the drivers stopped in darkness were black, and 44 percent of the drivers stopped in daylight were black. These statistics imply that, for these stops, officers essentially stop the same fraction of black drivers regardless of whether a driver's race is visible. Note that these stops occurred at 8:00 p.m., so the only likely difference between the daylight and darkness groups of drivers is visibility of race. There are too few stops at 8:00 p.m. to be conclusive. At other time points marked in Figure 3.2, the evidence is counter to the hypothesis of racial profiling, as stops at dark are more likely to involve black drivers than stops during daylight.

Statistically, we average over all time points using logistic regression to estimate the race effect.<sup>2</sup> Averaging over all time points combines all of the observations while still adjusting for clock time. In addition, we adjust for day of the week, so that we contrast stops made in daylight and darkness on the same day of the week.

Recall that methods must be able to tease out effects of racially biased practices from racial differences in exposure to police and racial differences in driving offenses. Drivers at 8:00 p.m. are exposed to the same distribution of police on either side of the DST switch. While incidents will, from time to time, draw police to particular locations, according to CPD, the allocation of police effort does not suddenly change following the time change. As a result, this method is not as prone to errors due to differential police exposure. The drivers who are likely to offend during daylight are also likely to be the ones who offend at nighttime. At night, the overall rate of offending might decrease (e.g., speeding in poorly lit areas might decrease). However, we assume that there is not a differential change in relative offending rates by race as daylight moves into nighttime. We believe that headlight violations

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<sup>2</sup> The logistic-regression model outcome is an indicator of whether the driver was black, and the predictors include an indicator for darkness and clock time, separated into 12 discrete 15-minute intervals, interacted with season.

are a special case, in that they are noticed only at nighttime. Therefore, we removed all equipment violations from the analysis so that the method is not prone to such confounding. As a result, the method does not label as racial bias those disparities that are due to differential exposure or due to differential offending rates. Table 3.2 shows the data used for the veil-of-darkness analysis. Clearly, this analysis excludes a large percentage of the recorded stops. However, it focuses on those stops that have the greatest potential to isolate the effect of racial bias. Other analyses in this report do make use of all of the available data.

We included evening stops that occurred within 30 days of either the spring or fall DST change. We isolated this group of stops believing that the racial mix of drivers on the road is more homogeneous during this limited period than during the rest of the year. There were relatively few reported stops in the morning hours, so we focused exclusively on evening stops. The estimates adjust for clock time to control for the possibility that the racial mix of drivers exposed to the police may change at different clock times.

**Results**

Overall, we did not find evidence of a racial bias in the decision to stop. Table 3.3 shows the results. The odds ratio indicates how many times more likely daylight stops are to involve a black driver than are

**Table 3.2**  
**Stops Used in the Veil-of-Darkness Analysis**

Characteristic	Stops
Stops in data set	58,035
Motor-vehicle stop	54,832
Moving violations only	42,223
Race not missing	42,039
Evening stops (intertwilight period)	6,295
Evening spring stops ( $\pm 30$ days of DST)	434
Evening fall stops ( $\pm 30$ days of DST)	299

**Table 3.3**  
**Comparison of Black and Nonblack Drivers Between Daylight and Dark,**  
**Seasonally Focused**

Year	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	p-Value	n
2003	1.02	(0.70, 1.47)	0.93	543
2004	1.19	(0.80, 1.77)	0.37	465
2005	1.10	(0.81, 1.51)	0.53	763
2006	0.71	(0.51, 1.00)	0.05	606
2007	1.17	(0.87, 1.60)	0.29	751
Combined	1.00	(0.86, 1.16)	0.99	3,128

NOTE: Includes all stops occurring within 30 days of the spring or fall DST change during the evening intertwilight period.

nighttime stops. In 2007, stops during daylight were more likely than stops after dark to involve a black driver, though there is considerable uncertainty in the estimate, so the observed differences could be due to chance. We estimate that the odds ratio is 1.17 (suggesting that the odds of a daylight stop involving a black driver is 17 percent larger than the odds that a stop after dark would involve a black driver), although the estimated 95-percent confidence interval ranges from 0.87 to 1.60.

Combining across all five years indicates that the accumulated data show no evidence of a racial bias in the decision to stop. The odds ratio computed for the 2006 data is strikingly smaller than that reported in other years. To make sure that the results were insensitive to the 2006 data, we reran the analysis without 2006 stops. Excluding the 2006 data yields a combined odds ratio of 1.07 and still remains not statistically different from 1.0.

The conclusion of no racial bias in the decision to stop is robust to additional adjustments for the neighborhood in which the stops take place.

The analysis summarized in Table 3.3 focuses on those stops in a tight period around the DST changes. That narrow focus aims to mitigate the risk that any observed differences might be due to seasonal

differences of drivers on the road rather than racial bias (e.g., the mix of black and white drivers on the road in July may differ from that in December). Although we believe that the analysis is less prone to such errors, the price of that prudence is that we could use only 3,128 stops across five years. Large racial biases would be easily detected if they were present, but, if racial bias is not so pronounced, the analysis might not be sufficiently powerful to detect it.

We repeated the veil-of-darkness analysis using all stops occurring during the intertwilight period, regardless of when during the year they occurred. The result is a test that has less uncertainty but is more sensitive to possible seasonal changes in the mix of black and white drivers exposed to police. Table 3.4 shows the results, which indicate no evidence of racial profiling. As with the analysis of stops near DST, the 2007 odds ratio is less than 1.0, evidence contrary to the existence of a racial bias against black drivers. The odds ratios in the second column are near 1.0 for all years, indicating that drivers have an equal chance of being stopped regardless of whether their races were visible in advance of the stop. Combining the analysis across all four years reinforces the conclusion of no racial bias in the decision to stop.

**Table 3.4**  
**Comparison of Black and Nonblack Drivers Between Daylight and Dark, Year-Round**

Year	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	p-Value	n
2003	1.04	(0.90, 1.20)	0.55	3,899
2004	0.99	(0.87, 1.14)	0.94	4,346
2005 <sup>a</sup>	1.06	(0.94, 1.20)	0.34	5,193
2006	0.90	(0.79, 1.02)	0.10	4,644
2007	0.94	(0.83, 1.05)	0.28	6,028
Combined	0.99	(0.93, 1.06)	0.85	24,110

NOTE: Includes all stops during the evening intertwilight period.

<sup>a</sup> The 2005 figures reported here differ slightly from those reported in the original analysis of the 2005 data, which double-counted observations. This did not affect the odds-ratio estimate—only the estimates of precision.



## Using Internal Benchmarking to Assess Racial Disparities in the Decision to Stop

The daylight-darkness analysis tests whether racial bias is a department-wide pattern of practice. If problems are not department-wide but rather the result of a few problem officers, the effect of their biases will likely not be large enough for the analysis in the previous section to detect the problem. In this section, we use an internal-benchmarking approach. For each officer, we compare the racial distribution of drivers whom the officer stopped with the racial distribution of drivers whom other officers have stopped in the same neighborhoods and at similar times. See Fridell (2004, Chapter Eight) for an overview of internal benchmarking and its use in other jurisdictions.

### Methods

The fundamental goal of internal benchmarking here is to compare a particular officer's rate of stops of black drivers with the rate of stops of black drivers by other officers patrolling the same area at the same time. Matching in this way assures us that the target officer and the comparison officers are exposed to the same set of offenses and offenders. Table 3.5 presents an internal benchmark constructed for a particular CPD officer based on the officer's stops (the neighborhood codes have been scrambled to de-identify the officer). Most of those stops occurred in neighborhood J (49 percent) and neighborhood K (33 percent), with some stops elsewhere in the city. Seventy-one percent of these stops involved black drivers. Depending on the distribution of the race of drivers committing stoppable offenses whom this officer could have stopped, the 71-percent figure could be too high. If vehicle stops that other officers made in the same areas and times at which this officer's stops occurred involved considerably less than 71 percent black drivers, further investigation of this officer is in order.

We located 571 stops that collectively have the same distribution of stop features as the stops made by the officer in question. They were made in the same places, at the same times, on the same days, during the same months, and for the same reasons. Since the officer made few stops in June and few in neighborhood H, the matched stops also

**Table 3.5**  
**Example of Internal Benchmarking for an Example Officer**

Variable		Stops Made by Officer 534 (%)	Similar Stops Made by Others (%)	Effect Size <sup>a</sup>
n		111	571 <sup>b</sup>	
Time	(12–4 p.m.]	9	9	0.01
	(4–8 p.m.]	57	56	0.01
	(8 p.m.–12 a.m.]	34	35	–0.02
Day	Monday	20	20	0.00
	Tuesday	12	11	0.02
	Wednesday	12	12	–0.00
	Thursday	20	21	–0.03
	Friday	14	14	–0.01
	Saturday	11	11	–0.01
	Sunday	13	12	0.03
Month	January	12	12	0.01
	February	14	15	–0.02
	March	7	7	–0.01
	April	6	6	0.00
	May	8	7	0.05
	June	3	3	–0.03
	July	4	4	–0.02
	August	10	10	0.00
	September	6	6	0.03
	October	4	5	–0.03
	November	14	14	0.01
	December	11	11	–0.01

**Table 3.5—Continued**

Variable		Stops Made by Officer 534 (%)	Similar Stops Made by Others (%)	Effect Size <sup>a</sup>
Neighborhood <sup>c</sup>	H	1	1	-0.01
	I	1	1	-0.01
	J	49	48	0.02
	K	33	34	-0.02
	L	5	5	0.01
	M	11	11	-0.01
Stop reason	Equipment	64	63	0.01
	Moving	26	27	-0.01
	Other	10	10	-0.00
Outcome	Stops involving black drivers	71	46	

<sup>a</sup> The effect size is the difference of the two columns divided by the standard deviation of the first column. Generally, 0.2 is considered a small effect size, a value much larger than any effect size computed for this comparison.

<sup>b</sup> For the comparison stops, n represents the effective sample size.

<sup>c</sup> The neighborhoods have been given random letter codes to mask the officers' identities.

showed very few stops in June and neighborhood H. Importantly, we created the matches without looking at the races of the drivers involved in the stops, mitigating the risk of setting up a comparison group of stops that would either absolve or fault the officer unfairly.

Of the matched stops, 46 percent involved a black driver. The officer in question appears to have stopped a larger fraction of black drivers (71 percent) than did other officers making stops in the same area. Statistically, this difference is larger than could be expected by chance. However, in a large collection of comparisons, some extreme differences can occur by chance.

The z-statistic is the commonly used statistical measure for assessing the magnitude of the difference between the percentage of an officer's stops involving a black driver and the officer's internal benchmark

(Fridell, 2004). The z-statistic scales this difference to account for the number of stops that the officer made and the number of stops used to construct the internal benchmark, so that large differences based on a small number of stops are treated with greater uncertainty than large differences based on a large number of stops. Given the value of an officer's z-statistic, we can estimate the probability that a flagged officer is, in fact, an outlier. We flag all officers with an outlier probability exceeding 50 percent (equivalent in this analysis to a z-statistic cutoff of about 4.0). The choice of 50 percent as the cutoff is subjective and depends on the costs associated with failing to flag a problem officer and those costs associated with investigating each flagged officer. The commonly selected cutoff is 80 percent (Efron, 2004), but we believe that such a choice undervalues the cost of failing to identify a problem officer. In addition, the 50-percent probability cutoff produces a short list of officers for closer evaluation. Appendix F contains technical details about the methodology.

For the analysis, we selected all CPD officers with more than 50 reported stops in 2007; 294 officers exceeded that cutoff.<sup>3</sup> The 50-stop cutoff focuses the analysis on those officers most frequently interacting with drivers in Cincinnati. It also ensures having at least a minimum level of statistical power for detecting differences if they exist. We have refined the methodology from last year's report, which used a 100-stop cutoff, to include more officers in the analysis. These 294 officers amount to 39 percent of the CPD officers who reported a stop in 2007 and account for 89 percent of the 2007 stops.

## Results

Stops were matched on month, day, time, neighborhood (53 neighborhoods plus nine highways and expressways), policing blocks (smaller partitions of a neighborhood) in which at least 10 percent of the officer's stops occurred, and the reason for the stop.

Table 3.6 summarizes the results of the analysis, listing four officers with a greater-than-50-percent probability of having disproportionate stop patterns. The second column in Table 3.6 indicates the

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<sup>3</sup> This is incidentally the same number of officers in the 2006 analysis.

**Table 3.6**  
**Summary of Internal-Benchmark Analysis**

Flagged Officer	Percentage of Stops Involving a Black Driver		Number of Stops		Probability That the Officer Exceeds the Benchmark
	Of Stops Made by the Flagged Officer	Of Stops Comprising the Internal Benchmark	Made by the Officer	Comprising the Internal Benchmark	
1	54	79	147	573	0.81
2	84	70	329	1,621	0.60
3	80	61	199	907	0.60
4	88	73	248	1,059	0.58

percentage of the officers' stops that involved a black driver. The third column shows the percentage of stops involving black drivers for the officers' benchmark. In these four cases, there are large differences between these percentages. For example, flagged officer 2 made 329 stops in 2007. We identified 1,621 stops to comprise the officer's benchmark that collectively had the same distribution of features as flagged officer 2's stops. Of the officer's stops, 84 percent involved a black driver, while 70 percent of the stops in the benchmark involved a black driver.

The last column shows the estimated probability that the officers' stop patterns do, in fact, depart from other similarly situated stops (Appendix F describes the method for calculating this probability). Based on flagged officer 2's stop pattern, for example, there is a 60-percent chance that this officer stops more black drivers than the other similarly situated officers do. Three officers were flagged as having a large probability of stopping a disproportionate percentage of black drivers (flagged officers 2, 3, and 4). One officer was flagged as having a large probability of stopping disproportionately few black drivers (flagged officer 1).

We estimate that four officers differ sufficiently from the internal benchmark to warrant further investigation. At this stage, we do not know whether there is a problem with these officers or why we observe such large differences. These differences cannot be due to differences

in the stops' times, places, or reasons, though some of these features are measured coarsely. These officers may have assignments that are targeted to very particular locations so that matching on neighborhood and policing block alone is insufficient.

### **Discussion**

The internal benchmark compared each officer's stops to stops made by other officers at the same time and place and for the same reason. Officers patrolling the same areas at the same times will be exposed to the same offender population. If the officers all had the same duties, we would expect the racial distribution of their stops to be similar, if not the same. We compared the racial distributions of these stops. We noted three officers who appeared to be stopping a much larger fraction of black drivers when compared with similar stops made by other officers.

All RAND studies go before an institutional review board that reviews research involving human subjects, as required by federal regulations. RAND's Federalwide Assurance for the Protection of Human Subjects (DHHS, through 2011) serves as its assurance of compliance with the regulations of 16 federal departments and agencies. According to this assurance, the committee is responsible for review, regardless of funding source. These federal regulations prevent RAND's research from singling out specific individuals whom its research could adversely affect.

The analysis in this section offers an estimate of the number of CPD patrol officers of concern. In the first quarter of 2007, RAND transferred capabilities to CPD analysts so that they could regularly run these analyses and conduct reviews of these officers. The system connects directly to CPD's contact-card database, constructs internal benchmarks for each officer, and produces a series of online reports navigable with a Web browser. These reports highlight flagged officers and include details on the stops included in the internal benchmark. These reports are now being included in the flagged officers' quarterly reviews.

## Assessing Racial Disparities in Post-Stop Outcomes

This section focuses on post-stop outcomes, including the decision to cite and search and stop duration. We used a method known as *propensity-score weighting* to identify stops involving nonblack drivers that are similarly situated to the stops involving black drivers and make post-stop comparisons between the two groups. Ridgeway (2006) gives a complete technical description of the method. Appendix E contains a brief overview.

### Methods

Officers conduct searches of 11 percent of stops involving black drivers. For stops of white drivers, the search rate is 5 percent. These figures describe the differences in experiences of black and white drivers in Cincinnati. Regardless of whether a racial bias causes these differences, such differences can fuel the perception of racial bias. These differences might have arisen from racial bias, or several other possible explanations could apply. The methods described here aim to measure how much of the observed racial differences in search rates (and several other stop outcomes) can be explained by other factors, to isolate the effect of racial bias.

Traffic stops involving black drivers occur at different times and places from those involving nonblack drivers. For example, nearly 8 percent of stops involving black drivers occur in the Over-the-Rhine neighborhood, while 3 percent of stops of nonblack drivers occur there. At the same time, 29 percent of stops of nonblack drivers were made on the highways, while only 9 percent of stops of black drivers were made on the highways. In addition, the driver's sex and age, the number of passengers, where they live, and whether they have a license all differ by race. In addition, these factors may, independent of race, influence an officer's post-stop decisionmaking process. For example, an officer may feel more (or less) compelled to issue a citation to a driver from Kentucky than to a Cincinnati resident. Since 12 percent of white drivers have Kentucky license plates compared with only 2 percent of black drivers, apparent racial disparities in citation rates may be due to dif-

ferences in place of residence or other factors that are correlated with race.

Whether these possible scenarios do, in fact, occur in the post-stop decision process, to ensure a fair comparison, we must match similarly situated black and nonblack drivers and compare their stop outcomes.

Table 3.7 gives detailed information on stop features by driver race. The “Black Drivers” column shows the distribution of stop features

**Table 3.7**  
**Comparison of the Features of Stops Involving Black Drivers with the Features of Stops Involving Nonblack Drivers, Matched and Unmatched**

Feature		Black Drivers (%) (n = 22,479)	Matched Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 4,996)	Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 24,220)
Neighborhood	CBD and Riverfront	2.0	1.9	4.5
	Queensgate	0.7	0.7	1.6
	West End	4.5	4.2	1.5
	Over-the-Rhine	7.9	7.7	3.3
	Mount Adams	0.5	0.5	2.3
	Pendleton	0.6	0.6	0.2
	East End	0.6	0.6	2.2
	East Walnut Hills	0.5	0.4	0.6
	Evanston	3.3	3.1	1.2
	Hyde Park	0.3	0.3	1.1
	California	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Oakley	0.4	0.4	1.2
	O'Bryonville	0.1	0.1	0.2
	Pleasant Ridge	1.0	1.0	0.3
	Kennedy Heights	0.3	0.3	0.1
	Mount Lookout	0.1	0.1	0.5



**Table 3.7—Continued**

Feature		Black Drivers (%) (n = 22,479)	Matched Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 4,996)	Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 24,220)
Neighborhood (continued)	Columbia and Tusculum	0.3	0.3	1.4
	Linwood	0.1	0.1	0.8
	Madisonville	1.9	1.8	1.1
	Mount Washington	0.1	0.1	0.5
	Sayler Park	0.0	0.0	0.6
	Riverside	0.2	0.2	2.3
	Sedamsville	0.2	0.2	1.7
	North Fairmount	0.9	0.9	0.2
	English Woods	0.5	0.5	0.2
	East Westwood	2.0	2.0	0.3
	Millvale	1.9	1.7	0.8
	Fay Apartments	1.6	1.6	0.2
	South Cumminsville	1.0	0.9	0.3
	East Price Hill	3.6	3.9	3.5
	West Price Hill	2.0	2.2	3.8
	Westwood	5.1	5.4	4.6
	Lower Price Hill	0.9	1.0	3.6
	South Fairmount	5.3	5.6	3.2
	Mount Auburn	1.0	1.0	0.7
	Corryville	1.5	1.4	0.9
	Avondale	6.6	6.2	1.0
	North Avondale	2.4	2.5	0.5
	Paddock Hills	0.8	0.8	0.2

Table 3.7—Continued

Feature		Black Drivers (%) (n = 22,479)	Matched Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 4,996)	Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 24,220)
Neighborhood (continued)	Hartwell	0.4	0.4	0.7
	Carthage	0.5	0.5	0.6
	Roselawn	1.4	1.4	0.6
	Bond Hill	2.5	2.6	0.4
	Walnut Hills	4.0	3.8	2.0
	College Hill	3.3	3.2	0.9
	Clifton and University Heights	1.8	1.9	2.2
	Fairview	1.4	1.5	1.6
	Northside	4.4	4.6	2.2
	Clifton	2.3	2.3	2.8
	Mount Airy	2.3	2.4	1.0
	Winton Hills	0.8	0.7	0.3
	Winton Place	1.5	1.5	0.8
	Camp Washington	1.9	1.9	1.4
	I-275	0.0	0.0	0.9
	I-471	0.0	0.0	0.0
	I-71	2.2	2.3	10.0
	I-74	0.8	0.8	4.0
	I-75	5.4	5.6	13.3
	Red Bank Expressway	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Ronald Reagan Highway	0.0	0.0	0.0

**Table 3.7—Continued**

Feature		Black Drivers (%) (n = 22,479)	Matched Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 4,996)	Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 24,220)
Neighborhood (continued)	Sixth Street Expressway	0.1	0.1	0.9
	SR-562	0.2	0.2	0.2
Residence	Cincinnati	92.2	91.0	59.6
	Ohio (not Cincinnati)	4.0	4.3	20.9
	Kentucky	1.6	2.5	12.4
	Outside Ohio and Kentucky	2.1	2.1	7.1
Invalid driver's license		17.8	12.9	5.6
Time	12–3 a.m.	23.6	20.8	15.6
	3–6 a.m.	4.2	4.4	3.2
	6–9 a.m.	4.5	6.0	9.4
	9 a.m.–12 p.m.	6.2	7.7	14.9
	12–3 p.m.	6.7	6.7	11.5
	3–6 p.m.	17.3	17.4	15.5
	6–9 p.m.	17.5	17.0	13.6
	9 p.m.–12 a.m.	20.1	20.0	16.2
Reason	Equipment violation	13.3	12.4	7.1
	Moving violation	72.9	77.3	87.9
	Offense	1.9	1.2	0.7
	Other	3.5	2.5	1.2
	Stolen auto	0.2	0.1	0.0
	Suspect in vehicle	8.2	6.6	3.0

Table 3.7—Continued

Feature		Black Drivers (%) (n = 22,479)	Matched Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 4,996)	Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 24,220)
Occupants	1	60.9	64.3	72.0
	2	25.5	23.7	19.1
	3	8.8	8.0	5.3
	4	3.4	2.9	2.6
	4+	1.4	1.1	0.9
Registration	Ohio	95.3	93.5	81.9
	Kentucky	2.3	3.4	11.0
	Other	2.4	3.1	7.1
Age (years)	0–17	1.7	1.7	1.8
	18–25	34.8	32.4	31.2
	26–35	28.9	26.3	26.0
	36–45	17.5	19.0	18.9
	46+	17.1	20.6	22.0
Day	Monday	13.4	12.2	12.2
	Tuesday	14.4	16.0	16.1
	Wednesday	15.5	16.4	15.9
	Thursday	15.6	15.8	16.2
	Friday	15.8	16.0	16.3
	Saturday	14.0	13.1	13.3
	Sunday	11.4	10.5	9.9
Month	January	9.6	10.3	9.7
	February	6.9	7.3	6.5
	March	9.4	8.8	9.5
	April	8.3	7.9	8.5

**Table 3.7—Continued**

Feature	Black Drivers (%) (n = 22,479)	Matched Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 4,996)	Nonblack Drivers (%) (n = 24,220)
Month (cont'd.) May	7.7	8.1	8.3
June	8.1	8.3	8.2
July	9.3	8.8	8.7
August	8.1	8.1	8.4
September	7.8	7.7	7.2
October	8.3	8.6	8.4
November	8.2	8.4	8.6
December	8.3	7.8	7.9
Male	64.7	63.3	66.0

NOTE: Stops were also matched by policing blocks within each neighborhood.

involving black drivers. The “Nonblack Drivers” column shows the same distribution for *all* stops involving nonblack drivers. Comparisons between these two columns show large differences. The shaded rows mark a few of the particularly large differences. On the other hand, the “Matched Nonblack Drivers” column is nearly identical to the “Black Drivers” column. To arrive at this near match on the distribution of stop features required effectively paring the set of stops of nonblack drivers down from 24,220 down to 4,996. This process downweighted and, at times, removed stops of nonblack drivers that had features that were atypical of stops involving black drivers. The key point of Table 3.7 is that any differences between black drivers and the matched nonblack drivers that we observe in post-stop outcomes *cannot* be due to any of the factors listed in Table 3.7. To isolate the effect of a racial bias, we must adjust for all factors associated with both race and post-stop outcomes, and we have made a concerted effort to include all such observable features in this analysis.

While we attempted to account for as many stop features as possible that might be associated with both race and stop outcomes, it is plausible that other variables not listed in Table 3.7 might be important. For example, the contact cards give no information on how serious the moving violations were. If one racial group committed more serious or more dangerous moving violations, our matching cannot account for this. Differences in stop outcomes between black and matched non-black drivers may be due to racial bias or any unobserved factor not listed in Table 3.7, such as seriousness of offense.

**Results**

The process of matching stops involving nonblack drivers to stops involving black drivers can determine the factors that most distinguish their stops. Table 3.8 lists the relative importance of each of the factors—essentially, how much each of the factors contributed to

**Table 3.8**  
**Relative Importance of the Stop Features for Eliminating Differences Between the Racial Groups**

Stop Feature	Relative Importance (%)
Policing block	94.3
Driver residence (Cincinnati, other Ohio, or not Ohio)	4.5
Invalid driver's license	0.4
Time of stop	0.4
Reason for stop	0.2
Number of vehicle occupants	0.1
Age of driver	0.1
License-plate state	0.0
Day of the week	0.0
Month stop occurred	0.0
Driver sex	0.0
Total	100.0

eliminating the differences between the two groups. Most of the difference between the features of stops of black and nonblack drivers involves differences in stop locations. Driver residence was also an important factor on which the black and nonblack driver stops greatly differed.

**Stop Duration.** The stop-duration analyses adjusted for all the factors listed in Table 3.8 as well as for whether the officer issued a citation and whether a search occurred. Any differences in stop duration, therefore, cannot be attributed to citations, searches, or any of the factors listed in Table 3.8.

Compared to previous years, more stops are now lasting less than 10 minutes. Table 3.9 shows the stop durations for black and nonblack drivers. Since 2004, we have not found racial differences in the percentage of stops that last less than 10 minutes when we account for the factors in Table 3.8. In 2007, 56 percent of the stops last less than 10 minutes for both black and similarly situated nonblack drivers.

**Table 3.9**  
**Stop Durations for Black and Nonblack Drivers**

Year	Stop Duration (Minutes)	Black Drivers (%)	Nonblack Drivers (Matched) (%)	Nonblack Drivers (Unmatched) (%)
2003 <sup>a</sup>		n = 16,708	n = 4,881	n = 18,548
	(0, 10)	40	43	56
	(10, 20)	42	41	36
	(20, 30)	10	9	5
	(30, 360)	8	7	4
2004 <sup>a</sup>		n = 18,721	n = 5,190	n = 20,390
	(0, 10)	40	44	59
	(10, 20)	43	39	33
	(20, 30)	10	10	5
	(30, 360)	8	7	3

Table 3.9—Continued

Year	Stop Duration (Minutes)	Black Drivers (%)	Nonblack Drivers (Matched) (%)	Nonblack Drivers (Unmatched) (%)
2005 <sup>b,c</sup>		n = 15,571	n = 4,965	n = 20,431
	(0, 10)	45	47	60
	(10, 20)	43	42	34
	(20, 30)	7	7	4
	(30, 360)	4	4	2
2006 <sup>d</sup>		n = 15,557	n = 3,358	n = 18,458
	(0, 10)	47	47	56
	(10, 20)	42	40	35
	(20, 30)	8	8	6
	(30, 360)	4	5	2
2007 <sup>c</sup>		n = 22,406	n = 4,963	n = 24,142
	(0, 10)	56	56	65
	(10, 20)	35	34	29
	(20, 30)	6	7	5
	(30, 360)	3	3	2

<sup>a</sup> In 2003 and 2004, there was a significant difference in the distribution of stop durations between black and nonblack drivers.

<sup>b</sup> This analysis excludes stops with missing stop durations, which comprised about 20 percent of the 2005 stops and 24 percent of the 2006 stops.

<sup>c</sup> In 2005 and 2007, there was no significant difference in the distribution of stop durations between black and similarly situated nonblack drivers.

<sup>d</sup> In 2006, black drivers were significantly less likely to have stops exceeding 30 minutes than were similarly situated nonblack drivers.

Note that 65 percent of the unmatched stops of nonblack drivers lasted less than 10 minutes, but the difference between 65 and 56 percent is due to differences in stop location, the driver’s residency, the validity of driver’s license, and other factors (e.g., highway traffic stops may take less time than other traffic stops). As a result, the places, times, and conditions under which officers stopped black driv-



ers tended to yield longer stops. Nonblack drivers stopped under those same conditions had essentially the same stop durations, indicating that individual officers' biases were not likely to cause longer stops.

**Citation Rates.** Table 3.10 compares citation rates for black drivers with those for a matched set of nonblack drivers. Stops resulting in arrest were excluded from this analysis.

Citation rates have generally been decreasing over the past five years. Since 2005, we have found a 3 to 4 percentage-point gap between the citation rates for black and matched nonblack drivers. Statistically, this is a significant difference. A 3-percent gap may not be negligible. We do not expect all stops to result in citations, and we expect some number of investigatory stops. However, one interpretation of the 3-percent gap is that police stopped an excess of 600 black drivers (3 percent of 20,000 stops). An alternate explanation is that the black drivers who would have received citations were actually found to have criminal involvement and were arrested rather than cited. We

**Table 3.10**  
**Citation Rates of Black Drivers and of a Matched Set of Nonblack Drivers**

Year	Black Drivers	Nonblack Drivers (matched)	Nonblack Drivers (unmatched)	p-Value
2003	n = 12,064	n = 4,438	n = 16,318	0.98
	74.6%	74.6%	82.7%	
2004	n = 12,507	n = 4,386	n = 16,920	0.14
	69.2%	70.4%	79.9%	
2005	n = 19,375	n = 6,141	n = 25,163	< 0.001
	67.7%	70.8%	78.1%	
2006	n = 20,146	n = 5,365	n = 24,383	< 0.001
	62.7%	66.5%	73.3%	
2007	n = 22,479	n = 4,996	n = 24,220	< 0.001
	57.1%	60.5%	70.7%	

NOTE: The shaded cells indicate the most-relevant comparisons.

removed stops resulting in arrest from the analysis to focus the analysis on the simplest stops.

**Search.** The decision to search involves many factors and different levels of officer discretion. If a search occurred, the contact card included the legal basis for the search. We coded the following legal bases as high discretion: consent, reasonable suspicion of weapons, dog alert, odor (alcohol or drugs), and other probable cause. We coded the following legal bases as low discretion: plain view, inventory, and incident to arrest.

Table 3.11 shows a comparison of the adjusted and unadjusted search rates broken down by level of discretion. The shaded cells indicate the most-relevant comparison. For high-discretion searches (the searches most at risk for a racial bias), black and matched nonblack drivers have nearly the same search rates. While the search rate of black motorists is twice the search rate of all nonblack motorists, the search rates are nearly the same when important factors are taken into account (e.g., time and location of stop, whether the motorist has a valid driver's license).

Note that the unmatched analysis shows that there are large differences in the experiences that black and nonblack drivers have; officers search black drivers at a rate that is more than double the rate for nonblack drivers (10.6 percent versus 4.7 percent). These differences in experiences can differentially shape black drivers' views of CPD officers. Our analysis indicates that factors other than racial bias can explain much of these differences; black drivers are stopped in locations, times, and situations for which officers are much more likely to search (e.g., in neighborhoods with more crime, such as Over-the-Rhine). White drivers stopped in those situations are equally likely to be searched, so racial bias cannot be the reason for the observed difference in search rates. Nonetheless, this will be of little solace to the many searched black drivers, even if all of the searches were legitimate and conducted professionally.

Table 3.12 breaks down the searches in more detail. As in 2006, stops involving black drivers are less likely to involve a search based on consent (shaded in Table 3.12). On the other hand, stops of black drivers are more likely than stops of white drivers to involve a search

**Table 3.11**  
**Searches of Black Drivers and of a Matched Set of Nonblack Drivers**

Year	Discretion	Black Drivers	Nonblack Drivers (matched) (%)	Nonblack Drivers (unmatched) (%)	p-Value
2003		n = 16,708	n = 4,992	n = 18,548	
	High	5.9	5.4	2.8	0.00
	Low	8.1	5.5	2.7	0.00
	All	14.0	10.9	5.5	0.00
2004		n = 18,721	n = 5,342	n = 20,390	
	High	6.7	6.2	3.2	0.00
	Low	10.7	7.0	3.9	0.00
	All	17.4	13.2	7.1	0.00
2005		n = 19,375	n = 6,141	n = 25,163	
	High	6.1	5.2	2.8	0.00
	Low	4.4	3.5	1.6	0.00
	All	11.4	9.4	4.7	0.00
2006		n = 20,146	n = 5,365	n = 24,383	
	High	6.1	6.7	3.0	0.06
	Low	4.9	3.9	1.8	0.04
	All	11.0	10.7	4.8	0.82
2007		n = 22,479	n = 4,996	n = 24,220	
	High	5.3	5.5	2.6	0.52
	Low	4.9	5.2	1.9	0.43
	All	10.6	10.9	4.7	0.44

NOTE: The shaded cells indicate the most-relevant comparison, comparing black drivers to matched nonblack drivers on high-discretion searches.

**Table 3.12**  
**Detailed Comparison of Searches of Stopped Black Drivers with Those of a Matched Set of Nonblack Drivers**

Year	Legal Basis <sup>a</sup>	Black Drivers (%)	Nonblack Drivers (matched) (%)	Nonblack Drivers (unmatched) (%)	p-Value
2003		n = 16,708	n = 4,992	n = 18,548	
	Consent	4.3	3.9	2.1	0.35
	Reasonable suspicion of weapon	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.54
	Dog alert	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.76
	Odor (alcohol or drugs)	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.00
	Other probable cause	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.94
	Plain view	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.17
	Inventory	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.11
	Incident to arrest	7.0	4.8	2.4	0.00
2004		n = 18,721	n = 5,342	n = 20,390	
	Consent	4.5	4.5	2.3	0.83
	Reasonable suspicion of weapon	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.25
	Dog alert	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.12
	Odor (alcohol or drugs)	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.00
	Other probable cause	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.91
	Plain view	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.97
	Inventory	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.00

**Table 3.12—Continued**

Year	Legal Basis <sup>a</sup>	Black Drivers (%)	Nonblack Drivers (matched) (%)	Nonblack Drivers (unmatched) (%)	p-Value
2004 (cont'd.)	Incident to arrest	9.4	6.0	3.3	0.00
2005		n = 19,375	n = 6,141	n = 25,163	
	Consent	3.8	3.9	2.0	0.70
	Reasonable suspicion of weapon	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.00
	Dog alert	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.01
	Odor (alcohol or drugs)	0.9	0.3	0.2	0.00
	Other probable cause	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.81
	Plain view	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.52
	Inventory	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.36
	Incident to arrest	2.9	2.3	0.9	0.00
2006		n = 20,146	n = 5,365	n = 24,383	
	Consent	3.9	4.9	2.2	0.05
	Reasonable suspicion of weapon	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.12
	Dog alert	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.00
	Odor (alcohol or drugs)	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.32
	Other probable cause	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.30
	Plain view	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.20
	Inventory	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.82

Table 3.12—Continued

Year	Legal Basis <sup>a</sup>	Black Drivers (%)	Nonblack Drivers (matched) (%)	Nonblack Drivers (unmatched) (%)	p-Value
2006 (continued)	Incident to arrest	3.5	2.8	1.2	0.02
2007		n = 22,479	n = 4,996	n = 24,220	
	Consent	3.1	4.2	2.0	0.001
	Reasonable suspicion of weapon	0.7	0.2	0.2	0.99
	Dog alert	0.1	0.0	0.0	-
	Odor (alcohol or drugs)	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.03
	Other probable cause	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.95
	Plain view	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.44
	Inventory	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.61
	Incident to arrest	4.0	4.5	1.6	0.27

<sup>a</sup> Sorted roughly from high to low discretion.

based on reasonable suspicion of a weapon. These two are not unrelated. Unless the officer believes that there is present reasonable suspicion of a weapon, that officer would not necessarily pursue a consent search.

Again, we stress that comparisons with unmatched nonblack drivers exaggerate the search-rate disparity, conflating potential racial bias with circumstances surrounding the stop. When properly matched, we found that black and nonblack drivers stopped under the same conditions had nearly the same search rates.

In addition, as noted in our previous reports, police search practices put the greatest burden of search on stop conditions that were more common to black drivers. As a result, Cincinnati’s black resi-

dents were more likely to be stopped under conditions that elevated the chance of a search (e.g., driving in a high-crime neighborhood). Some characteristics, such as having a valid driver's license, are clearly in the driver's hands. Officers searched 39 percent of the drivers stopped without a license, regardless of race. However, stopped black drivers were more than three times more likely than were nonblack drivers to have an invalid driver's license (18 percent versus 6 percent), greatly increasing the prevalence of searches among black drivers.

### **Hit Rates**

A search's success depends partially on whether contraband is found (Ayres, 2002). If police searched more drivers, their hit rates (the rate at which they recovered contraband) would likely decrease, because they would be searching drivers who are less suspicious. If the hit rate were lower for one racial group, this would suggest that officers searched that racial group more often than they did other racial groups.

Table 3.13 separates hit rates by level of discretion. We classified high-discretion searches as those conducted with consent, for reasonable suspicion of a weapon, dog alert, alcohol or drug odor, or other probable cause. Low-discretion searches include searches due to contraband in plain view, inventory searches, and searches incident to arrest. The number of reported searches continues to increase; 2007 shows a 5-percent increase in searches over 2006 (which already had a 16-percent increase over 2005). A 13-percent increase in low-discretion searches, such as searches incident to arrest, led to the increase. For high-discretion searches, the hit rates for black drivers are nearly the same as the hit rates for nonblack drivers. The similarity of these rates suggests that racial bias does not play a role in officers' selection of which drivers to search. The hit rates have varied over time but, importantly, do not seem to be related to the number of searches. That is, the doubling of the number of high-discretion searches between 2003 and 2005 did not result in a decrease in the hit rate. The 2007 hit rate was the lowest of any during the study period.

**Table 3.13**  
**Hit Rates, by Year and Race**

Year	Discretion	Black Drivers		Nonblack Drivers		p-Value
		No. of Searches	Hit Rate (%)	No. of Searches	Hit Rate (%)	
2003	High	982	28.0	517	22.4	0.02
	Low	1,360	16.3	495	16.2	0.96
2004	High	1,250	28.8	649	26.7	0.35
	Low	1,984	19.4	798	20.8	0.43
2005	High	1,743	29.0	1,011	26.5	0.18
	Low	2,763	19.6	1,203	15.5	0.00
2006	High	1,858	23.3	1,023	23.6	0.91
	Low	3,654	21.5	1,582	21.0	0.75
2007	High	1,642	19.7	835	20.5	0.70
	Low	4,130	18.3	1,689	20.1	0.13

NOTE: The number of searches may not equal the total in Table 3.13 due to officers not recording the legal basis for some of the searches. High-discretion searches include consent searches, reasonable suspicion of a weapon, dog alert, alcohol or drug odor, and other probable cause. Low-discretion searches include plain view, inventory, and incident to arrest.

Even though we found no racial bias, officers conducted 1,318 high-discretion searches of black drivers in 2007 that recovered no contraband. Such stops, which the motorist likely views as being made for no good reason, disproportionately affect the black community and likely contribute to blacks’ perceptions of unfair policing that were identified in last year’s report. While recovery of contraband from high-discretion searches, such as 29 weapon and 448 drug recoveries, can have a social benefit for the Cincinnati community, there is a societal cost for searches that result in no recovery of contraband.



## **Analysis of Videotaped Police-Motorist Interactions**

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### **Overview**

To better understand interactions between CPD and members of the community, we analyzed 325 randomly sampled video records of traffic stops from 2007. An interracial group of independent, trained coders viewed these recordings and described the interactions using a wide range of measures. These included measures of the objective characteristics of the stop (e.g., duration, infraction type, time of day) as well as measures of the communication between the driver and the police officer.

This analysis differs in important ways from the analysis of CPD stop data described in Chapter Three. Most notably, we do not match groups on situational characteristics (e.g., neighborhood), due to the smaller sample size. Because of this, the current analysis is not designed to determine whether racial inequalities are attributable specifically to racial profiling. Instead, the analysis is designed to look for differences that community members are likely to perceive as evidence of racially biased policing, regardless of any actual cause of bias. Thus, the analysis cannot assess the officers' reasons for their activities, but it does reflect how blacks and whites in the community experience those activities. This approach highlights the factors that are barriers to improved police-community relations, rather than searching for definitive evidence of civil-rights violations or the identification of racists.

This analysis revealed two key differences associated with officers' and drivers' races:

- Black drivers were more likely to experience proactive policing during the stop, resulting in longer stops that were significantly more likely to involve searches.
- White officers were more likely than were black officers to use proactive policing tactics in incidents involving black drivers.

These results are largely consistent with the findings in the 2005, 2006, and 2007 reports. There was no evidence of statistically significant changes over time in the effect of race on the behavior of either the driver or the officer. However, there has been substantial improvement in the quality of the data, with the overall missing rate less than half of what it was in the 2005 report. In addition, there is some evidence that CPD officers have improved in their communication with drivers over time, displaying better listening and improved patience.

Thus, while we find evidence of CPD improvement over time, both in its record keeping and in the quality of its interaction with the public, there are still racial inequalities that are likely to undermine police-community relations. We believe that reducing these differences is important for improving the relationship between CPD and the community it serves. These improvements will likely require a closer alignment between police practices and community priorities, the implementation of policies to ensure that white and black officers police black neighborhoods in a similar manner, and efforts by individual officers and citizens to minimize the inconvenience and irritation caused by traffic stops.

## **Background**

Information from vehicle-mounted video and audio recordings can shed light on the origins of police-community conflict and dissatisfaction because these recordings can document the quality of an interaction. Traffic stops constitute one of the most common interactions between police and community members. Prior to our previous three reports, there had been very little objective information about what typically occurs in traffic stops and how what occurs may depend on the race

of the officer or driver. In the absence of any valid data, beliefs about possible racial difference in these interactions are inevitably based on anecdotes, prejudices, or fears. By having trained, independent observers carefully analyze a random sample of traffic stops, this report is providing needed empirical evidence to assess possible problems in these interactions. This information may also point to specific policies and procedures that can improve police-community relations.

Data available in a video can address a much more diverse array of interaction characteristics than is available from the contact cards, including details of the communication and behavior of both the officers and the citizens involved. It also allows for third-party verification of the data that the officer provides on the contact card (e.g., stop duration and vehicle search), which may be more convincing to those community members with low trust in the police.

Research in communication, linguistics, and psychology has focused on the processes governing interactions between individuals. One conclusion of this research is that individual behavior can be understood only as part of a reciprocal, dynamic process between the participants. Personal expectations about an interaction are transmitted through verbal and nonverbal cues that each participant is constantly interpreting. These interpretations determine behavior, and these behaviors then affect the responses of the other party (Darley and Fazio, 1980; Giles and Smith, 1979). Interactions that result in conflict can often be traced to verbal and nonverbal cues that a participant interprets (or misinterprets) as distrust, disrespect, or anger (e.g., Mehrabian, 1968; Schlenker and Leary, 1982). Neither individual may be solely to blame for a conflict; instead, each person sees his or her own behavior as a reasonable and justified reaction to the situation. Nevertheless, changes in interpersonal interaction could have prevented the conflict.

Unfortunately, intergroup and interracial interactions, even among persons harboring no prejudice against the other group, often exhibit the sort of verbal and nonverbal cues that have led to conflict or hostile interactions (e.g., Devine and Vasquez, 1998; Hecht, Jackson, and Ribeau, 2003; Word, Zanna, and Cooper, 1974). In the absence of prejudice, interracial interactions may still go poorly because of low

expectations of a pleasant interaction, misattribution of behavior to prejudice, or different cultural expectations for communication. For example, a nonwhite driver may appear irritated or defensive during a traffic stop because of a personal history of negative interactions in similar situations and not because of any disrespect to a particular officer. Similarly, a nonprejudiced white officer may actually behave differently in interactions with blacks because of concern about being perceived as prejudiced, even though such behavioral changes may be seen as defensive, aggressive, or disrespectful (Devine, Evett, and Vasquez-Suson, 1996).

Our analysis of the audio and video records of traffic stops is designed to shed light on how these interactions between police and community members unfold. We have conducted a study that pinpoints how these interactions differ as a function of both officer and driver races. We have also identified aspects of the traffic stops that are associated with counterproductive or dissatisfying interactions. Finally, this report provides guidance on training and policies that may improve these interactions.

## **Methods**

### **Sample of Interactions**

The current study was designed to investigate the extent to which interactions between drivers and officers might be affected by the races of the officers and drivers involved. These analyses were conducted on a stratified random sample of video records ( $n = 325$ ) received from CPD.

The sampling frame for this sample was defined by the contact-card data that police officers entered. Contact cards were used to define the universe of stops because other data sources (e.g., call logs) are not linked to racial data, so the driver's race would typically be unknown. The completion of these contact cards is mandatory under CPD policy, and our attempts to validate the completion rates indicate a substantial degree of compliance (see Chapter Three). However, any systematic biases in the completion of contact cards could still influence the gen-

eralizability of our findings. Our sampling frame included all incidents that (a) had contact-card data associated with the incident, (b) involved a motor-vehicle stop, (c) had a driver's race that the officer assessed as either white or black, (d) had an officer's race that was reported as either white or black in CPD records, and (e) occurred during calendar year 2007. Incidents were included in the sampling frame without regard to the MVR data field on the contact card, which was designed to indicate whether a video recording was made. Thus, we requested to see recordings even when the officer did not explicitly state that a recording existed.

Four sampling strata were created based on the officer and driver races: black officer-black driver, black officer-white driver, white officer-black driver, white officer-white driver. Incidents were randomly sampled within each of these four strata using a computer-generated random number. Thus, all incidents within a stratum had an equal probability of being requested. To best achieve the goals of this task, an equal number of incidents was requested from each of the four strata. This provides the maximum analytic power (the ability to detect a difference that actually exists in the population) for describing racial differences in the interactions. By requesting an equal number of interactions from each stratum, we oversampled incidents involving black officers and drivers. Thus, the aggregate sample is not a representative sample of all incidents involving CPD, although it is a representative sample of incidents within each of the four racially defined strata. We believe that the stratified random-sampling method employed resulted in the strongest possible sample for the intended goals of the study, avoiding common problems associated with convenience samples or correlated observations that plague many studies of interpersonal communication.

For each month of 2007, CPD sent us a data file including the relevant contact-card data. RAND researchers sampled incidents from these monthly data and requested that CPD send any video records associated with those incidents. To account for the possibility of missing data (incidents not recorded, records not found, or damaged records), we requested more incidents than needed for the analysis. To ensure the desired sample of 300 analyzable incidents, we included

516 incidents in the requests. A total of 430 recordings were actually sent. To preserve the desired random sample, we analyzed only the first eight available recordings of each type in each month. Of the incidents requested, 17 percent were not sent to us (see Table 4.1) and were thus not available for analysis. This is similar to the rate for the 2007 report (18 percent), and a substantial improvement from the 55-percent not available rate in the 2005 report.

It is important to note that incidents were labeled *not available* in cases in which no video recording ever existed. For example, all requested motor-vehicle stops conducted by motorcycle or foot-patrol officer would be considered not available for analysis. Similarly, any stops conducted by patrol cars without video equipment installed or with malfunctioning equipment are not available.

CPD labeled each recording with an incident number. When a recording contained more than one incident, RAND staff located the requested incident on the tape or digital recording by matching the time stamp on the recording with the time reported on the contact card. When none of the incidents occurred within 45 minutes of the time listed on the card, other information from the contact card was

**Table 4.1**  
**Data Quality of the Video Records**

Aspect of Data Quality	Percentage
Of incidents requested, records not available	17
Of recordings sent, incident not found <sup>a</sup>	13
Overall requested incidents missing for analysis	28
Of the usable records (n = 318)	
Incident is not completely recorded	2
Officer's voice is not audible	12
Driver's voice is not audible	17

<sup>a</sup> An incident was considered not found when the record labeled with the incident number did not contain an incident with an electronic time stamp within 45 minutes of the time marked on the contact card.

clearly incorrect, or the recording could not be played for technical reasons, we determined that a match was not found, and that incident was coded as missing. This is a stricter standard than used in our 2005 and 2006 reports, in which the incident had to be off by more than one hour. Thirteen percent of the available recordings did not have a satisfactory match to the contact-card data (or were damaged) and were considered not found (see Table 4.1). This is almost identical to the rate not found in the year 3 report. This yields a total missingness rate of 28 percent for the current analyses. This is the same rate of missing data as in the 2007 report, but it represents a substantial improvement from the 45 percent missing in year 2 and 60 percent missing in year 1.

Because we had more recordings this year than were needed to achieve a 300-incident sample size, we did not attempt to code recordings with extensive technical problems. This may make our data-quality variables appear slightly better than they were in past years, so these should not be compared over years. Consistent with our goal of coding at least 300 incidents, we coded 325 incident recordings.

There are also several more-minor types of missing information that affect only some of our measured variables on the 318 coded videos. In approximately one-fifth of the recordings, either the video or the audio was of poor quality (e.g., camera was not aimed so that driver and officer were in the field of view, or the audio quality prevented the coders from understanding the driver). The number of cases in which the video record was not complete (omitting either the beginning or end of an incident) dropped to 2 percent.

As with data in prior years, the rates of missing records (*missingness*) for both the incidents not available and the incidents not found were approximately equal across the racially defined strata. Because the missingness is not associated with the primary predictor variables in our analyses, it is less likely to constitute a threat to the study's validity. Nevertheless, missing data may be of the "non-ignorable" type (Little and Rubin, 1987) if the causes of the data being missing differ for the different racial groups.

The total usable sample size of 325 is very near our target of 300 coded incidents. This sample size was chosen because it provides a good balance between costs and statistical power to detect differences.

It allows us an 83-percent chance of detecting a difference in means across two groups (using standard statistical assumptions) when the true difference is half of one standard deviation, a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). Many of the effects found in previous years' studies were smaller than half of one standard deviation. For instance, when the difference between groups is one-quarter of a standard deviation, we have less than 40-percent power. In other words, when the differences in the population are relatively small, we will detect them less than half the time that we conduct a study of this size. For this reason, the reader should expect that many of the small or medium-sized effects we found as significant in past years' data will not be detected as significant in the 2007 data, a result that is entirely due to chance inherent in random sampling. The fact that an effect is not significant within every year's data should not be interpreted as a change in police or driver behavior across years but as an inherent limitation of working with a random sample of 300 incidents. Analyses of the communication variables have somewhat less power, due to the level of incompleteness in the data caused by inaudible audio.

### Coding Procedures

**Codebook.** The key to this analysis is the conversion of raw video and audio records into meaningful measurements, a process called *coding*. The finalized set of measures and coding instructions, a *codebook*, was developed after a review of the study goals, an intensive review of the scientific literature, and an empirical examination of the content that could be discerned from the recordings. A fuller discussion of the development of these instruments is contained in the year 1 report (Riley et al., 2005). The actual content and quality of the recordings presented real limitations on what measures could be reliably extracted from these interactions. Specifically, the single camera position (almost always 30–50 feet behind the stopped driver); low video resolution; single, lapel-style microphone on the officer; and high ambient noise limited the measurements that could be taken from analysis of the recordings.

The year 4 codebook used on 2007 data has only minor changes from the year 2 codebook used on the 2005 data, which was itself an



adaptation from the year 1 codebook. The development process for the year 1 codebook can be found in the year 1 report, along with a comprehensive list of constructs included. The entire year 4 codebook, along with detailed descriptions and instructions, is contained in Appendix G.

**Coder Training.** Four graduate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign worked as coders during the codebook development. Individuals were recruited in the speech communication department and screened to obtain those with strong academic records. The coders are from the Midwest region (two from Ohio) and have different racial backgrounds. The coders were the same as the ones used for the year 2 report. Retraining for year 3 was accomplished with approximately 10 hours of instruction in a small seminar setting on coding interpersonal interactions, followed by extensive practice with the incident recordings. During the training, all coders would independently code several recordings. The coders' responses were then compared to ensure that there was a high level of agreement. When disagreements among coders existed, the differences were discussed as a group. For items that caused regular disagreement, additional instructions or examples were added to the codebook to document the coding procedure. Training continued until the average interrater reliability across all of the items was 0.85.

**Coding Procedures.** Once training was complete, each of the 318 incidents was randomly assigned to a coder. Coders were not given information about driver or officer race from the contact cards; however, racial information was often available from the recording itself at some point during the incident. Coders viewed each recording alone and could watch the entire incident, or any segment of it, as many times as necessary to make the required coding judgments. Data for most incidents were obtained from a single coder. For this reason, it was essential to demonstrate that the coding process maintained a strong and consistent level of performance over time to ensure reliability of the data. To assess this, all coders were asked to code a common set of eight incidents at five points in the coding process, for a total of 40 incidents. By looking at the agreement among coders on these incidents, we monitored the ongoing reliability of the coding procedure.

The overall results of these analyses indicated a high level of interrater reliability on virtually all variables, with no evidence of coder fatigue over the course of the study.

### **Analysis**

The basic analyses are designed to describe how a range of possible outcomes measured from the recordings (e.g., stop characteristics, officer behavior, driver behavior, communication variables) were related to (1) the officer's race, (2) the driver's race, and (3) the similarity between the races of the officer and driver. For most of the objective characteristics of the stop (e.g., duration, number of vehicle occupants, infraction type, citation issued), we assessed these three types of racial differences for each stop characteristic. As described in our year 1 report, communication measures were designed to be grouped into scales rather than analyzed individually. This helps to limit the number of separate statistical hypotheses that were tested—and thus limit exposure to false positive statistical errors. We analyze two communication scales in this report: officer communication quality and driver communication quality.

We used a range of statistical methods to assess the associations between the racial groups and the outcomes that were coded from the recordings. For dichotomous or polytomous outcomes, we used the  $\chi^2$  test of independence and logistic regression to assess for differences as a function of the officer's race, the driver's race, and the similarity between the races of the officer and driver. For continuous outcomes, we used analysis of variance (ANOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to assess for differences as a function of the officer's race, the driver's race, and the similarity between of the races of the officer and driver. These are common statistical techniques used to ensure that appropriate generalizations are made to a broader population given the limited sample of incidents and the reliability of our measures.

In general, each type of race effect reported (mean differences across groups defined by officer race, driver race, or racial similarity) is controlling for the other two effects. For example, if we report a difference in the probability of being searched across black and white drivers, that difference controls for any additional effects of officer race or

racial similarity. The proper interpretation of that effect is that white and black drivers differed in the probability of being searched *regardless* of the officer's race or racial similarity between the driver and officer.

We implemented additional statistical controls when analyzing the officer's or driver's communication quality. These communication variables are inherently reciprocal between the individuals in an interaction (see, e.g., Giles and Smith, 1979): An individual's communication quality typically rises, or sinks, to the communication level of the other person in the interaction. Because of this interdependence, we controlled for the driver's communication quality when assessing predictors of the officer's communication. Similarly, we controlled for the officer's communication quality when assessing predictors of the driver's communication. For example, when looking at the average communication level for black versus white drivers, we adjusted the results to account for the possibility that police officers could, on average, communicate differently to black versus white drivers. This ensured that black drivers were being compared to white drivers whom officers treated similarly. In several instances, we performed additional analyses that employed more-complex multivariate models to better understand the nature of the observed effects.

In addition to these analyses of stops from 2007, we also look at how the various race effects have changed over time. To do this, we compare the 325 cases from 2007 to the 325 cases coded from 2005. We did not compare to the cases from 2004 because there are several differences in the study methods for the year 1 study that make comparisons difficult to interpret. Specifically, the 2004 data were collected only from stops in the fall of 2004 (rather than distributed throughout the year), and it had very high rates of missingness. For variables that have been shown to be linked to either the officers' or drivers' races in the prior reports, we tested whether the magnitudes of those race effects are equal in the 2005 and 2007 data.

Because of the large number of measures being examined, we present findings only when statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ) differences were found. For example, if we discuss a difference between black and white drivers in the proportion of stops involving searches but do not present data on the proportion of searches as a function of officer

race, the reader should assume that no reliable differences as a function of officer race were found. In interpreting “nonresults,” it is important to keep in mind that not finding a significant difference does not ensure that no difference exists. It is possible that important differences exist in the full population of traffic stops but were not found in the random sample of 318 records analyzed.

## **Results**

### **Data Quality**

Coders assessed several aspects of the quality of each audio or video recording. In the majority of sampled incidents, the interaction between officer and driver was clearly visible, and their speech was audible and intelligible. However, some recording-quality problems resulted in missing data on specific measures (see Table 4.1). The most important recording-quality problem was the intelligibility of the audio. In approximately one-quarter of the recordings, the audio did not allow for analysis of the officer’s speech, the driver’s speech, or both. The sample size for these analyses is reduced to 240, which results in slightly less analytic power for communication-outcome analyses than for the stop-characteristic outcomes. Because most of the communication effects found in prior years were medium or small, the current amount of power makes it likely that we will fail to find some of the real communication effects observed in prior reports.

### **Differences in Incidents as a Function of Driver Race**

Several differences in the circumstances of the motor-vehicle stop were associated with the driver’s race (see Table 4.2). Black drivers were, on average, carrying more passengers than white drivers were. A lower proportion of the stops of black drivers than those of white drivers occurred due to moving violations. The analysis cannot indicate the reasons for these different types of stops for black and white drivers. These differences could, for example, occur because white drivers had different rates of certain types of infractions, because whites were more likely to be driving in areas in which the police had different

**Table 4.2**  
**Differences in Stop Characteristics as a Function of Driver Race**

Characteristic	Black Drivers	White Drivers	n <sup>a</sup>	Significance
Mean number of passengers	0.60	0.39	324	<0.01
Stop was for a moving violation	59%	73%	276	<0.05
Mean duration of stop (minutes)	14.9	11.5	322	<0.01
Mean number of officers at scene	1.6	1.4	325	<0.001
Require passenger ID <sup>b</sup>	43%	21%	127	<0.01
Visual search of the vehicle <sup>c</sup>	12%	5%	325	<0.05
Driver was searched	10%	1%	322	<0.001
Vehicle was searched	10%	2%	324	<0.01
Officer leaves with a pleasant word <sup>d</sup>	65%	76%	266	<0.05

<sup>a</sup> n gives the number of nonmissing observations for each variable.

<sup>b</sup> Among those incidents involving vehicles with passengers.

<sup>c</sup> The coders were asked, Do any of the officers at the scene, including the primary officer, attempt to do a preliminary search of the car? Usually the officers will be close to the car. The search is not simply a glance. It is an attempt to find probable cause for a more in-depth search. The specific behaviors involved in a preliminary search would include (1) looking intently through the windows of the car, with attention directed to the back seat and (2) use of a flashlight to locate any items apparently visible in the vehicle without moving any materials.

<sup>d</sup> Significance tests for racial differences for "Officer leaves with a pleasant word" are conducted while controlling for the driver's age and sex and the officer's age, sex, and communication quality.

enforcement practices, or because the driver's race was influencing the officer's behavior.

There were also several differences in the characteristics of the stop itself for white drivers relative to black drivers. These differences

indicate that black motorists experience, on average, more-intensive policing than their white counterparts. The stops of black drivers took an average of 3.4 minutes longer than for white drivers, and they were more likely to involve multiple police officers. In addition, black drivers and their vehicles were more likely to be investigated for illegal items. Relative to white drivers, black drivers were much more likely to (1) have the officer intently look through the windows to find probable cause for a more in-depth search, (2) have a passenger searched, and (3) have the vehicle physically searched.

Officers are less likely to end the interaction with phrases like “have a nice day” or “take care” in interactions with black drivers. Although some drivers may interpret these benedictions as sarcastic—actually causing increased tensions—they are an expected component of almost all friendly interactions. These word-use differences persist even after controlling for a range of interaction characteristics, including the driver’s communication quality, or politeness. The driver’s communication quality was not significantly different for black and white drivers while controlling for the officers’ communication quality. While that communication difference had been significant in the prior three reports, it was not significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level this year, although it was close to significant. More generally, there was no significant evidence of change over time in the magnitude of the racial difference in driver communication quality. In addition, all of the other racial differences in the circumstances of the stop and the stop characteristics were very similar to prior years, with no significant changes across the study years.

It is important to note that the observed differences in stop characteristics may not be directly caused by the driver’s race. While these results show an association with driver race, the reason for the differences could be any factor that is correlated with driver race. For example, black drivers may be more likely to be stopped in high-crime neighborhoods than are their white counterparts. This could lead to higher rates of searches of black motorists, even if the officer did not consider the driver’s race in the decision to search.

### Differences in Incidents as a Function of Officer Race

Similarly to data from 2006, data from 2007 indicated several differences in the average behavior of white and black officers, suggesting that slightly different procedures are being followed or different assignments have been given to black and white officers. White officers were significantly more likely to require identification from passengers in the cars, and they were more likely to stop cars for nonmoving violations (most typically, equipment or registration violations) (see Table 4.3). This pattern of effects suggests that white officers are using more proactive police tactics in their traffic stops, using the traffic stop as a means to investigate possible drugs, weapons, or warrants. In contrast, a larger portion of the stops by black officers is made up of classic traffic stops in which the driver is pulled over for a driving infraction, given a ticket, and allowed to leave.

In general, the differences between the behaviors of black and white officers in 2007 has not changed significantly from those differences found in 2005 data. However, there is one significant difference relative to 2006: The discrepancy between the numbers of searches conducted by black and white officers (in which black officers performed fewer searches) is smaller in 2007 than in 2006. This change is largely attributable to an increase in the rate of searches performed by black officers in 2007 relative to 2006.

**Table 4.3**  
**Differences in Stop Characteristics as a Function of Officer Race**

Characteristic	Black Officer (%)	White Officer (%)	n	Significance
Passengers required to give ID	20	46	127	<0.01
Stopped for a moving violation	73	60	276	<0.05

NOTE: n gives the number of nonmissing observations on each variable. Percentage of passengers is computed based on the number of vehicles containing passengers, rather than on all incidents.

Differences That May Give an Appearance of Racial Bias

The differences we observed in the behavior of white versus black officers, or in the stop characteristics between white and black drivers, have the potential to give an appearance of racial bias. A given driver, either white or black, may believe that he or she is being treated differently based on the officer’s prejudices. Whenever that driver is actually treated differently by black and white officers, the driver’s attribution to racial bias is likely to be strengthened.

To investigate which stop characteristics may reinforce beliefs of racial bias, we break down the variables on which we found both driver-race and officer-race effects. These are contained in Table 4.4.

For both of these variables, the racial difference between the actions of white and black officers is found only for stops involving black drivers. There is no significant effect of officer race when looking at stops of white motorists. Because of this, black drivers may notice differences in the stop based on the race of the officer who stopped them. This may lead to an appearance that they are treated with more suspicion when stopped by a white officer. The stop is less likely to be for a moving violation, and passengers are more likely to be asked for ID. In contrast, the stops of white drivers are largely the same regardless of the officer’s race.

Table 4.4  
Stop Characteristics as a Function of Both Officer and Driver Race (%)

Characteristic	Black Driver <sup>a</sup>		White Driver	
	Black Officer	White Officer	Black Officer	White Officer
Stop was for a moving violation	70	49	76	71
Passengers required to give ID	24	61	16	27

NOTE: Percentage of passengers is computed based on the number of vehicles containing passengers rather than on all incidents.

<sup>a</sup> Significant effect of officer race when the driver was black (p < 0.05).



There appears to be the most proactive policing in the black driver–white officer combination. For both of the variables in Table 4.4, that combination is significantly different from the average of the other three combinations ( $p < 0.001$ ).

## **Predictors of Constructive Officer-Driver Communication**

To better understand the factors that are associated with pleasant and productive interactions between officers and the community, we explored factors that were associated with high communication quality. This was done by estimating two separate multivariate-regression models predicting driver and officer communication quality from a wide range of stop characteristics, demographic factors, and communication variables. As in the previous two reports, the best predictor for good officer communication was good driver communication, and vice versa. These effects remain strong even when controlling for all available stop and personal characteristics. Regardless of whether the stop was in the day or night, ended in a warning or an arrest, or was by a man or a woman, the quality of each person's communication tended to rise or sink to the level of the other. See Riley et al. (2005) for more detail on the predictors of communication quality.

## **Differences Between 2007 and 2005 Data**

In general, the results largely replicate the findings of previous years. Black drivers experience longer stops with more searches and a greater emphasis on infractions unrelated to their driving. These differences in the stops of black and white drivers are generally larger when a white officer initiates the stop. While some racial differences found in prior years were not found in 2007, these changes in significance should be anticipated due to the modest analytic power to detect small effects with 325 incidents. In other words, the failure to find this effect in year 4 should not be interpreted as evidence that it does not exist.

We did, however, find one significant difference over time that is unrelated to the race of the officer or driver: The communication quality of CPD officers has improved between 2005 and 2007 ( $p < 0.001$ )

while controlling for driver communication and stop characteristics. Specifically, officers displayed better listening and greater evidence of patience and helpfulness. The other important change, which was mentioned in the previous two reports, is the marked improvement in data quality. Although the amount of missing data in 2007 is almost identical to 2006, both represent dramatic improvements from 2004 and 2005.

## Discussion

The random sample of video records analyzed sheds light on the nature of ordinary interactions between Cincinnati's citizens and its police. One key finding that sets the background for understanding these interactions is that, on average, blacks and whites experienced very different types of policing. White drivers typically experienced traffic stops that were shorter and less likely to involve an investigation beyond the original vehicle infraction—inquiries and searches for drugs, weapons, contraband, or outstanding warrants. This finding is generally consistent with the descriptive findings presented in Chapter Three (prior to adjusting for neighborhood, time of day, and other potentially explanatory variables), although the video analyses use independent observers to determine stop characteristics rather than the officers' self-reports.

As we discussed in earlier reports, the fact that stopped black drivers are typically subjected to more intensive and time-consuming traffic stops may be a significant barrier to improved police-community relations. There are several plausible reasons for these differences in stops other than racial profiling, including different neighborhood enforcement techniques or differences in the types of infractions committed by whites and blacks. However, the longer, more-invasive traffic stops that black drivers experience are likely to contribute to a more negative attitude in future interactions with the police.

These concerns about enforcement patterns are particularly of interest because of evidence that these differences in the stops of black and white drivers are more pronounced when the officer is white. While some community members may view this result as evidence of

racial profiling, there are other plausible explanations that we cannot rule out with the existing data. White officers may be given different assignments or duties than black officers, or they may have a different understanding of their assignments for reasons that are not directly related to race (e.g., seniority, neighborhood of assignment, shift being worked). Because we do not rule out several factors that may be correlated with officer race, we do not conclude that this indicates racially biased policing. However, the nature of these effects is consistent with the fundamental asymmetry in outcomes that typically indicates racial discrimination against minorities: White officers are more aggressively policing black neighborhoods than are black officers. This reinforces cultural beliefs about racial discrimination.

Regardless of the ultimate cause of these effects, the fact that the more-invasive traffic stops that black drivers experience occur primarily when they have been stopped by white officers should be expected to contribute to more negative attitudes within the black community. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that white officers conduct approximately two-thirds of all stops of black motorists, so any problems in these interactions are likely to affect a large number of African Americans. Improving relations between CPD and this community will likely require efforts to ensure that white and black officers act similarly when stopping motorists.

## **Evidence of Change Over Time**

In general, the role of race in the interactions between police and citizens has been remarkably stable over the four years of analysis. We did not find convincing evidence of change for any of the race effects we observed. This leads to three relatively stable conclusions that can be seen when combining data over the life of the study: Black drivers experience longer and more-invasive traffic stops; this difference in stop characteristics is attributable largely to those stops involving white officers; and black drivers tend to be more upset and less apologetic than white drivers in similar situations.

In spite of this stability in the racial effects over time, there was evidence of improvements in police-community relations. Specifically, CPD officers display more positive communication with citizens in 2007 than in 2005; the observers rate them as better at listening to what the drivers say, as well as showing more patience and helpfulness in 2007 than in 2005.

The causes of this improvement cannot be easily inferred from the available data. There are several plausible hypotheses, including improvements in police training, increased awareness by police officers that their behavior was being recorded and evaluated, improvements in the attitudes of police officers about the community they serve (perhaps as a result of lowered crime rates), changes in stop procedures, and changes in the composition of the force conducting traffic stops. While the improvement in police communication quality is likely to be beneficial for police-community relations, without knowing why this occurred, it is difficult to determine whether it is a sustainable improvement.

### **Suggestions for Continued Improvement**

Correlational research has a very limited ability to identify the ultimate causes of what we observe. Thus it is difficult to know whether the racial inequalities we have found are caused by racial bias or are the unintended outcome of policies and circumstances that are race blind. Regardless of the cause of the observed inequalities, we believe that they represent a significant barrier to improved police-community relations. Several steps could be taken to remove these barriers.

First, it may be possible to make improvements in relations between CPD and the black community by rethinking how black neighborhoods are policed. The proactive policing of motor vehicles that occurs in these communities (longer stops, more searches) is likely to put a high burden on law-abiding members of these communities, and it may not match these communities' policing priorities. The high-crime neighborhoods may want more police assistance with drugs and violent crime, but what they are getting is more tickets for expired registrations, more time having their passengers investigated, and more instances of being patted down in public. This type of aggressive

policing will certainly help to apprehend some offenders (e.g., Koper and Mayo-Wilson, 2006; Skogan and Frydl, 2004; Sherman, 1990), but it may have high costs on community relations. Efforts should be made to identify methods of targeting the specific offenses that are a concern to the community while minimizing the impact on community members who are not involved in those offenses.

Secondly, efforts should be made to ensure that black and white officers are consistent in their enforcement priorities and methods. The continued discrepancy in the investigation of passengers during traffic stops suggests that there is no enforced CPD policy governing this procedure. Similar to previous years, we recommend that specific guidelines be developed to determine when officers should run ID checks on vehicle passengers who have not, themselves, been observed violating any law. We also suggest that these guidelines reflect the inconvenience to law-abiding passengers that result from an ID check, as well as the low proportion of arrests that can be attributed to these ID checks. We also suggest that clear traffic-enforcement priorities be communicated to officers. White officers appear to be pursuing technical violations at a greater rate than are black officers in the same situation. Clear tasking and enforcement priorities may reduce this discrepancy. To best improve police-community relations, policies that determine enforcement priorities for moving versus technical violations should reflect the priorities of the community being served.

### **Limitations**

There are several limitations to our analysis of the audio-video recordings. One primary limitation is that it uses observational data, and we cannot match black and white drivers on the full range of situational factors (e.g., neighborhood of stop). These methods allow us to describe what typically occurs in these interactions, but we cannot know definitively why it happens. Because of this limitation, the reader should avoid assuming a specific cause of the effects we report. For example, the reader should not conclude from our study that the police chose to search black motorists, or to hold them longer, *because* they are black.

## Conclusions

An analysis of 325 randomly sampled video records revealed two key differences associated with the officers' and drivers' races: (1) Black drivers were more likely to experience proactive policing during the stop, resulting in longer stops that were significantly more likely to involve searches; and (b) white officers were more likely than black officers to use proactive police tactics in incidents involving black drivers. Although the original causes for these differences are unknown, we believe that reducing them is important for improving the relationship between CPD and the community it serves. These improvements will likely require a closer alignment between police practices and community priorities, the implementation of policies to ensure that white and black officers use similar operating procedures, as well as efforts by individual officers and citizens to minimize the inconvenience and irritation caused by traffic stops.

In general, the role of race in the interactions between police and citizens has been remarkably stable over the four years of analysis. We did not find convincing evidence of change for any of the race effects we have observed. This leads to three relatively stable conclusions that can be seen when combining data over the life of the study: Black drivers experience longer and more-invasive traffic stops, this difference in stop characteristics is attributable largely to those stops involving white officers, and black drivers tend to be more upset and less apologetic than white drivers in similar situations.

In spite of this stability in the race effects over time, there is evidence of improvements in police-community relations. Specifically, CPD officers display more positive communication with citizens in 2007 than in 2005; observers rate them as better at listening to what the drivers say, as well as showing more patience and helpfulness in 2007 than in 2005.

## Police-Community Satisfaction Survey

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### Overview

To examine changes in police-community relations in the city of Cincinnati, we conducted a follow-up to our 2005 survey of Cincinnati residents. The primary purpose of the community-police satisfaction survey was to understand the dynamics of community perceptions of CPD. The community-police satisfaction survey polled 3,000 residents in Cincinnati via random-digit dialing (RDD) and list-assisted sampling methods.

Our approach involved three assessments of residents' perceptions of police in Cincinnati: (1) an assessment of overall levels of perceived professionalism of CPD officers; (2) an assessment of the residents' perceptions of the frequency at which CPD officers are active in their neighborhoods; and (3) an assessment of the perception of racially biased policing. In particular, we assessed changes in these measures between 2005 and 2008.

The analysis yielded four key findings:

- Black respondents reported greater perceived police professionalism in 2008 than in 2005. Nonblack respondents generally reported CPD's professionalism as good, and that rating was unchanged between 2005 and 2008. Black respondents, on average, gave lower ratings than nonblack respondents, but the trend shows clear improvements.
- Black and nonblack respondents reported that they generally do not see CPD officers actively stopping or detaining individu-

als, though black respondents were slightly more likely to report seeing CPD activity in their neighborhood. The perceived level of active policing remained the same between 2005 and 2008.

- Between 2005 and 2008, both black and nonblack respondents reported significant decreases in the perception of the use of racial profiling by CPD officers. Black respondents still report that CPD officers treat blacks and whites “somewhat unequally” and “usually” use race in deciding how to police.
- Black male respondents were 3.5 times more likely than black women to report that they believed they had been stopped because of their race. Perceived personal experience with racial profiling appears to be more common for those with more education and for those who perceive greater disorder in their neighborhoods.

## Survey Method

Data collection for the community-police satisfaction survey was conducted by Abt SRBI, which contacted Cincinnati residents by phone. To be included in the study, the respondent had to be 18 years or older and had to indicate that he or she lived in one of the 53 Cincinnati neighborhoods. Using a list of known good phone numbers compiled during the 2005 survey effort, Abt SRBI began telephoning a representative sample of Cincinnati residents on February 13, 2008. These efforts yielded 945 completed surveys, with a 52-percent response rate. RDD of households across Cincinnati began on April 10, 2008. Our aim was to obtain roughly equal numbers of respondents from the 53 neighborhoods comprising the city. Based on early results, telephone exchanges were weighted to evenly distribute the respondents by neighborhood. The survey efforts were completed on July 8, 2008. The efforts yielded 3,000 usable surveys, with a response rate of 45 percent.



## Main Outcomes of Interest

The survey included several questions about the conduct of police within respondents' neighborhoods. The response options to these questions were coded as four-point Likert scales, although, in some instances, voluntary responses indicating that individuals neither agreed nor disagreed with a statement were coded as neutral and assigned a value of 2.5. (See Appendix A for detailed questions and response options for all questions.)

Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D give a detailed breakdown of each question by race, year, and neighborhood. In this chapter, to reduce the number of analyzed questions without losing substantively informative responses, we combine questions to create three scales that correspond to (1) perceptions of police professionalism, (2) active policing, and (3) racial profiling. Most of the discussion in this chapter focuses on these three key areas.

The survey questions used for each scale are listed in Tables 5.1 (police professionalism), 5.2 (active policing), and 5.3 (racial profiling). Alpha scores, which, on a scale of 0 to 1, indicate how close the items composing a scale are related to each other, ranged between 0.67 for the active-policing scale to 0.92 for the police-professionalism scale. Where respondents gave no answer to a question, we imputed the values from their responses to other questions in the scale. For example, if a respondent answers seven of the eight items in the police-professionalism scale, we can use the data from those who answered all eight items in conjunction with the seven items that the respondent completed to estimate what the respondents' answer to the eighth item would have been had they answered. Imputation is far preferable to other options, such as dropping respondents with missing items, and we needed to impute in a small fraction of the cases. For all the scale questions, the average percentage of imputed cases was 5 percent. At the high end, 12 percent of responses were imputed for the question about whether the police use race as a factor in deciding which neighborhoods to patrol frequently; at the low end, fewer than 1 percent of responses were imputed for the question about how often residents see police stopping and patting down individuals on street corners.

**Table 5.1**  
**Survey Items Used to Create Police-Professionalism Scale (alpha = 0.92)**

Survey Item	Response Options			
	1	2	3	4
1 How would you rate the performance of the Cincinnati Police on working with residents to address local crime problems?	Poor	Fair	Good	Excellent
2 In your opinion, would you say the Cincinnati police officers are generally [polite or rude]?	Very rude	Somewhat rude	Somewhat polite	Very polite
3 How much do you trust the police officers [who] work for the Cincinnati Police Department?	Not at all	A little bit	Somewhat	A lot
4 CPD officers treat people with respect and dignity.	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
5 In general, how would you rate the quality of police protection in Cincinnati?	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
6 CPD officers understand and apply the law fairly.	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
7 CPD officers consider the views of the people involved when deciding what to do.	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
8 CPD officers apply the rules consistently regardless of someone's race or ethnicity.	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly

**Table 5.2****Survey Items Used to Create Active-Policing Scale (alpha = 0.67)**

<b>Survey Item: How often do you see police officers in your neighborhood . . .</b>		<b>Response options</b>			
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
9	Stopping and patting down individuals on street corners	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always
10	Making drug arrests	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always
11	Stopping and questioning motorists	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always
12	Talking to residents about their concerns	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always

**Table 5.3****Survey Items Used to Create Racial-Profilng Scale (alpha = 0.88)**

<b>Survey Item</b>		<b>Response Options</b>			
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
13	Do you think that Cincinnati police officers treat blacks and whites with equal suspicion?	Definitely equal	Somewhat equal	Somewhat unequal	Definitely unequal
How often does the CPD make the following types of decisions based on someone's race or ethnic background?					
14	Which people to arrest and take to jail	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always
15	Which people to stop and question on the street	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always
16	Which cars to stop for traffic violations	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always
17	Which areas of the neighborhood to patrol the most frequently	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always
18	Which people in the neighborhood to help with their problems	Almost never	Sometimes	Usually	Almost always

We also analyzed a question that asks respondents whether they felt that a CPD officer had ever personally stopped them because of their race or ethnic background. Because only 5 percent of the non-black population responded “yes,” this question is analyzed only for the sample of black respondents.

## **Control Variables**

### **Demographics**

Our analyses included several variables that hold constant respondents’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The demographic variables include sex, race, age, and marital and family status. The race variable is treated dichotomously, as either black or nonblack, though the nonblack category is comprised almost entirely of white respondents; 95 percent of the respondents are either black or white. We also recorded the birth year of respondents in order to account for age and birth-year differences. Marital status was recorded as either married or nonmarried, the latter group including single, divorced, and widowed. Family status was similarly recorded as a household either with or without minor children.

### **Socioeconomics**

We account for respondents’ socioeconomic status with measures of educational attainment, household income, employment status, and housing-unit tenancy. We code respondents’ highest educational attainment into four ordered categories: (1) less than high school, (2) high-school diploma or equivalent, (3) some college experience, and (4) a bachelor’s degree or higher. Annual household income is measured with the following response options: \$20,000 or less; more than \$20,000 but less than \$30,000; more than \$30,000 but less than \$50,000; more than \$50,000 but less than \$75,000; more than \$75,000 but less than \$100,000; and \$100,000 or more.

Respondents were asked to describe their employment status as employed full or part time, retired, student, unemployed, or not working or not looking for work. Workers comprised 58 percent of

the sample, and retired persons comprised 26 percent. The remaining respondents were primarily not working or looking for work (7 percent of the sample). We documented a respondent's tenancy status as either residing in a housing unit owned by the head of household or residing in a unit that is not owned by any resident of the household (e.g., rented).

### **Neighborhood Residency**

We recorded the neighborhood and police district where the respondent lived. Additionally, we measured how long a resident has resided in his or her neighborhood. We recorded this information to indicate whether a respondent had resided in that neighborhood less than five years, between five and 10 years, or more than 10 years.

### **Neighborhood Disorder**

Several survey questions were used to better understand how respondent's perceptions of conditions in their neighborhoods were related to the outcomes of interest. The survey asked respondents to rate their neighborhood in general; how serious of a problem they felt crime was in their neighborhood; how safe they felt alone in the neighborhood at night; and how often in their neighborhood they saw garbage in the streets, kids hanging out on the corners without adult supervision, graffiti, drug transactions, or people acting disrespectfully toward police. Additionally, respondents were asked whether any armed robberies, murders, sexual assaults, or burglaries had occurred in their neighborhood during the preceding 12 months.

Analysis confirmed that this collection of questions all measured one common respondent feature, which we labeled as *neighborhood disorder*. Therefore, the answers to each of the questions described in the previous paragraph are combined into a single neighborhood-disorder scale, where a higher score indicates greater perceived disorder.

We also supplement the respondents' perceptions of their neighborhoods with neighborhood-level crime statistics obtained from CPD (CPD, undated). For 2008, data were available on all reported violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny, and auto theft) between January 1 and

May 31, 2008. These are divided by the estimated 2008 neighborhood population to create violent- and property-crime rates per 10,000 residents. For 2005, the average monthly number of violent and property crimes for all of 2005 is multiplied by 5 and divided by the estimated 2005 population to create the 2005 crime rates per 10,000 residents.<sup>1</sup>

### **Social Capital**

The survey also contained questions about respondents' involvement in neighborhood activities; their frequency of social contact with neighbors; the number of relatives they have living in the neighborhood; and how much they trust other people in their neighborhood. Except for the yes/no question about participation in neighborhood activities, the items are coded as four-point scales on which a 4 indicates more relatives, more-frequent socializing, and more trust. We did not find much reliability in these items as a whole (the highest alpha for any combination of the items was 0.41). Instead of combining them into a single scale, we treat them as separate items. Because only a fraction of respondents (about 35 percent) had any relatives in the neighborhood, this item is recoded into either having relatives or not having relatives in the neighborhood.

### **Weights**

For descriptive statistics and predicted scale outcomes, all cases are weighted to reflect the neighborhood, age, race, and sex distribution of Cincinnati's population in 2000. Seven of the 53 neighborhoods yielded few respondents. The few respondents identifying themselves

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<sup>1</sup> The most current neighborhood-population estimates come from the 2000 census. Using 2000 population for both years could introduce an upward bias in calculated crime rates if the observed number of crimes actually grew in proportion to the population. While we do not know how population growth occurred across the neighborhoods, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the city of Cincinnati grew by an average of 0.05 percent per year between 2000 and 2006. Assuming average growth in 2007 and 2008, we multiply each neighborhood's share of the 2000 population by the estimated population in 2005 and 2008 to derive the denominator for the crime rates.

with those neighborhoods, shown in Table 5.4, were merged with respondents from larger, adjacent neighborhoods.

## Analytic Methods

First, we tested whether the collection of residents we enrolled in the survey changed between 2005 and 2008.

Next, for each of the outcomes of interest (perceptions of police professionalism, active policing, racial profiling, and personal experiences of being stopped because of race), we conduct a series of analyses to determine how attitudes have changed over time. The emphasis in these models is how the change (if any) varies between black and nonblack respondents.<sup>2</sup> The models include a random effects term for each neighborhood. For each outcome, the first model includes a variable indicating the year of the survey, an indicator of whether the respondents were black and other demographic variables, and a term to estimate the interaction between the year and the African American variables. The second model adds social capital variables; the

**Table 5.4**  
**Recoded Respondents**

Original Neighborhood	Sample Size	Recoded Neighborhood
Pendleton	3	Over-the-Rhine
East Westwood	3	Westwood
English Woods	3	North Fairmount
O'Bryonville	3	Evanston
Millvale	3	Cumminsville
California	3	East End
Queensgate	3	West End

<sup>2</sup> Initially, these models also included the police-district dummy variables. However, the bivariate effects of these variables were explained entirely by the demographic variables and neighborhood controls. For this reason, they are excluded from subsequent estimations.

third model adds the neighborhood-disorder scale and the crime-rate variables.

Finally, we study, among the black respondents, which respondent features have the strongest association with the respondent reporting that they had been stopped because of their race. The models follow the format described in the preceding paragraph. As with the other outcome variables, the models include a random effects term for each neighborhood.

Results

Table 5.5 shows summary statistics for the variables in each year (after weighting to reflect Cincinnati’s neighborhood, age, race, and sex distributions reported in the 2000 census) and results of tests indicating whether the difference is statistically significant.

We adjusted the raw sample through weighting to ensure that the sample accurately reflected the city population in terms of neighborhood, race, sex, and age. As confirmed in Table 5.5, we were able to finely match the 2005 and 2008 samples on these factors.

Table 5.5  
Summary Statistics

Characteristic	2005 <sup>a</sup>	2008 <sup>b</sup>	Difference Is Significant?
Demographics			
Age (%)			No
18–21	4	7	
22–29	20	19	
30–39	21	20	
40–49	19	20	
50–64	18	17	
65+	17	17	



**Table 5.5—Continued**

Characteristic	2005 <sup>a</sup>	2008 <sup>b</sup>	Difference Is Significant?
African American (%)	43	43	No
Female (%)	53	54	No
Birth year	1963	1963	No
Married (%)	32	36	Yes
Any minor children at home (%)	37	29	No
Educational attainment (%)			Yes
Less than high-school diploma	11	10	
High-school diploma or GED <sup>c</sup>	30	26	
Some college	31	30	
Bachelor's degree or higher	29	34	
Household income (%)			Yes
≤ \$20,000	23	22	
\$20,000–\$30,000	23	17	
\$30,000–\$50,000	25	24	
\$50,000–\$75,000	14	17	
\$75,000–\$100,000	7	8	
≥ \$100,000	8	12	

**Table 5.5—Continued**

Characteristic	2005 <sup>a</sup>	2008 <sup>b</sup>	Difference Is Significant?
Employment and homeownership			
Full- or part-time worker (%)	63	62	No
Homeowner (%)	50	58	Yes
Years in neighborhood (average)	13.1	14.9	Yes
Police district (%)			No
One	7	7	
Two	26	26	
Three	28	28	
Four	19	19	
Five	21	20	
Outcomes (1 = less, 4 = more)			
Neighborhood disorder (average)	2.2	2.2	No
Police professionalism (average)	2.7	2.8	Yes
Active policing (average)	1.6	1.6	No
Racial profiling (average)	2.5	2.3	Yes
Feel stopped because of race			
Nonblack	6	4	No
Black	39	39	No

<sup>a</sup> The 2005 results are based on a sample of n = 2,951. In revisiting the 2005 sample, we identified 49 cases that we could not match to specific neighborhoods.

<sup>b</sup> The 2008 figures are based on a sample of n = 3,000 respondents.

<sup>c</sup> GED = General Educational Development.

Compared to 2005, respondents in 2008 had higher household incomes,<sup>3</sup> lived in their neighborhoods for more years, and were slightly more likely to be married or hold a bachelor's degree and much more likely to own their homes.<sup>4</sup>

On the outcome measures, respondents in 2008 reported higher levels of police professionalism than did respondents in 2005. Reports of active policing were unchanged. The perception of racial profiling fell between 2005 and 2008, but the overall proportion of African Americans who felt that police had ever stopped them because of their race remained statistically unchanged at 39 percent.

### Police Professionalism

Table 5.6 shows the results from analysis of the relationship between race, survey year (2005 or 2008), and the police-professionalism scale. To make sure that the observed relationships are not due to other mitigating factors (e.g., neighborhood crime), we considered several models. The results shown in Table 5.6 account for demographic and socioeconomic variables. Analysis of models that further added the social capital variables, the disorder scale, and the neighborhood crime rates, but these adjustments resulted in no changes to the results shown in Table 5.6.

**Table 5.6**  
**Results from the Police-Professionalism Analysis**

Respondent Race	Predicted Score for the Average Respondent		Change in Perceived Police Professionalism	
	2005	2008	Change	95% Confidence Interval
Black	2.35	2.50	0.15	(0.06, 0.22)
Nonblack	2.92	2.94	0.02	(-0.02, 0.07)

<sup>3</sup> There was approximately 12-percent inflation between 2005 and 2008.

<sup>4</sup> Homeownership rates in the Cincinnati metropolitan area did not change between 2005 and 2007 (68 percent). The 2008 survey was fielded in the first half of 2008, well into the mortgage crisis.

The results show that, on average, the police-professionalism score for nonblack respondents in 2005 was just under 3.0 (equivalent to a “Good” rating of police professionalism) out of a maximum of 4.0. Nonblack respondents reported a negligible increase in the police-professionalism score in 2008, an increase of 0.02. On average, black respondents in 2005 rated police professionalism about 0.6 points lower than did nonblack respondents. Nonetheless, average scores for both groups were well above 2.0, which indicate generally favorable impressions of police professionalism.

The figure most relevant to the goals of the collaborative agreement is the increase in perceived police professionalism among black respondents, which we found increased by 0.15. It is unlikely that this change is due to chance alone. This indicates that, on average, black residents in Cincinnati in 2008 rate CPD’s professionalism higher than they did in 2005, between a “Fair” and a “Good” rating. Even in traditionally problematic neighborhoods for police-community relations, we find increases in perceived police professionalism. In Over-the-Rhine, police professionalism increased significantly—from 2.2 in 2005 to 2.6 in 2008 (see Table D.2 in Appendix D).

Active Policing

Table 5.7 shows the results from analysis of the active-policing scale. This scale measured the frequency at which respondents reported observing officers interacting with the public, such as in traffic stops, making arrests, or talking to residents about their concerns. The

Table 5.7  
Results from the Active-Policing Analysis

Respondent Race	Predicted Score for the Average Respondent		Change in Perceived Active Policing	
	2005	2008	Change	95% Confidence Interval
Black	1.61	1.62	0.006	(−0.06, 0.07)
Nonblack	1.50	1.50	0.004	(−0.03, 0.04)

analysis includes the same adjustments for demographics as those described for the police-professionalism scale.

Similar to the results observed for the police-professionalism scale, black and nonblack respondents reacted differently to questions about active policing practices in their neighborhoods. Nonblack respondents' active-policing scale averaged 1.5, exactly between an "Almost never" and a "Sometimes" response to questions about perceived active policing. Black respondents report slightly more active policing, though the racial differences in active policing are much smaller than the racial differences reported in Table 5.4 for police professionalism. The perceived level of active policing remained unchanged between 2005 and 2008 for both black and nonblack respondents.

### Racial Profiling

Table 5.8 shows the results of the analysis of the responses to the racial-profiling questions. The racial-profiling scale combined responses to six questions about whether or how CPD officers use race in their interactions with the public.

Black and nonblack respondents differed significantly on their responses to questions about CPD's use of race in policing activities. Black respondents, on average, indicated that CPD officers treated blacks and whites "somewhat unequally" and that they "usually" used race in deciding where and how to police. Nonblack respondents were more likely to indicate that they believed that blacks and whites were treated "somewhat equally" and that race is "sometimes" used in police decisions.

**Table 5.8**  
**Results from the Analysis of Racial-Profiling Perceptions**

Respondent Race	Predicted Score for the Average Respondent		Change in Perceived Active Policing Racial Profiling	
	2005	2008	Change	95% Confidence Interval
Black	2.88	2.79	-0.08	(-0.18, -0.01)
Nonblack	2.15	2.08	-0.07	(-0.12, -0.02)

For both black and nonblack respondents, the perception of racial profiling has decreased, relating directly to the goals of the collaborative agreement. Although black respondents still report relatively strong perceptions of racial inequity in police practice, these data indicate that the strength of those perceptions are slowly decreasing.

**Reports of Racial Profiling**

We also analyzed whether there were factors associated with black respondents reporting that they felt that CPD had ever stopped them because of their race. We considered all the demographic and socioeconomic variables as well as social capital variables, the disorder scale, and the neighborhood crime rates.

Table 5.9 shows the results for only those factors that had a statistically strong relationship with respondents reporting racial profiling.

**Table 5.9**  
**Adjusted Percentage of Black Respondents Who Felt That They Had Ever Been Stopped Because of Their Race**

Characteristic		Percentage
Year	2005	34
	2008	32
Sex <sup>a</sup>	Male	53
	Female	25
Birth year <sup>a</sup>	1940	28
	1960	34
	1980	41
	1990	44
Education	Less than high school	28
	High school	28
	Some college	38
	BS/BA or more	39

**Table 5.9—Continued**

Characteristic		Percentage
Marital status	Married	30
	Not married	34
Children at home	Yes	33
	No	33
Income <sup>a</sup>	\$20,000 or less	31
	\$20,000–\$30,000	32
	\$30,000–\$50,000	31
	\$50,000–\$75,000	42
	\$75,000–\$100,000	41
	\$100,000 or more	42
Ownership of home	Yes	33
	No	33
Employed	Yes	34
	No	32
Years living in neighborhood	0–5	35
	5–10	33
	11 or more	32
Active in neighborhood? <sup>a</sup>	Yes	35
	No	32
Relatives in neighborhood?	Yes	34
	No	32
Get together with neighbors	Daily	34
	Once or twice per week	33
	Less than once per month	33
	Never	32

Table 5.9—Continued

Characteristic		Percentage
Trust neighbors <sup>a</sup>	A lot	29
	Somewhat	31
	A little bit	34
	Not at all	37
Disorder scale (larger values indicate more disorder) <sup>a</sup>	1	27
	2	32
	3	38
	4	44
Violent-crime rate (crimes/10,000 residents)	14	33
	33	33
	73	33
Property-crime rate (crimes/10,000 residents)	128	34
	184	34
	347	33

NOTE: Based on an analysis of 2,443 black respondents combined from 2005 and 2008. Percentages shown are regression adjusted for the other factors listed in the table.

<sup>a</sup> There were statistically significant differences in the percentage of respondents reporting that they had been stopped because of their race.

The table shows the adjusted percentage of respondents in each category who reported feeling that they had been stopped because of their race. These are adjusted for the other factors in the table. For example, 53 percent of black men felt that they had been stopped because of their race, and 25 percent of females of similar age, education, marital status, and other characteristics reported that they had been stopped because of their race. The results also indicate that the percentage of those perceiving having been stopped because of race decline with age. With each additional year of age, the odds of reporting experience with racial profiling decreases by 1 percent. Contrasting with age, we found



that perception of experience with racial profiling increases with educational attainment above a high-school diploma (difference between people with some college or bachelor's degrees were not statistically significant).

None of the models indicates that respondents' tendencies to feel that they had ever been stopped because of their race changed between 2005 and 2008.

The results show no differences across marital or family status, employment, homeownership, or duration of neighborhood residence and no consistent differences across the income groups. The amount of trust one had in one's neighbors was the only social capital measure associated with feelings of ever having been stopped because of one's race. Finally, respondents who perceived more social disorder in their neighborhoods were more likely than others to feel they had ever been stopped because of their race.

## **Summary and Conclusions**

Overall, this year's survey results suggest positive trends for police-community relations in Cincinnati. On average, black residents in Cincinnati are reporting greater levels of police professionalism and decreases in the perception that CPD officers practice racial profiling. These two findings suggest that police-community relations have improved in the past three years and are headed in the right direction. On average, black residents in 2008 still frequently report that officers "usually" use race in deciding how to police; however, the percentage of black residents holding this belief is in decline.



## Satisfaction of Police Officers Working in Cincinnati

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### Overview

A key objective of the evaluation was to obtain information from CPD officers whose duties entail significant interaction with citizens. The information was obtained through a survey that asked officers about personal safety, working conditions, morale, organizational barriers to effective policing, fairness in evaluation and promotion, and attitudes of citizens in Cincinnati.

Our year 1 survey effort yielded responses from 40 officers but, in the process, identified several barriers for achieving good response rates from officers. As a result, we made substantial changes to the survey plan for the year 2 report, which yielded 83 returned surveys. The changes in the year 2 survey–distribution plan were made to encourage survey response. During the spring and summer, patrol officers received training at the police academy on new mobile terminals. Selection into a particular class is balanced across districts so as not to interfere with police allocation, and, as a result, the officers surveyed were representative of CPD patrol officers. CPD management distributed the surveys to each class with encouragement to complete them. All identifying questions had been removed, so that signed consent was no longer required. As a result, the cover letter was changed from the legal document–like image that it had in year 1 to a cover letter from Chief Thomas H. Streicher Jr. and Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) president Kathy Harrell encouraging response. Since this year’s surveys were anonymous, we could not send reminders or replacement surveys to those officers who did not respond, nor could

we send incentives, all of which promote response. Telephone follow-up is another common strategy to encourage response, but anonymous surveying made this impossible. So while the new survey-distribution plan reduced roadblocks to survey return, it also prevented the use of some of the methods that increase response rate.

The same method was used in 2008. All officers working in assignments with significant direct public contact who received in-service training were given the survey between March and May 2008. Despite CPD's continuous encouragement to complete surveys, only 40 were returned, which is less than half as many as in the previous year. The response rate was 13 percent. Half the number of officers answered the survey in 2008 as in 2006, which makes comparisons across years suspect. We were hopeful that this year would yield a similar (or higher) response rate to enable multiyear comparisons; however, with a response rate so low, any analyses of change would likely be highly biased and nonmeaningful.

The survey identified five key findings:

- The overwhelming majority of officers who responded to the survey believe that residents' input is critical to solving neighborhood problems. However, the officers did not express a great deal of confidence that cooperation is likely. Only a small percentage indicated that they consistently receive information from the community, and only half felt that residents were likely to help officers. Most troubling, only a small minority of officers reported being aware of the Community Police Partnering Center, though the center is reduced to operating in eight of Cincinnati's 53 neighborhoods rather than operating in 22 as in the past.
- Officers who responded to the survey believe that the black community and the media complained unfairly about racial profiling and police abuse of power; however, this perception differed by race. Black police officers were less likely to believe that the black community or the media complained unfairly than were white officers.
- Officers who responded to the survey experience a great deal of stress on the job, including significant disrespect, suspects using

physical force to resist arrest, and feelings of serious danger from physical violence.

- Officers who responded to the survey believe that the CPD command staff is capable of identifying officers who abuse authority but do not feel protection from unreasonable lawsuits or get enough feedback about their performances.
- Despite the problems that the officers identified, they expressed a high level of commitment and derive personal satisfaction from their jobs.

## Methods

### Sampling Strategy

CPD distributed 300 surveys to patrol officers attending training programs at the CPD academy. To avoid disclosing responses to CPD, surveys were anonymous, and the survey packets included prepaid envelopes for returning the surveys directly to Abt SRBI. Abt SRBI entered all returned surveys twice to ensure data accuracy. We developed questions for the police officer survey from a review of the existing research literature on police officer job satisfaction and pared them down to six questions on the officers' background and nine questions on their perceptions of police work in Cincinnati. The survey assessed officers' perceptions of Cincinnati citizens' attitudes, personal safety, working conditions, morale, organizational barriers to effective policing, and fairness in evaluation and promotion.<sup>1</sup> Appendix B contains the specific survey items.

CPD received the surveys in March 2008, and distribution began that same month. All surveys had been distributed by May 2008. Abt SRBI created the final data set on October 10, 2008.

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<sup>1</sup> The following sources were drawn upon to construct the survey items: Hackman and Oldham (1980), Mastrofski et al. (2002), Skogan (1995), and Weisburd et al. (2000).

**Survey Response**

Table 6.1 presents the number of survey respondents contacted and surveys returned. A total sample of approximately 300 officers who had significant citizen interaction in their daily duties received the survey during routine academy training. The surveys were anonymous, so no follow-up was possible. Forty officers returned completed surveys. The response rate was 13 percent.

**Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

Table 6.2 displays the basic demographic characteristics of the officers who responded to the survey. For comparison, the two rightmost columns of the table show the composition of officers who responded to the survey in 2006 and the composition of the department in 2007.

**Results**

**Cooperation and Complaints from Citizens**

The police officer survey asked several questions about the level of cooperation and complaints from citizens. Police officers were asked to rate how likely it is that citizens of Cincinnati would work with the police to try to solve neighborhood problems and about their experiences with citizens providing them information. Approximately half of the officers who responded indicated that it was somewhat or very unlikely that citizens would work with the police to solve neighborhood problems (Table 6.3). This is not surprising, as 78 percent of them reported that they “almost never” or “sometimes” experience citizens providing them with information about a crime. This perception was consistent across districts. The officers who responded to the survey in 2008 held similar

**Table 6.1**  
**Disposition of Survey Responses**

Contacts	Start Date	End Date	Total Completed	Response Rates (%)	2006 Response Rates (%)
300	March 2008	May 2008	40	13	28

**Table 6.2**  
**Respondent Demographics**

Category	Characteristic	n	Percentage	2006 (%)	2007 CPD (%) <sup>a</sup>
Race	Black	8	20	13	31
	White	30	75	82	68
	Other	5	5	4	1
Sex	Male	28	70	80	79
	Female	12	30	20	21
Age	18–25	5	13	2	
	25–35	20	50	35	
	35–50	13	33	54	
	50+	2	5	8	
Rank	Officer	35	88	61	
	Specialist	5	12	22	
District	1	5	13	27	
	2	5	13	12	
	3	9	23	29	
	4	8	20	13	
	5	5	13	11	
Years on force	0–3	14	35	—	
	4–7	8	20	—	
	8–12	11	28	—	
	12+	7	18	—	

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

<sup>a</sup> Race, sex, and rank data reflect CPD composition in 2007 as reported in CCA (2008).

**Table 6.3**  
**Cooperation Between Police and Citizens**

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Somewhat Unlikely	Very Unlikely
Would Cincinnati citizens work with the police to solve neighborhood problems?	5	48	33	15
In your experience, how often do citizens provide information about a crime when they know something and are asked about it by the CPD?	Almost Always	Usually	Sometimes	Almost Never
	3	10	63	25

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

views to those who responded in 2006 (52 percent reported that it was somewhat or very unlikely that citizens would work with the police to solve neighborhood problems).

Police officers were also asked to rate their levels of agreement on several questions related to how much they agreed or disagreed that the black community complained unfairly about racial profiling and police abuse of authority. The majority of responding officers (78 percent) indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed that the black community complained unfairly about racial profiling. Similarly, three-quarters of respondents indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed that the black community complained unfairly about police abuse of authority (see Table 6.4). The officers' agreement about the black community's complaints against the department mirrors those from the previous year's study (93 and 92 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the black community complained unfairly about racial profiling and police abuse of authority, respectively).

Unlike the 2006 survey, in 2008, black officers held different views than white officers. There is a strong racial divide in perceptions of complaints of racial profiling (p-value < 0.01) and police abuse of authority (p-value = 0.03). The black officers were far less likely to report that the black community complained unfairly about racial



**Table 6.4**  
**Blacks' Complaints About Police**

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Blacks complain unfairly about racial profiling.	40	38	18	5
Blacks complain unfairly about police abuse of authority.	35	40	25	0

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

profiling or police use of authority (63 percent disagreed with both statements). This racial difference was not seen in the 2006 survey. Of course, since the response rate was so low, we are unable to attribute this difference to real changes in perceptions rather than sampling bias.

Consistent with their perceptions regarding the black community, the majority of respondents indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed (75 percent) that the media report unfairly about racial profiling, as well as police abuse of authority (74 percent) (see Table 6.5). In contrast, only half the officers indicated that the general community complains unfairly. This pattern of results appears the same as the 2006 survey, in which 93 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the media report unfairly about racial profiling and 87 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the media complain unfairly about police abuse of authority. Similarly, in 2006, around half (41 percent) felt that the community complains unfairly about police abuse of authority.

Again, unlike in 2006, these perceptions differed by race in an analogous fashion to their views of black residents' complaints about the police. While 87 percent of white officers agreed that the media complained unfairly about racial profiling, 63 percent of black officers disagreed. The black officers were evenly split on whether they believed that the media complained unfairly about police abuse of authority; the white officers overwhelmingly believed that they did (83 percent). This racial difference was not observed in 2006. The white and black officers did not differ in their views of the general community's unfair complaints against police abuse of authority. Officers generally

**Table 6.5**  
**Perceived Unfairness of Media and General Community Complaints**

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The media complain unfairly about racial profiling.	25	50	25	0
The media complain unfairly about police abuse of authority.	18	56	25	0
The community complains unfairly about police abuse of authority.	13	35	53	0
It is too easy for a citizen to file a complaint against a police officer.	55	30	15	0

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

thought that the complaint process makes filing a complaint against an officer too easy (85 percent agreed or strongly agreed, which is the exact same percentage to that in 2006). This perception did not vary by officer race, rank, or district. Despite this perception, easy access to a complaint system is critical for community members to trust that their police force is responsive to their concerns. Citizens can file complaints by mail, telephone, fax, or email or in person, indeed offering them easy access to the complaint process. The public would perceive any barriers as a threat to police accountability. An analysis and discussion of those involved in the complaint process are presented in the next chapter.

We also queried officers on the resistance level they face from suspects and citizens during their duties. We asked officers, for example, how many citizens with whom they interacted on the street acted disrespectfully toward police (e.g., making obscene hand gestures, swearing). The officers were split, with half indicating that none or only a few citizens act in a disrespectful way on the street and the other half indicating that most citizens are disrespectful (Table 6.6). We asked officers how many suspects with whom they come into contact attempted to resist arrest through physical force, and almost

**Table 6.6**  
**Citizen Attitude and Behavior Toward Police**

Question	Officers Responding Yes (%)			
	Almost all	Half or more	A few	None
Do citizens on the street act disrespectfully toward police?	10	43	43	5
Do suspects attempt to resist arrest through the use of physical force?	45	48	3	5
When with a criminal suspect, how often do feel that you are in serious danger of physical violence?	18	70	8	5
How would you rate CPD training and procedures on officer safety?	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
	58	33	5	5

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

all respondents (95 percent) indicated that this occurs sometimes, with nearly half (45 percent) reporting that almost all suspects use physical force. This paints a very different picture from the results from the 2006 survey, in which only 7 percent reported that suspects usually use physical force, 67 percent reported that suspects sometimes use physical force, and a quarter reported that suspects never use physical force. It is less likely that the officers are experiencing more physical force, since police use of force has not risen nor has crime during this time period (see Chapter Two for discussion of changes in crime and use of force) and more likely that this difference is due to the fact that the respondents in 2006 and 2008 are not representative of the entire police force.

Perhaps due to the high rates of physical force in resisting arrest, officers reported that it is not uncommon for them to feel in serious danger when dealing with criminal suspects. Eighty-eight percent of respondents indicated that they usually or always feel that they are in serious danger when dealing with suspects. These rates did not vary by the district in which the officer worked. This again is quite different from the previous year, in which only 23 percent reported feeling in serious danger, with more than half reporting sometimes feeling in

serious danger and one-quarter never feeling in serious danger. It may warrant further investigation to determine whether this is a change in suspect behavior, officer perception, or simply in the types of officers who completed surveys.

While the officers reported experiencing a great deal of disrespect, physical force, and feelings of serious danger, the overwhelming majority felt that the training they received in officer safety was adequate (only 5 percent thought it was poor). Almost all officer respondents (91 percent) indicated that the training that they received from CPD on officer safety was good or excellent, which is the same as the survey from the previous year.

## **Work Environment**

We surveyed officers about several aspects of their daily work environments. We asked officers to indicate their levels of satisfaction with their work environments and the support and feedback they received from police management. In terms of job satisfaction, we asked officers to indicate the extent to which their jobs as police officers were major sources of satisfaction in their lives and whether they had personal commitments to their job. Approximately two-thirds of the officers who responded to the survey indicated that their jobs were major sources of satisfaction in their lives (up from 54 percent in 2006), while 83 percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they were personally committed to their jobs (same as 2006 survey) (Table 6.7).

The survey asked several questions about the nature of supervision, feedback, and input in the CPD organization. Table 6.8 shows the results. We asked officers to indicate how strongly they agreed that effective supervision could identify police officers who abused their authority, and 78 percent strongly agreed or agreed. We asked officers to indicate how likely police management was to help fix a problem that their units identified. A little more than half of the officers believed this to be likely (58 percent). However, they felt little support and protection from police management regarding lawsuits and accusations; 76

**Table 6.7**  
**Officer Satisfaction**

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
One of the major satisfactions in my life is my job.	8	68	18	8
I have a personal commitment to my job.	18	65	15	3

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

**Table 6.8**  
**Officer Attitudes Toward Management and Administration**

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
CPD command staff can identify officers who abuse authority.	10	68	20	2
Police management is likely to help fix an identified problem.	0	58	25	13
CPD protects its officers from unreasonable lawsuits and accusations.	0	25	58	18

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not some to 100 because of rounding.

percent did not think that CPD offered protection. Officers may have believed that it is not CPD management's role to offer this protection. Again, these numbers are similar to those from the 2006 survey, with the only notable exception being that a larger proportion in the 2008 survey reported that police management is likely to help fix an identified problem (58 percent, up from 30 percent in 2006).

In terms of officer feedback, we asked officers to indicate how likely management was to publicly recognize an officer who was exceptional at his or her job, whether supervisors often provided them with feedback, the level of input they had in their jobs, and the expectations for officers for evaluations and promotions. Most officers (88 percent)

believed that public recognition for exceptional officers was rare. Officers also felt that supervisors did not let them know how well they were performing; only 20 percent thought supervisors gave adequate input, while 80 percent of officers felt they had inadequate input. Officers were mixed on whether they received clear guidance from the CPD on what was expected of officers for evaluations and promotion, with around two-fifths of respondents perceiving unclear guidance (see Table 6.9). It is hard to compare these numbers with the 2006 survey, which found that 75 percent of respondents believed that management does not publicly recognize exceptional officers, 61 percent reported not being appraised of their performance often, and a similar split in opinion over the clarity of performance expectations. There does not appear to be a large difference between the 2006 and 2008 surveys concerning officer attitudes toward supervisor feedback.

In terms of input into their jobs, 40 percent of respondents indicated that they did not have a lot of input into how they did their work, and 60 percent indicated they had a lot (see Table 6.10). The majority of respondents (65 percent) reported that they disagreed or disagreed strongly that it was easy for them to communicate suggestions for improving their jobs. In 2006, 40 percent reported having a lot of input into how they did their jobs, and 73 percent did not feel that it was easy to communicate suggestions for improving their jobs.

**Table 6.9**  
**Officer Attitudes Toward Supervisor Feedback**

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Management publicly recognizes exceptional officers.	0	13	50	38
Supervisors often let me know how well I am performing.	0	20	50	20
CPD provides clear guidance on expectations for evaluations and promotions.	8	55	28	10

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

**Table 6.10**  
**Officer Input to Management**

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
I have a lot of input into how I do my job.	5	55	30	10
I can easily communicate suggestions to management.	3	33	50	15

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

## Community-Policing Knowledge

Officers were asked several questions about their knowledge of the communities in which they work and community-policing philosophy. Approximately 48 percent of officers who responded to the survey indicated that they were familiar with the Community Police Partnering Center in 2006, but, in 2008, only 15 percent were familiar with it. This compares with 20 percent of the general population of Cincinnati that we found in our 2005 survey of Cincinnati residents. It does suggest that fewer officers are aware of the Community Police Partnering Center in 2008 than were in 2006. This is potentially problematic, as CPD is attempting to integrate community policing into its system, and knowledge of this resource is an important component of the initiative.

Officers were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that police officers should try to solve noncrime problems in their districts, make frequent informal contact with people in their districts to establish trust and cooperation, and find out what residents think are the neighborhood problems, in order to focus their efforts on these issues (see Table 6.11). Almost all officers (90 percent) felt that consulting with community residents was an important part of the problem-solving process. Most (96 percent) also felt that working with residents was key in solving crime. However, officers were split on whether CPD officers should also take on solving non–crime-related problems in their

**Table 6.11**  
**Officer Attitudes About Community Relations**

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
A good officer consults with residents about problems.	15	80	2	0
Officers should work with residents to solve crime problems in their districts.	30	70	0	0
Officers should try to solve noncrime problems in their districts.	5	53	38	5
Officers should make frequent informal contact with people in their districts.	43	55	3	0

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

districts, a central tenet of the community-policing model. Finally, almost all respondents (96 percent) indicated that police officers should make frequent informal contact to establish trust and cooperation with citizens. These numbers are almost identical to those from the 2006 survey.

The police officer survey also asked respondents several questions about their levels of support for various crime-control philosophies of police work. We asked officers to indicate the extent to which they thought that a good patrol officer works proactively, stopping cars, checking people out, running license checks, and so forth. Most officers who responded to the survey (83 percent) indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed that these proactive activities were signs of a good patrol officer. We also asked officers to indicate the extent to which they agreed that enforcing the law was a patrol officer's most important responsibility and whether police officers had reason to be distrustful of most citizens. The majority of respondents (71 percent) indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed that enforcing the law was an officer's highest priority. Finally, we asked officers to indicate whether they should be distrustful of most citizens, and officers were



split: Forty percent believed that police officers had reason to be distrustful of most citizens, while 60 percent disagreed that they should be distrustful of most citizens (see Table 6.12). Again, these numbers are similar to those from the 2006 survey.

Conclusions

Results from the police officer survey are based on 40 returned surveys. With a response rate of 13 percent, those who chose to respond to this survey may differ systematically from those who chose not to respond. The survey was voluntary and anonymous, so we cannot discern what differences there might be between responders and nonresponders. Additionally, since the response rate was much lower than the survey performed in 2006, it is impossible to determine whether differences reflect real changes in perceptions, attitudes, or behaviors or are simply a result of sampling bias.

For those who responded to the survey, the findings indicate a high level of commitment to their jobs, but, at the same time, these officers suffer strains from the community and citizens with whom they interact. The majority of responding officers thought that the media and the black community complained unfairly about racial profiling and police abuse of authority, but these perceptions differed by

Table 6.12  
Officer Attitudes About Responsibility

Statement	Officer Opinion on Statement (%)			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
A good patrol officer works proactively.	33	50	18	0
Enforcing the law is an officer's most important responsibility.	23	48	30	0
Officers have reason to be distrustful of most citizens.	8	33	53	8

NOTE: In some cases, percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

race, which could lead to intradepartmental friction. The majority of the black officers did not believe that the black community or media unfairly complained about racial profiling or abuse of power, while the majority of white officers did. Additionally, an overwhelming majority of the officers reported working under physically dangerous conditions, with 93 percent reporting that half or more suspects attempt to resist arrest through physical force and 88 percent reporting that they feel half or more of the time that they are in serious danger of physical harm when they are with a criminal suspect.

Police officers who responded to the survey also appear to have been knowledgeable about community policing but not about the Community Police Partnering Center. Although the majority of officers who responded to the survey viewed enforcing the law as their highest priority, they were also aware that informal interactions with citizens were an important method for solving problems and crime. Officers who responded to the survey also expressed a high level of agreement that community residents should help shape police work priorities. However, almost half of the officers still felt that non-crime-related problems in their districts were not their concern. They generally felt that proactively stopping cars and “checking people out” were components of good police work. Such practices, though, taken to extreme, may tax the relationship between the police and community members.

## Citizen and Officer Satisfaction with the Complaint Process

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### Overview

RAND was also asked to conduct a survey of officers and citizens who were parties to official complaints. The survey assessed the perceived fairness of the complaint process, the level of input that citizens and officers had in the process, and justifications for the final resolution. Additionally, the survey asked for input from officers and citizens on improving the internal complaint process. We distributed surveys to each officer and each citizen involved in each complaint handled through the Citizen Complaint Resolution Process (CCRP), IIS, and CCA investigative process.<sup>1</sup> The surveys were distributed after case closure and along with the final disposition of the complaint.

Few officers and citizens responded to the survey in 2008, although we received more than in 2006 (23 officer and 12 citizen survey in 2008 compared to 11 officer and eight citizen surveys in 2006). With so few responses, we cannot draw any inferences about the population of all citizens or officers involved in official complaints in either year, but we can comment on perceptions that the respondents indicated.

The survey identified five key findings:

- The complaint-review process did appear to be working, in that respondents indicated that investigators followed up on a major-

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<sup>1</sup> All CCA cases are also investigated by CPD's IIS or the CCRP. CCA does not investigate all complaint cases that CPD investigates. An individual may receive a survey from the CCA and potentially a second one from CPD at the time of the case closure.

ity of complaints (100 percent of police officers and 92 percent of complainants).

- Officers who responded tended to have more-favorable opinions of the investigation than complainants had. Three-quarters of the officers felt that their views were considered and that they were treated with respect and dignity, while only a third of complainants felt their views were considered, and just half reported being treated with dignity and respect.
- Officers and citizens who responded to the survey had disparate views on the honesty of the investigators; three-quarters of the officers—but only two-fifths of the citizens—thought the investigators were honest. There are three complaint processes managed by two organizations, but we had insufficient data to discern differences between the processes.
- Both officers and citizens who responded to the survey felt that the process allowed them to tell their side of the story, but only half of them thought that the investigators understood the facts of the case.
- Officers who responded were more satisfied with the complaint process and outcome than citizens who responded to the survey.

## Methods

### Sampling Strategy

In our complaint-survey effort for the 2005 report, we distributed surveys to parties involved in 169 complaints, and we received completed surveys from 34 citizens and 19 officers. For the 2006 report's survey effort, we made large changes to the survey and its distribution in an attempt to increase the response rate from all parties involved. We changed the distribution of the survey so that each of the three complaint processes would distribute the survey and complaint resolution to each officer and each citizen. In this way, the incident to which the survey refers would be a recent event and might improve response and recall. We also made the surveys anonymous by removing questions, including complaint identifiers, that could identify the respondent. Although this increases

confidentiality and eliminates the need for signed consent, it does prevent follow-up to decrease nonresponse and precludes the analysis from linking the survey to the complaint itself. Additionally, for the officer-complaint survey, we replaced the cover letter with one from Chief Streicher and FOP president Kathy Harrell encouraging officer participation. Lastly, we reduced the number of questions from 33 in the 2005 report to 22 in the 2006 report. We estimate that the survey took respondents five minutes to complete. Appendix C contains the survey items.

CPD received the surveys in March 2008, and distribution began shortly after. Table 7.1 shows the number of surveys distributed and received. Abt SRBI created the data set used for analysis in this chapter on October 6, 2008.

The survey response rate was low—12 percent for officers and 8 percent for citizens. We received more returned surveys in 2008 than in 2006, but the response rates are about half the size; we received 20 percent completed surveys for officers and 15 percent completed surveys from citizens in 2006. These response rates are extremely low; however, due to the manner in which the survey is disseminated, traditional strategies for increasing survey response (e.g., offering incentives, additional mailings, follow-up phone calls) are impossible. It is also important to note that the officers and citizens responding to the survey were probably not involved in the same complaint cases.

**Table 7.1**  
**Number of Surveys Distributed and Received**

Responsible Body	Distributed to Officers	Distributed to Complainants
IIS	110	86
CCA	77	60
	Officer Surveys Received	Complainant Surveys Received
RAND	23	12

### Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Table 7.2 displays the demographic characteristics of those who responded to the survey. Six citizens who responded to the survey were black and six were white. In comparison, five officers who responded to the survey were black and 18 were white. All of the officers were male, as were seven of the citizens.

**Table 7.2**  
**Demographics of Respondents**

Category	Characteristic	Officer (n)	Citizen (n)	CCA Allegations 2007 Officer (%) <sup>a</sup>
Sex	Male	23	7	62
	Female	0	5	35
Race	Black	5	6	35
	White	18	6	62
Age	Under 18	0	0	—
	18–25	1	1	—
	25–35	16	2	—
	35–50	6	8	—
	Over 50	0	1	—
Rank	Officer	20	—	—
	Specialist	2	—	—
	Sergeant	1	-	—
Years at CPD	0–3	5	—	—
	4–7	9	—	—
	9–12	6	—	—
	12+	3	—	—

<sup>a</sup> From CCA (2007).

## Nature and Characteristics of Complaints

First, we examined the nature and characteristics of the complaints associated with the survey respondents. Table 7.3 shows descriptive statistics of these incidents. Most of the complaints were in regard to face-to-face interactions between officers and citizens (91 percent of officer surveys and 67 percent of citizen surveys). In most cases, the incident had other witnesses (70 percent of officers and 50 percent of citizens). The police officers who answered the survey reported that the complaints lodged against them were generated mostly from incidents in which the police initiated contact (e.g., traffic stop), although a significant number came from calls for service (40 percent). Citizens reported a variety of mechanisms for the contact that resulted in a complaint, and there was no identifiable pattern (e.g., there was not a larger number of complaints from citizens acting as witnesses, being pulled over for traffic stops, or calling the police for service).

Of those who reported filing a complaint, one reported being physically injured during the interactions that resulted in the official complaint. Four officers reported that a civilian was injured during the incident.

Table 7.4 shows the distribution of the reported reasons for the complaint. The majority (92 percent) of complainants accused the police of discourtesy or an unprofessional attitude. The officers reported complaints based on criminal misconduct (9 percent), serious misconduct (9 percent), discrimination (18 percent), excessive use of force (40 percent), improper pointing of firearm (9 percent), improper search and seizure (9 percent), and sexual misconduct (4 percent). Citizens, on the other hand, reported their complaints being based on criminal misconduct (8 percent), serious misconduct (25 percent), discrimination (25 percent), lack of timely or proper service (33 percent), excessive use of force (8 percent), improper pointing of firearm (8 percent), and improper search and seizures (8 percent).

**Table 7.3**  
**Nature of the Complaint**

Survey	Officers (n)	Citizens (n)
Was the complaint filed because of a face-to-face interaction?		
Yes	21	8
No	1	3
District in which the incident that generated the complaint occurred.		
1	4	1
2	5	1
3	1	2
4	7	1
5	6	1
There were other police officers witnesses to the incident. (number indicating yes)	17	n.a.
There were other civilian witnesses to the incident. (number indicating yes)	16	6
Was a civilian injured during the incident? (number indicating yes)	4	1
What initiated the incident?		
Call for service	9	n.a.
Officer initiated stop	12	n.a.
Other	2	n.a.
Why did you have contact with the police officer(s)?		
I called for the police.	n.a.	3
The police stopped me.	n.a.	2
I witnessed the incident.	n.a.	1
Other	n.a.	5

NOTE: n.a. = not applicable.



**Table 7.4**  
**Reason for the Complaint**

Survey: What were the reasons for complaint? (multiple)	Officers (n)	Citizens (n)	CCA (%) <sup>a</sup>
Discourtesy or unprofessional attitude	0	9	12
Criminal misconduct	2	1	—
Serious misconduct	2	3	—
Discrimination	4	3	6
Lack of timely or proper service	0	4	17
Excessive use of force	9	1	33
Improper pointing of firearm	2	1	9
Improper searches and seizures	2	1	17
Sexual misconduct	1	0	0

<sup>a</sup> Source: CCA (2007).

## Investigation of Complaints

In terms of the investigation of the complaints, 11 of the 12 citizens and all of the officers indicated that an investigator contacted them about the complaint (see Table 7.5). Most were also asked to attend a meeting to resolve the complaint (seven citizens and 16 officers), and some actually did attend (two citizens and 15 officers).

## Satisfaction with Process and Outcomes

Citizens were asked to indicate their levels of satisfaction with the complaint-review process. Specifically, we asked respondents to indicate the extent to which, during the investigation and review process, their views were considered and how much they thought that those investigating the complaint showed care for their concerns. There was a lot of diversity among both officers and citizens in how they felt about the

**Table 7.5**  
**Responses to Complaints**

Survey	Officers (n)	Citizens (n)
Did the investigator contact you about the complaint? [number indicating yes]	23	11
Were you asked to attend a meeting regarding this complaint? (number indicating yes)	16	7
Did you attend a meeting regarding this complaint? (number indicating yes)	15	2
Why did some officers not attend?		
[I] was told I didn't need to attend.	0	n.a.
The civilian did not want to attend.	4	n.a.
Other	2	n.a.
Why did some complainants not attend?		
The meeting would be pointless.	n.a.	2
I did not want to see the officer again.	n.a.	1
I was not interested in attending the meeting.	n.a.	1

**Table 7.6**  
**Characteristics of Investigation**

Survey	Respondent	Response to Survey (n)			
		A Great Deal	A Fair Amount	Only a Little	Not at All
Did investigators consider your views?	Officer	9	8	3	3
	Citizen	3	1	2	5
Were you treated with respect and dignity?	Officer	9	8	4	2
	Citizen	5	1	2	4

investigation of complaints, but, in general, the officers who returned their surveys felt that they were listened to and respected more than the citizens. Three-quarters of the officers felt that the investigators

considered their views, while only one-third of the citizens felt this way. Again, 77 percent of the officers felt that they were treated with respect and dignity during the process as opposed to 55 percent of the citizens (see Table 7.6).

Respondents were also asked to indicate their levels of agreement with statements regarding their overall treatment during the review and investigation (see Table 7.7). Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed that they were treated the same as anyone else in a similar situation, that officials investigating the case were basically honest, that the decisions made about their complaint were based on facts, and that the process allowed them to tell their side of the story. Seven citizens (63 percent) and 19 officers (83 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that they were treated the same as anyone else in a similar situation. Officers and citizens had uneven

**Table 7.7**  
**Treatment of Complaints**

Survey	Respondent	Response to Survey (n)			
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
I was treated the same as anyone else in a similar situation.	Officer	4	15	4	0
	Citizen	3	4	1	4
Officials investigating and reviewing case were honest.	Officer	7	11	3	2
	Citizen	4	1	1	6
Officials accurately understood the facts of the incident.	Officer	6	9	2	6
	Citizen	3	2	1	6
The process allowed you to tell your side of the story.	Officer	5	17	1	0
	Citizen	4	4	0	4

views on investigators' honesty; 18 officers (78 percent) thought the investigators were honest, and five citizens (42 percent) held this belief. However, in many cases, those involved in the complaint did not think that investigators had the facts of the case straight; roughly half of the officers and half of the citizens who responded to the survey did not think that officials understood the facts. Generally, both officers and citizens felt that the process allowed them to tell their side of the story (75 and 72 percent, respectively). These results suggest that citizens and officers who responded to the survey may not have been happy with the complaint process but acknowledged that the process allowed them to tell their side of the story.

Survey respondents were asked whether they thought that the outcomes of their complaints were fair. Table 7.8 shows the results. About half the officers thought the process was fair and were satisfied with the process. Citizens were less impressed with the process; seven (58 percent) of them believed that the process was not fair and were not satisfied with the process. These findings are consistent with other research that finds that citizens who respond to surveys on civilian review or complaint processes generally have a low level of satisfaction with the process (Walker and Herbst, 2001). On the other hand, this may reflect respondents to such surveys being a selected group of complainants who are more likely to be vocal about their dissatisfaction.

**Table 7.8**  
**Fairness of and Satisfaction with Complaint Process**

Statement	Respondent	Response to Statement (n)			
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The outcome was fair.	Officer	6	7	5	5
	Citizen	1	3	1	6
I am satisfied with the complaint process.	Officer	2	10	7	4
	Citizen	1	3	1	6

As we expect, there appears to be a relationship between complaint outcome and satisfaction, but the empirical evidence is extremely weak given the small number of responses. Half of the respondents did not know or understand the resolution of the complaint when they completed the survey (the survey was included with the disposition of the complaint). However, in the three cases in which the complaint was not sustained or unfounded, the complainant believed that the outcome was unfair. Two of the complaints ended with a sustained charge, and both of those respondents were satisfied and believed that the outcomes of their cases were fair.

In more than half of the cases, citizens wished no punishment at all for the officer—just a warning from the officer's supervisor or an apology. In two cases, citizens were at the other extreme, wishing that the officer be fired, if not also charged with a crime.

## Conclusions

Results from the complainant survey are based on an extremely small number of responses from citizens and officers involved in official complaints. With such a low response rate, the results could not be generalized to all citizens and officers involved in official complaints. For those who did return surveys, the complaint-review process did appear to be working, in that respondents indicated that investigators followed up on a majority of complaints and both officers and citizens had an opportunity to present their views.

There was diversity among both officers and citizens in how they felt about the investigation of complaints. Some respondents felt that investigators carefully weighed their views, while others felt that they were not treated with respect and that their views concerning the incident were not valued in the process. Most citizens who responded did not feel that the process was fair nor were they satisfied, though three of those who did not have their complaints sustained were still satisfied with the process.

Unfortunately, with so few returned surveys, we are unable to draw any conclusions about the perceptions and experiences of those

involved in the complaint process. It is likely that the people who chose to complete and return the surveys were different from those who did not and held much stronger opinions (perhaps both positive and negative) of the process and outcomes of their cases. Therefore, the numbers reported in this chapter may not be representative of the population of those involved in the complaint process.

## Summary and Conclusions

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This fourth-year evaluation report aims to measure the impact of the collaborative agreement on police-community relations in Cincinnati. We approached this task from multiple directions, directly surveying the residents of Cincinnati, analyzing data on interactions between the police and citizens, and documenting the actions and communication quality observed in video recordings of traffic stops.

### Data Issues

In the initial years of our study, data quality was a significant problem. This improved dramatically in the past four years. In 2004, 20 percent of stops were not documented, and, among those that were documented, 16 percent were missing critical information, such as time and place the stop occurred or the driver's race. Our first analysis of video records in 2005 was hampered by the unavailability of 60 percent of requested recordings. This year, we found that, with the exception of District 1, about 13 percent of traffic stops recorded in CPD dispatch logs do not have an associated contact card, down substantially from the 2004 rate. Only 0.7 percent of stops documented in 2007 were missing critical information. In addition, only 17 percent of requested video recordings were unavailable for this year's report. With these lower levels of missing data, we can be more confident in the validity of our findings.

## Progress Toward the Goals of the Collaborative Agreement

The collaborative agreement identifies five areas that it is intended to address: the development of proactive police-community partnerships on problem-solving; building relationships between the police and the community; improving CPD's staffing, training, and management practices in several dimensions; ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all members of the community; and developing methods to increase support for the police. Our evaluation was intended to measure progress toward the meeting the goals of the collaborative agreement.

The collaborative agreement's independent monitoring team reported,

In the five years of the Collaborative Agreement and the Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Justice, the City made significant changes in the way it polices Cincinnati. The Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) has improved its training, its policies and procedures, its investigations of uses of force and citizen complaints, its risk management and its accountability. . . . [E]fforts to improve relations between the police department and the community, particularly the African American community, continue to be needed. (Green and Jerome, 2008, p. 1)

Our survey of Cincinnati residents indicates that relations between the police department and the community have, in fact, improved. We found that residents perceive a more professional police department than they did in 2005. This improvement was largest among black respondents who, although they rated CPD less favorably than nonblack respondents, rated the department's professionalism between "Fair" and "Good." Furthermore, residents of Over-the-Rhine reported an even greater increase in perceived police professionalism than the citywide average. This key finding suggests that police-community relations have been heading in the right direction in the past three years.

We also find some evidence that officers have improved in their communication quality when conducting vehicle stops. For example,



they displayed better listening to what the drivers say and improved patience in stops made in 2007 than in 2005. Although these changes are relatively small, they also suggest positive change in police-community relations in the past several years.

Our analysis of the pattern of traffic stops indicates that, in similar circumstances, black and white drivers have similar stop outcomes. They have an equal chance of being searched and an equal chance of having a short traffic stop. We also found no evidence of a department-wide pattern of racial bias in the decision to make stops. These findings endorse the collaborative agreement's goal of "ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all members of the community."

Although we found no convincing evidence of racial bias in the stops of black and similarly situated white drivers, there are facts about policing in Cincinnati that continue to exacerbate the perception of racial bias. We continue to find different policing behavior between black officers and white officers, particularly in stops involving black motorists. White officers tend to be more proactive and more investigative with black drivers and passengers than are black officers. These differences in how white and black officers carry out their duties may fuel the perception of racial profiling and should be eliminated.

In addition, black residents, by virtue of where they live, how police allocate their officers, and other factors, are more likely to encounter enforcement in general and more likely to encounter enforcement of a particularly proactive nature. The outcomes of the law-enforcement encounters may be very similar across the races, but, all other factors being equal, blacks experience interactions with the police more frequently than whites do.

Crime has decreased in recent years, which has had the positive side effect of reducing the number of negative interactions between the police and residents. Crime continues to be concentrated in primarily black neighborhoods; therefore, as we noted in our 2007 report, it may not be possible to field a proactive enforcement strategy that is racially neutral (Schell et al., 2007). The quality, tenor, and tone of such stops are largely under police control. Our analysis of video recordings of traffic stops indicate that officer communication quality has improved over time, a trend that will foster improve police-community relations.

Many factors have shaped policing in Cincinnati in recent years. The intense oversight of federal monitors, numerous policy changes throughout the department, and large reductions in crime in Cincinnati's neighborhoods likely all contributed to the reshaping of police-community relations. Our analysis shows that CPD and the residents of Cincinnati are moving toward the goals of the collaborative and that police-community relations are on the right track. However, significant racial disparities remain, and there is substantial room for further improvement.

The oversight and analysis of police-community relations in Cincinnati by the monitor team and by RAND researchers is ending. Both the monitor team and RAND researchers have found strong evidence of improvement over the course of the agreement but have also documented areas in which additional improvement is needed. There are still substantial gaps between how black and white residents view CPD, how different neighborhoods are policed, and how white and black officers carry out their duties. In light of these ongoing disparities, the improvements that have been seen over the life of the collaborative agreement may be fragile. It will require a continued and concerted effort on the part of CPD and community leaders to maintain progress toward the goals stated in the collaborative agreement, as well as to prevent reversals in the positive trends that we observed while this agreement was in force.

## Police-Community Satisfaction Survey Instrument

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Hello. My name is [name]. I am conducting a survey about community perceptions of police community relations in Cincinnati. This survey is being conducted by RAND, an independent, non-profit institution that is working with community groups and the City of Cincinnati. Participation is completely confidential and I would really appreciate your help.

S1: To start, how many adults age 18 or older live in your household?

Range (1–7)

DK<sup>1</sup>/Refused = 9 (Screen-out S1: DK/Ref<sup>2</sup> screener)

[IF S1 = 2–7]

S2: Since we can interview only one person in each household, may I please speak to the person who had his/her birthday most recently? Please include anyone at least 18 years old or older who lives at your house, whether they are at home now or not.

1>Designated respondent currently on phone.

2>Designated respondent was brought to phone (RE-INTRODUCE, CONFIRM THAT RESPONDENT IS 18+ AND CONTINUE).

---

<sup>1</sup> DK = don't know.

<sup>2</sup> Ref = refused.

3>Designated respondent not available (SCHEDULE CALL-BACK).

4>Designated respondent refuses to come to the phone (Respondent Soft refusal)

[IF S1 = 1]

S3: Are you/or may I speak to the person age 18 or older?

1>Designated respondent currently on phone.

2>Designated respondent was brought to phone (RE-INTRODUCE, CONFIRM THAT RESPONDENT IS 18+ AND CONTINUE).

3>Designated respondent not available (SCHEDULE CALL-BACK).

4>Designated respondent refuses to come to the phone (Respondent Soft refusal).

1. First, I have a few questions about life in your neighborhood.

What is the name of the neighborhood you live in (e.g., Pleasant Ridge, East Price Hill, Walnut Hills, Camp Washington)?

IF ANSWER IS NOT IN THESE NEIGHBORHOODS OR IS "OTHER/DK/REFUSED" ASK THE FOLLOWING:

Some neighborhoods are associated with more than one name. Is your neighborhood known as any of the following (other) names? (READ LIST OF NEIGHBORHOODS and RECORD IF GIVEN. IF NOT, RECORD INITIAL NEIGHBORHOOD GIVEN.)

Avondale	Fay Apartments	Over the Rhine
Bondhill	Hartwell	Paddock Hills
CBD/Riverfront	Hyde Park	Pendleton
California	Kennedy Heights	Pleasant Ridge
Camp Washington	Linwood	Queensgate
Carthage	Lower Price Hill	Riverside
Clifton	Madisonville	Roselawn
Clifton/University Heights	Millvale	Sayler Park

College Hill	Mount Adams	Sedamsville
Columbia/Tusculum	Mount Airy	South Cumminsville
Corryville	Mount Auburn	South Fairmount
East End	Mount Lookout	Walnut Hills
East Price Hill	Mount Washington	West End
East Walnut Hills	North Avondale	West Price Hill
East Westwood	North Fairmount	Westwood
English Woods	Northside	Winton Hills
Evanston	Oakley	Winton Place
Fairview	O'Bryonville	

97 Other-SPECIFY\_\_\_\_\_—DISCONTINUE SCREEN OUT—OTHER NEIGHBORHOOD AFTER ASKING Q1a.

98 Don't Know—DISCONTINUE SCREEN OUT- DK NB-AFTER ASKING Q1a

99 Refused—DISCONTINUE SCREEN OUT- REF NB-AFTER ASKING Q1A.

ASK, IF Q1 = 97, 98, 99

1a. Do you live within the city limits of Cincinnati?

1. Yes — SCREEN OUT Q1

2. No— S/O<sup>3</sup>-1

8. Don't Know— S/O-1

9. Refused— S/O-1

37. Enter respondent's gender?

1. MALE

2. FEMALE

---

<sup>3</sup> S/O = screen out.

2. When you think of the neighborhood where you live, do you think of

1. YOUR BLOCK
2. A FEW BLOCKS AROUND YOUR HOUSE
3. A SECTION OF THE CITY
8. DK (vol.<sup>4</sup>) (PROBE: "General size of your neighborhood")
9. REF (vol.)

3. How many years have you lived in this neighborhood? (range 0–90) (Enter 0 if less than one year)

98. Don't Know
99. Refused

4. In general, how would you rate your neighborhood as a place to live? (read list)

1. EXCELLENT
2. GOOD
3. FAIR
4. POOR
8. (vol) DK
9. (vol) REF

5. In your opinion, how serious a problem is crime in your neighborhood? (READ LIST)

1. VERY SERIOUS
2. SERIOUS
3. SOMEWHAT SERIOUS
4. NOT VERY SERIOUS
5. NOT A PROBLEM
8. (vol) DK
9. (vol) REF

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<sup>4</sup> vol. = Voluntary.

6. How safe would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night: very safe, reasonably safe, somewhat safe, or very unsafe? (READ LIST)

- 1. VERY SAFE
- 2. REASONABLY SAFE
- 3. SOMEWHAT UNSAFE
- 4. VERY UNSAFE
- 8. (vol) DK (PROBE: “In general. . .”),
- 9. (vol) REF

7. I’m going to read some things you may or may not see in your neighborhood. Please tell me whether you almost never, sometimes, usually, or almost always see the following in your neighborhood. In your neighborhood, how often do you see [list items in table]? Almost never, sometimes, usually, almost always? (Randomize a–e)

- 1. ALMOST NEVER
- 2. SOMETIMES
- 3. USUALLY
- 4. ALMOST ALWAYS
- 8. Don’t Know
- 9. Refused

	AN	S	U	AA	DK	RF
a. Garbage in the streets and empty beer bottles?						
b. Kids hanging out on street corners without adult supervision?						
c. Graffiti on walls, bus stops, and mailboxes?						
d. Drug transactions, or activities that appear to be drug dealing?						
e. People acting disrespectfully toward the police (e.g., yelling obscenities)?						

NOTE: AN = almost never. S = sometimes. U = usually. AA = almost always. RF = refused.

8. During the last 12 months, which of the following have occurred in your neighborhood, that you know of?

- a. armed robberies
- b. murders
- c. sexual assaults
- d. burglaries

1. YES

2. NO

8. DK (PROBE: "Hear of anything. . .")

9. REF

13. Do you participate in any neighborhood associations or activities?

1. YES

2. NO

8. DK

9. REF

14. About how often do you get together with your neighbors?  
(READ LIST)

1. DAILY

2. ONCE OR TWICE A WEEK

3. LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH

4. NEVER

8. (vol.) DK

9. (vol.) REF

16. How many of your relatives, not including those who live in your house, live in your neighborhood? (READ LIST)

1. ALMOST ALL

2. MORE THAN HALF

3. A FEW

4. NONE

8. (vol.) DK (PROBE: "In general. . .")

9. (vol.) REF



17. How much do you trust people in your neighborhood? (READ LIST)

1. A LOT
2. SOMEWHAT
3. A LITTLE BIT
4. NOT AT ALL
8. (vol.) DK (PROBE: "In general. . .")
9. (vol.) REF

Next, I'd like to ask you a few questions about the police in your neighborhood.

18. How would you rate the performance of the Cincinnati Police on working with residents to address local crime problems—would you say it is excellent, good, fair, or poor?

1. EXCELLENT
2. GOOD
3. FAIR
4. POOR
8. (vol.) DK (PROBE—"In general. . .")
9. (vol.) REF

19. In general, how would you rate the quality of police protection in Cincinnati—would you say it's excellent, good, fair, or poor?

1. EXCELLENT
2. GOOD
3. FAIR
4. POOR
8. (vol.) DK (PROBE: "Just your general impression.")
9. (vol.) REF

20. When was the last time you saw a uniformed police officer in your neighborhood? (READ LIST)

1. WITHIN THE PAST 24 HOURS
2. WITHIN THE PAST WEEK
3. WITHIN THE PAST MONTH

4. MORE THAN A MONTH AGO

8. (vol.) DK (PROBE)

9. (vol.) REF

21. Do you know any of the police officers [who] work in your neighborhood, by name or by sight?

1. YES

2. NO

8. (vol.) DK

9. (vol.) REF

23. When it comes to getting its share of police services, would you say that your neighborhood gets more than it needs, about the right amount, or not enough?

1. MORE THAN IT NEEDS

2. ABOUT THE RIGHT AMOUNT

3. NOT ENOUGH

8. (vol.) DK (PROBE: "In general. . .")

9. (vol.) REF

24. Are you familiar with the Community Police Partnering Center?

1. YES

2. NO

8. Don't know

9. REF

25. I'm going to read some things you may or may not see police officers doing in your neighborhood. Please tell me whether you almost never, sometimes, usually, or almost always see police officers doing the following in your neighborhood. How often do you see police officers in your neighborhood [READ OPTIONS FROM TABLE]? Almost never, sometimes, usually, almost always? (Randomize a–d)

1. ALMOST NEVER

2. SOMETIMES

3. USUALLY

4. ALMOST ALWAYS

8. (vol.) Don't Know

9. (vol.) Refused

---

AN S U AA DK RF

---

a. Stopping and questioning motorists

b. Stopping and 'patting down' individuals  
on street corners

c. Making drug arrests

d. Talking to residents about their concerns  
with local crime problems

---

26. In your opinion, would you say the Cincinnati police officers are generally very polite toward people like yourself, somewhat polite, somewhat rude, or very rude?

1. VERY POLITE

2. SOMEWHAT POLITE

3. SOMEWHAT RUDE

4. VERY RUDE

8. (vol.) DK (PROBE: "In general. . .")

9. (vol.) REF

27. I'm going to read some statements that may or may not be used to describe the Cincinnati Police Department. For each one, please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.

The first/next statement is [READ OPTIONS FROM LIST]. Do you

1. AGREE STRONGLY

2. AGREE SOMEWHAT

3. DISAGREE SOMEWHAT

4. DISAGREE STRONGLY

5. (vol.) NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

8. (vol.) Don't Know

9. (vol.) Refused

(RANDOMIZE A-D)

- a. CPD officers consider the views of the people involved when deciding what to do.
- b. CPD officers understand and apply the law fairly.
- c. CPD officers apply the rules consistently regardless of someone's race or ethnicity.
- d. CPD officers treat people with respect and dignity.

28. In their attempts to prevent and solve crimes, officers often have to choose whom to stop, investigate, or talk to. How often should police officers be more suspicious of blacks relative to whites? Always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

- 1. ALWAYS
- 2. OFTEN
- 3. SOMETIMES
- 4. RARELY
- 5. NEVER
- 8. (vol.) Don't Know
- 9. (vol.) Refused

29. Do you think that Cincinnati police officers treat blacks and whites with equal suspicion? Would you say the treatment is definitely equal, somewhat equal, somewhat unequal, or definitely unequal?

- 1. DEFINITELY EQUAL
- 2. SOMEWHAT EQUAL
- 3. SOMEWHAT UNEQUAL
- 4. DEFINITELY UNEQUAL
- 8. (vol.) DK (PROBE: "In general. . .")
- 9. (vol.) REF

30. Next, I'm going to read some decisions the CPD makes. Please tell me if you think the CPD makes these decisions based on someone's race or ethnic background almost never, sometimes, usually, or almost always.

In your opinion, how often does CPD make the following types of decisions based on someone's race or ethnic background?

- 1. ALMOST NEVER

- 2. SOMETIMES
- 3. USUALLY
- 4. ALMOST ALWAYS
- 8. (vol.) Don't Know
- 9. (vol.) Refused

	AN	S	U	AA	DK	RF
a. Which cars to stop for traffic violations						
b. Which people to stop and question on the street						
c. Which people to arrest and take to jail						
d. Which people in the neighborhood to help with their problems						
e. Which areas of the neighborhood to patrol the most frequently						

31. How much do you trust the police officers [who] work for the Cincinnati Police Department? [READ LIST]

- 1. A LOT
- 2. SOMEWHAT
- 3. A LITTLE BIT
- 4. NOT AT ALL
- 8. (vol.) DK (PROBE: "In general. . .")
- 9. (vol.) REF

32. Have you ever felt that you were personally stopped by CPD because of your race or ethnic background?

- 1. YES
- 2. NO
- 8. Don't Know
- 9. REF

33. If yes, why do you think that your race was a factor in the decision to stop you?

OPEN-ENDED RESPONSE

Our last few questions are used to ensure that our sample for this survey accurately reflects the population of Cincinnati as a whole.

34. First, in what year were you born?

19\_\_\_\_ (00–90)

98. Don't Know

99. Refused

35. What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed? [READ IF NECESSARY]

1. LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL (grade 11 or less)

2. HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OR GED (including GED)

3. SOME COLLEGE

4. ASSOCIATE'S DEGREE OR TECHNICAL TRAINING

(2 year)

5. BACHELOR'S DEGREE

6. GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE

8. (vol.) Don't Know

9. (vol.) REF

36. What race do you consider yourself to be? [READ LIST]

1. ASIAN

2. BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN

3. HISPANIC

4. WHITE

5. OTHER

8. (vol.) Don't Know

9. (vol.) REF

38. What category best describes your annual HOUSEHOLD income? [READ LIST]

1. \$20,000 OR LESS

2. MORE THAN \$20,000 BUT LESS THAN \$30,000

3. MORE THAN \$30,000 BUT LESS THAN \$50,000

4. MORE THAN \$50,000 BUT LESS THAN \$75,000

5. MORE THAN \$75,000 BUT LESS THAN \$100,000

6. \$100,000 OR MORE

8. (vol.) DK

9. (vol.) REF

39. Which category best describes your current work status?  
[READ LIST]

1. EMPLOYED FULL OR PART TIME

2. STUDENT

3. UNEMPLOYED/IN BETWEEN JOBS

4. NOT WORKING/NOT LOOKING FOR WORK

5. RETIRED

8. (vol.) Don't know

9. (vol.) Refused

40. What is your current marital status? [READ LIST]

1. MARRIED

2. LIVING WITH PARTNER

3. SEPARATED

4. DIVORCE

5. WIDOWED

6. NEVER MARRIED

8. (vol.) Don't Know

9. (vol.) Refused

41. Do you or your family own the place where you are living now, or do you rent?

1. OWN

2. RENT

8. Don't Know

9. REF

42. How many children, aged 17 or younger, live in your household?

NUMBER (range 0–7, enter 7 for 7+)

98. Don't Know

99. Refused

That completes my interview. Thank you for speaking with me today.



## **Police Officer Survey Instrument**

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This appendix contains facsimile pages of the police officer survey instrument.





## **POLICE OFFICER SURVEY**

POLICE OFFICER SURVEY



**City of Cincinnati  
Fraternal Order of Police**



Dear Fellow Officer:

The RAND Corporation has been selected by the Police Department and the Fraternal Order of Police, Queen City Lodge #69, to conduct a study of police/community relations in Cincinnati. We are asking you to take the time to participate in this process by completing the attached survey.


Just as citizens are being asked to provide feedback on their contacts with officers and their perception of policing in this City, your insight is also valuable in helping to identify the issues you face in your daily contact with the public.

To ensure your confidentiality, all surveys are being returned directly to Abt SRBI, a RAND contractor. A postage-paid envelope is included so that you can mail this survey to Abt SRBI. RAND will treat your answers as completely confidential. RAND will not provide individual information to anyone outside of the RAND research staff, except as required by law.

Although participation in this process is strictly voluntary, we encourage you to have your voice heard. Please complete the survey within the week of receiving it and mail it in the supplied return envelope.

Thank you for taking the time and making the effort to provide your perspective.

Sincerely,

  
Thomas H. Streicher, Jr.  
Police Chief

  
Kathy Harrell  
President, FOP Queen City Lodge 69

### POLICE OFFICER SURVEY

The survey will take you about 15 minutes to complete. Please mail your completed survey to Abt SRBI in the enclosed prepaid envelopes. Abt SRBI is helping us coordinate the survey. They will record your responses and destroy the original surveys.

For additional information:

If you have any questions about the survey you can call collect to speak with Dr. Greg Ridgeway, RAND, (310) 393-0411 ext. 7734 during business hours 9am to 5pm (Pacific) Monday through Friday.

**The following questions ask you about your experience as a police officer in Cincinnati.**

Please mark (X) in the ☐ box to indicate your answer.

**1. How many years have you been a Cincinnati Police Officer?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> 0-3 YEARS
- ☐<sub>2</sub> 4-7 YEARS
- ☐<sub>3</sub> 8-12 YEARS
- ☐<sub>4</sub> MORE THAN 12 YEARS

**2. What is your current rank in the CPD?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> OFFICER
- ☐<sub>2</sub> SPECIALIST
- ☐<sub>3</sub> SERGEANT
- ☐<sub>4</sub> LIEUTENANT
- ☐<sub>5</sub> CAPTAIN
- ☐<sub>6</sub> OTHER

**3. What district do you work in?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> DISTRICT ONE
- ☐<sub>2</sub> DISTRICT TWO
- ☐<sub>3</sub> DISTRICT THREE
- ☐<sub>4</sub> DISTRICT FOUR
- ☐<sub>5</sub> DISTRICT FIVE
- ☐<sub>6</sub> VORTEX (NO PERMANENT DISTRICT)

**4. In your experience, how often do the citizens of Cincinnati provide information about a crime when they know something and are asked about it by the CPD?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> ALMOST ALWAYS
- ☐<sub>2</sub> USUALLY
- ☐<sub>3</sub> SOMETIMES
- ☐<sub>4</sub> ALMOST NEVER



**POLICE OFFICER SURVEY**

5. **How likely are the citizens of Cincinnati to work with the police to try to solve neighborhood problems?**
- ☐<sub>1</sub> VERY LIKELY
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> SOMEWHAT LIKELY
  - ☐<sub>3</sub> SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY
  - ☐<sub>4</sub> VERY UNLIKELY
6. **Are you familiar with the Community Police Partnering Center?**
- ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> NO
7. **How many of the citizens you interact with on the street act disrespectfully towards the police (for example, making hand signals, swearing, derogatory words towards officers)?**
- ☐<sub>1</sub> ALMOST ALL
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> MORE THAN HALF
  - ☐<sub>3</sub> A FEW
  - ☐<sub>4</sub> NONE
8. **How often do suspects you come into contact with attempt to resist arrest through the use of physical force?**
- ☐<sub>1</sub> ALMOST NEVER
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> SOMETIMES
  - ☐<sub>3</sub> USUALLY
  - ☐<sub>4</sub> ALMOST ALWAYS
9. **When you come into contact with a criminal suspect, how often do feel you are in serious danger of physical violence.**
- ☐<sub>1</sub> ALMOST NEVER
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> SOMETIMES
  - ☐<sub>3</sub> USUALLY
  - ☐<sub>4</sub> ALMOST ALWAYS
10. **How would you rate the CPD training and procedures on officer safety?**
- ☐<sub>1</sub> EXCELLENT
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> GOOD
  - ☐<sub>3</sub> FAIR
  - ☐<sub>4</sub> POOR

## POLICE OFFICER SURVEY

11. The following statements ask you to rate your level of AGREEMENT or DISAGREEMENT based on your personal experience as a police officer in Cincinnati.

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
A. "A GOOD PATROL OFFICER WILL TRY TO FIND OUT WHAT RESIDENTS THINK THE NEIGHBORHOOD PROBLEMS ARE AND THEN WILL FOCUS HIS/HER EFFORTS ON THESE ISSUES."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
B. "POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD WORK WITH CITIZENS TO TRY AND SOLVE CRIME RELATED PROBLEMS IN THEIR DISTRICT."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
C. "ENFORCING THE LAW IS A PATROL OFFICER'S MOST IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
D. "POLICE OFFICERS HAVE REASON TO BE DISTRUSTFUL OF MOST CITIZENS"	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
E. "A GOOD PATROL OFFICER IS ONE WHO WORKS PROACTIVELY STOPPING CARS, CHECKING PEOPLE OUT, RUNNING LICENSE CHECKS, AND SO FORTH."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
F. "POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD TRY TO SOLVE NON-CRIME PROBLEMS IN THEIR DISTRICT."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
G. "THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY COMPLAINS UNFAIRLY ABOUT RACIAL PROFILING."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
H. "THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY COMPLAINS UNFAIRLY ABOUT POLICE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
I. "THE MEDIA COMPLAINS UNFAIRLY ABOUT RACIAL PROFILING."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
J. "THE MEDIA COMPLAINS UNFAIRLY ABOUT POLICE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
K. "THE GENERAL COMMUNITY COMPLAINS UNFAIRLY ABOUT POLICE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
L. "CURRENTLY, IT IS TOO EASY FOR A CITIZEN TO FILE A COMPLAINT AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
M. "THERE ARE CLEAR GUIDELINES IN THE CPD THAT DEFINE WHAT 'REASONABLE SUSPICION' IS AND INDICATE WHEN OFFICERS ARE ALLOWED TO STOP AND QUESTION CITIZENS."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
N. "IN ORDER FOR POLICE OFFICERS TO EFFECTIVELY FIGHT STREET CRIME, SOME INNOCENT CITIZENS WILL HAVE TO EXPERIENCE THE OCCASIONAL INCONVENIENCE OF BEING STOPPED OR QUESTIONED BY THE POLICE."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
O. "POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD MAKE FREQUENT INFORMAL CONTACT WITH PEOPLE IN THEIR DISTRICT TO ESTABLISH TRUST AND COOPERATION."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4

## POLICE OFFICER SURVEY

12. The following statements ask you to rate your level of AGREEMENT or DISAGREEMENT about work conditions in the CPD based on your personal experience as a police officer in Cincinnati.

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
A. "CPD SUPERVISORS AND COMMAND STAFF CAN IDENTIFY POLICE OFFICERS WHO ABUSE THEIR AUTHORITY, IF THERE IS SUCH A PROBLEM."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
B. "WHEN MY UNIT IDENTIFIES A PROBLEM, THE POLICE MANAGEMENT IS LIKELY TO HELP FIX THE PROBLEM."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
C. "MANAGEMENT IS LIKELY TO PUBLICLY RECOGNIZE A POLICE OFFICER THAT IS EXCEPTIONAL IN HIS/HER JOB."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
D. "MY SUPERVISORS OFTEN LET ME KNOW HOW WELL I AM PERFORMING."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
E. "THE CPD PROTECTS ITS OFFICERS FROM UNREASONABLE LAWSUITS AND ACCUSATIONS."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
F. "IN GENERAL, I HAVE A LOT OF INPUT OVER HOW I GO ABOUT DOING MY JOB"	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
G. "ONE OF THE MAJOR SATISFACTIONS IN MY LIFE IS MY JOB."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
H. "I HAVE A PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO MY JOB."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
I. "IF I HAD A SUGGESTION FOR IMPROVING MY JOB IN SOME WAY, IT IS EASY FOR ME TO COMMUNICATE MY SUGGESTIONS TO MANAGEMENT IN THE CPD"	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
J. "THE CPD PROVIDES CLEAR GUIDANCE ON WHAT IS EXPECTED OF OFFICERS FOR EVALUATIONS AND PROMOTIONS."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4



**POLICE OFFICER SURVEY**

Our last few questions are used to ensure that our sample for this survey accurately reflects the population of Cincinnati police officers.

**13. What is your age?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> UNDER 25
- ☐<sub>2</sub> 25-35
- ☐<sub>3</sub> 36-50
- ☐<sub>4</sub> OVER 50

**14. What race do you consider yourself to be?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN
- ☐<sub>2</sub> WHITE
- ☐<sub>3</sub> OTHER

**15. What is your gender?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> MALE
- ☐<sub>2</sub> FEMALE

Thank you for participating in this survey. Please mail your completed survey in the enclosed prepaid envelopes to Abt SRBI. Abt SRBI is helping us coordinate the survey. They will record your responses and then destroy the original survey. To preserve confidentiality do not put your name on the survey or the envelope.

Abt SRBI - David Ciemnecki  
275 Seventh Ave, Suite 2700, New York, NY 10001



POLICE OFFICER SURVEY



**POLICE OFFICER SURVEY**



## **Complaint Survey Instruments**

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This appendix contains facsimiles of the complaint surveys.





## **POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY**

POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY



**City of Cincinnati  
Fraternal Order of Police**



Dear Fellow Officer:

The RAND Corporation has been selected by the Police Department and the Fraternal Order of Police, Queen City Lodge #69, to conduct a study of police/community relations in Cincinnati. We are asking you to take the time to participate in this process by completing the attached survey about your recent experience with the citizen complaint process.

Just as the person who filed the complaint is being asked to provide feedback on their experience, your insight is also valuable in helping to identify your perception of the process.

To ensure your confidentiality, all surveys are being returned directly to Abt SRBI, a RAND contractor. A postage-paid envelope is included so that you can mail this survey to Abt SRBI. RAND will treat your answers as completely confidential. RAND will not provide individual information to anyone outside of the RAND research staff, except as required by law.

Although participation in this process is strictly voluntary, we encourage you to have your voice heard. Please complete the survey within the week of receiving it and mail it in the supplied return envelope.

Thank you for taking the time and making the effort to provide your perspective.

Sincerely,

Thomas H. Streicher, Jr.  
Police Chief

Kathy Harrell  
President, FOP Queen City Lodge 69





## POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY

### POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY

The survey will take you about 5 minutes to complete. Please mail your completed survey to Abt SRBI in the prepaid envelopes. Abt SRBI is helping us coordinate the survey. They will record your responses and destroy the original surveys.

For additional information:

If you have any questions about the survey you can call collect to speak with Dr. Greg Ridgeway, RAND, (310) 393-0411 ext. 7734 during business hours 9am to 5pm (Pacific) Monday through Friday.

Please mark (X) in the ☐ box to indicate your answer where applicable.

**First, we would like to ask a few questions about the incident that caused the complaint.**

1. **Was this complaint filed as a result of a face-to-face interaction with a civilian?**
  - ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> NO
2. **In which district did the incident that generated the complaint occur?**
  - ☐<sub>1</sub> DISTRICT ONE
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> DISTRICT TWO
  - ☐<sub>3</sub> DISTRICT THREE
  - ☐<sub>4</sub> DISTRICT FOUR
  - ☐<sub>5</sub> DISTRICT FIVE
3. **Were there any other police officers that witnessed the incident?**
  - ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> NO
4. **Other than the person who filed the complaint, were there any other civilian witnesses to the incident?**
  - ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> NO
5. **What initiated the incident?**
  - ☐<sub>1</sub> I WAS RESPONDING TO A CALL FOR SERVICE
  - ☐<sub>2</sub> I STOPPED OR DETAINED THE CIVILIAN (E.G. TRAFFIC STOP, INVESTIGATION)
  - ☐<sub>3</sub> OTHER

## POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY

6. How would you describe the reason or reasons given by the citizen for filing the complaint against you?

Mark (X) next to ALL that apply to your complaint situation.

- ☐<sub>1</sub> DISCOURTESY/UNPROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE
- ☐<sub>2</sub> LACK OF PROPER OR TIMELY SERVICE
- ☐<sub>3</sub> CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT
- ☐<sub>4</sub> SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
- ☐<sub>5</sub> SERIOUS MISCONDUCT (E.G. SEVERE PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS, ETC.)
- ☐<sub>6</sub> EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE
- ☐<sub>7</sub> UNNECESSARY POINTING OF FIREARMS AT PERSONS
- ☐<sub>8</sub> IMPROPER SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
- ☐<sub>9</sub> DISCRIMINATION
- ☐<sub>10</sub> ANY OTHER REASON

7. Was any civilian injured during the incident?

- ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
- ☐<sub>2</sub> NO

8. How many police officers were accused in the complaint?

- ☐<sub>1</sub> ONE (JUST YOU)
- ☐<sub>2</sub> TWO
- ☐<sub>3</sub> THREE OR MORE

9. What was the race of the civilian who filed the complaint? (If more than one civilian, what was the race of the civilian with the most serious accusation.)

- ☐<sub>1</sub> WHITE
- ☐<sub>2</sub> BLACK
- ☐<sub>3</sub> OTHER RACE

Now we would like to ask you some questions about your experiences with the investigation of the complaint.

10. Did an investigator contact you about the complaint?

- ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
- ☐<sub>2</sub> NO

**POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY**

11. Were you asked to attend a meeting regarding this complaint?
- ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
- ☐<sub>2</sub> NO
12. Did you attend a meeting regarding this complaint?
- ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
- ☐<sub>2</sub> NO
- IF NO, WHY NOT?
- ☐<sub>3</sub> I WAS TOLD I DIDN'T NEED TO ATTEND
- ☐<sub>4</sub> THE CIVILIAN DID NOT WANT TO ATTEND
- ☐<sub>5</sub> OTHER
13. During the investigation and review process how much did those investigating the complaint consider your version of events?
- ☐<sub>1</sub> A GREAT DEAL
- ☐<sub>2</sub> A FAIR AMOUNT
- ☐<sub>3</sub> ONLY A LITTLE
- ☐<sub>4</sub> NOT AT ALL
14. During the investigation and review process of the complaint how much do you feel you were treated with politeness, respect and dignity?
- ☐<sub>1</sub> A GREAT DEAL
- ☐<sub>2</sub> A FAIR AMOUNT
- ☐<sub>3</sub> ONLY A LITTLE
- ☐<sub>4</sub> NOT AT ALL

POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY

15. How much do you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following statements about the citizen complaint process?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
A. "I WAS TREATED THE SAME AS ANYONE ELSE IN A SIMILAR SITUATION."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
B. "THE OFFICIALS INVESTIGATING AND REVIEWING MY CASE WERE HONEST."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
C. "THE OFFICIALS INVESTIGATING MY CASE ACCURATELY UNDERSTOOD THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
D. "THE PROCESS ALLOWED ME TO TELL MY SIDE OF THE STORY."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
E. "THE OUTCOME WAS FAIR."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4

16. Overall, how satisfied are you with the complaint review process in this case?

- ☐1 VERY SATISFIED
- ☐2 SATISFIED
- ☐3 UNSATISFIED
- ☐4 VERY UNSATISFIED

17. What was the actual outcome of the complaint?

- ☐1 SUSTAINED
- ☐2 NOT SUSTAINED
- ☐3 EXONERATED
- ☐4 UNFOUNDED
- ☐5 OPEN CASE
- ☐6 NO JURISDICTION
- ☐7 DON'T KNOW YET

### POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY

Lastly, the following questions ask for basic information about you and your experience. All your responses will be kept confidential

**18. How many years have you been a Cincinnati Police Officer?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> 0-3 YEARS
- ☐<sub>2</sub> 4-7 YEARS
- ☐<sub>3</sub> 8-12 YEARS
- ☐<sub>4</sub> MORE THAN 12 YEARS

**19. What is your current rank in the CPD?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> OFFICER
- ☐<sub>2</sub> SPECIALIST
- ☐<sub>3</sub> SERGEANT
- ☐<sub>4</sub> LIEUTENANT OR ABOVE

**20. What is your gender?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> MALE
- ☐<sub>2</sub> FEMALE

**21. What race do you consider yourself to be?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN
- ☐<sub>2</sub> WHITE
- ☐<sub>3</sub> OTHER

**22. What is your age?**

- ☐<sub>1</sub> UNDER 25
- ☐<sub>2</sub> 25-35
- ☐<sub>3</sub> 36-50
- ☐<sub>4</sub> OVER 50

Thank you for participating in this survey. Please mail your completed survey in the enclosed prepaid envelopes to Abt SRBI. Abt SRBI is helping us coordinate the survey. They will record your responses and then destroy the original survey. To preserve confidentiality do not put your name on the survey or the envelope.

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275 Seventh Ave, Suite 2700, New York, NY 10001



POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY



**POLICE OFFICER COMPLAINT SURVEY**







## **CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY**

**CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY**

**CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY**

RAND, a nonprofit research company, is working with the City of Cincinnati and the ACLU to improve relations between the police department and the community. We would like you to be a part of this effort by expressing your views about the police complaint process. The enclosed survey collects no identifying information, such as your name, address, or the complaint that you filed. Your responses will be kept confidential and cannot be associated with you. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and you may skip any questions that you prefer not to answer. By participating in this study you will be able to provide us with the citizen's perspective on the complaint process. Your honest opinions about your experience will help us identify ways to make the complaint process fairer and less difficult for citizens bringing complaints.

The survey will take you about 5 minutes to complete. Please mail your completed survey to Abt SRBI in the prepaid envelopes. Abt SRBI is helping us coordinate the survey. They will record your responses and destroy the original surveys.

For additional information:

If you have any questions about the survey you can call collect to speak with Dr. Greg Ridgeway, RAND, (310) 393-0411 ext. 7734 during business hours 9am to 5pm (Pacific) Monday through Friday.

### CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY

#### CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY

This survey asks questions about the complaint documented or resolved in this packet. Please answer the following questions regarding only this complaint.

Please mark (X) in the ☐ box to indicate your answer.

**First, we would like to ask a few questions about the incident that caused you to file a complaint.**

- 1. Was the complaint filed because of a face-to-face interaction with a CPD officer?**

☐<sub>1</sub> YES

☐<sub>2</sub> NO

- 2. In which Cincinnati neighborhood did the incident occur? \_\_\_\_\_**

(EXAMPLES: OVER-THE-RHINE, HYDE PARK, WESTWOOD, AVONDALE, CLIFTON)

- 3. Were there any witnesses to the incident besides police officers?**

☐<sub>1</sub> YES

☐<sub>2</sub> NO

- 4. Why did you have contact with the police officer(s)?**

☐<sub>1</sub> I WANTED OR NEEDED POLICE ASSISTANCE

☐<sub>2</sub> THE POLICE STOPPED ME

☐<sub>3</sub> I WITNESSED THE INCIDENT

☐<sub>4</sub> OTHER

- 5. How would you describe the reason or reasons for your complaint?**

MARK (X) NEXT TO ALL THAT APPLY TO YOUR COMPLAINT SITUATION.

☐<sub>1</sub> DISCOURTESY/UNPROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE

☐<sub>2</sub> LACK OF PROPER OR TIMELY SERVICE

☐<sub>3</sub> CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT

☐<sub>4</sub> SEXUAL MISCONDUCT

☐<sub>5</sub> SERIOUS MISCONDUCT (E.G. SEVERE PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS, ETC.)

☐<sub>6</sub> EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE

☐<sub>7</sub> UNNECESSARY POINTING OF FIREARMS AT PERSONS

☐<sub>8</sub> IMPROPER SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

☐<sub>9</sub> DISCRIMINATION

☐<sub>10</sub> ANY OTHER REASON

## CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY

6. Were you (or the person you filed the complaint for) physically injured as a result of the incident?

☐<sub>1</sub> YES

☐<sub>2</sub> NO

7. How many police officers were accused in the complaint?

☐<sub>1</sub> ONE

☐<sub>2</sub> TWO

☐<sub>3</sub> THREE OR MORE

8. What was the race of the police officer? (If more than one was involved, what was the race of the officer with the most troublesome behavior)

☐<sub>1</sub> WHITE

☐<sub>2</sub> BLACK

☐<sub>3</sub> OTHER

☐<sub>4</sub> DON'T KNOW

Now we would like to ask a few questions about your filing of the complaint.

9. Which organization handled your complaint? (mark all that apply)

☐<sub>1</sub> CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW PROCESS (CCRP)

☐<sub>2</sub> CITIZEN COMPLAINT AUTHORITY (CCA)

☐<sub>3</sub> INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION (IIS)

☐<sub>4</sub> DON'T KNOW

10. If you filed the complaint in person or by telephone, did the person who took your complaint act professionally?

☐<sub>1</sub> YES

☐<sub>2</sub> NO

☐<sub>3</sub> I DID NOT FILE IN PERSON OR BY PHONE

Now we would like to ask you some questions about your experiences with the investigation of the complaint.

11. Did an investigator contact you about the complaint?

☐<sub>1</sub> YES

☐<sub>2</sub> NO

## CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY

12. Were you contacted about attending a meeting to address the complaint?
- ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
- ☐<sub>2</sub> NO
13. Did you attend a meeting regarding this complaint?
- ☐<sub>1</sub> YES
- ☐<sub>2</sub> NO
- IF NO, WHY NOT? (MARK THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON)
- ☐<sub>3</sub> THE MEETING WOULD BE POINTLESS
- ☐<sub>4</sub> I DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE OFFICER AGAIN
- ☐<sub>5</sub> I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO ATTEND THE MEETING
- ☐<sub>6</sub> I WAS NOT INTERESTED IN ATTENDING THE MEETING
14. During the investigation and review process how much did those investigating the complaint consider your version of events?
- ☐<sub>1</sub> A GREAT DEAL
- ☐<sub>2</sub> A FAIR AMOUNT
- ☐<sub>3</sub> ONLY A LITTLE
- ☐<sub>4</sub> NOT AT ALL
15. During the investigation and review process of the complaint, how much do you feel you were treated with politeness, respect, and dignity?
- ☐<sub>1</sub> A GREAT DEAL
- ☐<sub>2</sub> A FAIR AMOUNT
- ☐<sub>3</sub> ONLY A LITTLE
- ☐<sub>4</sub> NOT AT ALL

CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY

16. How much do you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following statements about the citizen complaint process?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
A. "I WAS TREATED THE SAME AS ANYONE ELSE IN A SIMILAR SITUATION."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
B. "THE OFFICIALS INVESTIGATING AND REVIEWING MY CASE WERE HONEST."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
C. "THE OFFICIALS INVESTIGATING MY CASE ACCURATELY UNDERSTOOD THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
D. "THE PROCESS ALLOWED ME TO TELL MY SIDE OF THE STORY."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
E. "THE OUTCOME WAS FAIR."	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4

17. Overall, how satisfied are you with the complaint process in this case?

- ☐1 VERY SATISFIED
- ☐2 SATISFIED
- ☐3 UNSATISFIED
- ☐4 VERY UNSATISFIED

18. What would you like to happen to the officer or officers? (mark only one choice)

- ☐1 NO PUNISHMENT NEEDED. IT WAS JUST A MISUNDERSTANDING
- ☐2 THE OFFICER APOLOGIZES
- ☐3 THE OFFICER RECEIVES A WARNING FROM SUPERIORS
- ☐4 THE OFFICER IS REASSIGNED TO DIFFERENT DUTIES
- ☐5 THE OFFICER IS DEMOTED WITH A CUT IN PAY
- ☐6 THE OFFICER IS SUSPENDED TEMPORARILY ("TIME OFF WITHOUT PAY")
- ☐7 THE OFFICER IS FIRED
- ☐8 THE OFFICER IS FIRED AND CHARGED WITH A CRIME



## CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY

## 19. What was the actual outcome of the complaint?

- ☐<sub>1</sub> SUSTAINED
- ☐<sub>2</sub> NOT SUSTAINED
- ☐<sub>3</sub> EXONERATED
- ☐<sub>4</sub> UNFOUNDED
- ☐<sub>5</sub> OPEN CASE
- ☐<sub>6</sub> NO JURISDICTION
- ☐<sub>7</sub> DON'T KNOW YET

The following questions will help us better understand the circumstances surrounding the complaint.  
All your responses will be kept completely confidential.

## 20. What race do you consider yourself to be?

- ☐<sub>1</sub> BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN
- ☐<sub>2</sub> WHITE
- ☐<sub>3</sub> OTHER

## 21. What is your gender?

- ☐<sub>1</sub> MALE
- ☐<sub>2</sub> FEMALE

## 22. What is your age?

- ☐<sub>1</sub> UNDER 18
- ☐<sub>2</sub> 18-25
- ☐<sub>3</sub> 26-35
- ☐<sub>4</sub> 36-50
- ☐<sub>5</sub> 51-65
- ☐<sub>6</sub> OVER 65

Thank you for participating in this survey. Please mail your completed survey in the enclosed prepaid envelopes to Abt SRBI. Abt SRBI is helping us coordinate the survey. They will record your responses and then destroy the original survey. To preserve confidentiality do not put your name on the survey or the envelope.

Abt SRBI - David Ciemnecki  
275 Seventh Ave, Suite 2700, New York, NY 10001

CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY





**CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW SURVEY**





# Summary of Community-Police Satisfaction Survey

**Table D.1**  
**Survey Responses, by Race and Year**

Survey Item	Black		White	
	2005	2008	2005	2008
In general, how would you rate your neighborhood as a place to live? <sup>a</sup>	2.60 (0.04)	2.52 (0.05)	2.23 (0.03)	2.23 (0.04)
How serious a problem is crime in your neighborhood? <sup>b</sup>	2.72 (0.04)	2.60 (0.04)	2.47 (0.03)	2.49 (0.03)
How safe would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night? <sup>c</sup>	2.48 (0.04)	2.41 (0.04)	2.30 (0.03)	2.34 (0.04)
How often do you see the following things?				
Garbage in the streets and empty beer bottles <sup>d</sup>	2.27 (0.05)	2.31 (0.05)	2.27 (0.04)	2.22 (0.05)
Kids hanging out on street corners without adult supervision <sup>d</sup>	2.85 (0.05)	2.70 (0.06)	2.45 (0.04)	2.42 (0.05)
Graffiti on walls, bus stops, and mailboxes <sup>d</sup>	1.78 (0.04)	1.69 (0.05)	1.78 (0.03)	1.78 (0.05)
Drug transactions, or activities that appear to be drug dealing <sup>d</sup>	2.23 (0.05)	2.12 (0.05)	1.76 (0.04)	1.68 (0.04)
People acting disrespectfully toward the police? <sup>d</sup>	1.77 (0.04)	1.72 (0.05)	1.56 (0.03)	1.56 (0.04)

**Table D.1—Continued**

Survey Item	Black		White	
	2005	2008	2005	2008
In the past 12 months, how many serious crimes have occurred in your neighborhood, that you know of?	2.19 (0.04)	2.13 (0.04)	2.24 (0.03)	2.22 (0.04)
Do you participate in any neighborhood associations or activities? (%)	21 (1.5)	23 (1.7)	23 (1.4)	27 (0.02)
About how often do you get together with your neighbors? <sup>e</sup>	2.24 (0.05)	2.18 (0.05)	2.49 (0.03)	2.55 (0.04)
How many of your relatives, not including those who live in your house, live in your neighborhood?	1.60 (0.03)	1.59 (0.03)	1.39 (0.03)	1.37 (0.03)
How much do you trust people in your neighborhood? <sup>f</sup>	2.2 (0.05)	2.3 (0.05)	2.86 (0.04)	2.97 (0.05)
How would you rate the performance of the Cincinnati Police on working with residents to address local crime problems? <sup>a</sup>	2.16 (0.04)	2.33 (0.05)	2.72 (0.03)	2.75 (0.04)
How would you rate the quality of police protection in Cincinnati? <sup>a</sup>	2.08 (0.04)	2.25 (0.04)	2.56 (0.03)	2.64 (0.03)
Would you say the Cincinnati police officers are generally very polite toward people like yourself, somewhat polite, somewhat rude, or very rude? <sup>g</sup>	2.72 (0.04)	2.79 (0.05)	3.31 (0.03)	3.38 (0.04)
CPD officers consider the views of the people involved when deciding what to do. <sup>h</sup>	2.33 (0.04)	2.40 (0.05)	2.93 (0.03)	2.99 (0.03)
CPD officers understand and apply the law fairly. <sup>h</sup>	2.27 (0.04)	2.32 (0.05)	3.05 (0.03)	3.14 (0.04)
CPD officers apply the rules consistently regardless of someone's race or ethnicity. <sup>h</sup>	2.11 (0.04)	2.23 (0.05)	2.87 (0.03)	2.99 (0.04)

**Table D.1—Continued**

Survey Item	Black		White	
	2005	2008	2005	2008
CPD officers treat people with respect and dignity. <sup>h</sup>	2.42 (0.04)	2.56 (0.05)	3.13 (0.03)	3.21 (0.04)
How much do you trust the police officers that work for the Cincinnati Police Department? <sup>f</sup>	2.37 (0.04)	2.55 (0.05)	3.27 (0.03)	3.32 (0.04)
How often do you see the police. . .				
Stopping and questioning motorists? <sup>d</sup>	1.89 (0.04)	1.99 (0.05)	1.62 (0.03)	1.69 (0.04)
Stopping and patting down individuals on street corners? <sup>d</sup>	1.85 (0.05)	1.77 (0.05)	1.29 (0.02)	1.27 (0.03)
Making drug arrests? <sup>d</sup>	1.77 (0.04)	1.73 (0.04)	1.34 (0.02)	1.32 (0.03)
Talking to residents about their concerns with local crime problems? <sup>d</sup>	1.47 (0.04)	1.44 (0.04)	1.44 (0.02)	1.38 (0.03)
Do you think that Cincinnati police officers treat blacks and whites with equal suspicion? <sup>i</sup>	3.30 (0.03)	3.14 (0.04)	2.46 (0.04)	2.34 (0.05)
Does the CPD make the following types of decisions based on someone's race or ethnic background?				
Which cars to stop for traffic violations <sup>d</sup>	2.87 (0.04)	2.78 (0.05)	1.97 (0.03)	1.81 (0.04)
Which people to stop and question on the street <sup>d</sup>	2.88 (0.04)	2.82 (0.05)	2.08 (0.03)	1.93 (0.03)
Which people to arrest and take to jail <sup>d</sup>	2.76 (0.04)	2.67 (0.05)	1.91 (0.03)	1.78 (0.04)
Which people in the neighborhood to help with their problems <sup>d</sup>	2.48 (0.05)	2.37 (0.05)	1.89 (0.03)	1.71 (0.04)
Which areas of the neighborhood to patrol the most frequently <sup>d</sup>	3.03 (0.04)	2.93 (0.05)	2.40 (0.03)	2.21 (0.04)

Table D.1—Continued

Survey Item	Black		White	
	2005	2008	2005	2008
n	1,234	1,209	1,487	1,558

NOTE: Data include mean and, in parentheses, standard error.

<sup>a</sup> 4 = excellent, 3 = good, 2 = fair, 1 = poor.

<sup>b</sup> 4 = very serious, 3 = serious, 2.5 = somewhat serious, 2 = not very serious, 1 = not a problem.

<sup>c</sup> 4 = very safe, 3 = reasonably safe, 2 = somewhat safe, 1 = very unsafe.

<sup>d</sup> 4 = almost never, 3 = sometimes, 2 = usually, 1 = almost always.

<sup>e</sup> 4 = daily, 3 = once or twice per week, 2 = less than once per month, 1 = never.

<sup>f</sup> 4 = a lot, 3 = somewhat, 2 = a little bit, 1 = not at all.

<sup>g</sup> 4 = very polite, 3 = somewhat polite, 2 = somewhat rude, 1 = very rude.

<sup>h</sup> 4 = agree strongly, 3 = agree somewhat, 2.5 = neither agree nor disagree, 2 = disagree somewhat, 1 = disagree strongly.

<sup>i</sup> 4 = definitely equal, 3 = somewhat equal, 2 = somewhat unequal, 1 = definitely unequal.

**Table D.2**  
**Survey Scales, by Neighborhood and Year**

		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
Neighborhood		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Avondale	Mean	2.3	2.5	1.7	1.8	2.8	3.0
	Standard error	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
	n	145	148	146	147	141	147
Bondhill	Mean	2.4	2.6	1.7	1.5	2.9	2.8
	Standard error	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)
	n	89	118	89	118	88	118
CBD/ Riverfront	Mean	2.4	2.3	1.5	1.5	2.8	2.5
	Standard error	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.20)
	n	28	20	28	20	24	20
Camp Washington	Mean	3.0	2.7	1.3	1.8	1.7	2.3
	Standard error	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.16)
	n	13	20	13	20	12	20

Table D.2—Continued

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Carthage	Mean	3.0	2.6	1.5	1.3	2.3	2.0
	Standard error	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.16)
	n	22	27	21	27	22	26
Clifton	Mean	2.9	2.9	1.4	1.4	2.4	2.3
	Standard error	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
	n	77	119	77	119	74	117
Clifton/ University Heights	Mean	2.6	2.9	1.5	1.3	2.3	2.1
	Standard error	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)
	n	78	76	78	76	78	73
College Hill	Mean	2.6	2.9	1.5	1.4	2.6	2.4
	Standard error	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)
	n	136	150	136	150	133	148
Columbia/ Tusculum	Mean	2.5	3.1	1.9	1.4	2.5	2.0
	Standard error	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.08)
	n	27	27	27	27	26	27



Table D.2—Continued

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Corryville	Mean	2.2	2.9	1.6	1.7	2.8	2.3
	Standard error	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.15)
	n	34	21	34	21	34	20
East End	Mean	2.5	2.8	1.1	1.5	2.7	1.9
	Standard error	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.12)
	n	20	28	20	28	19	28
East Price Hill	Mean	2.8	2.7	1.8	1.7	2.3	2.1
	Standard error	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
	n	161	114	161	114	161	113
East Walnut Hills	Mean	2.8	2.6	1.5	1.4	2.5	2.6
	Standard error	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.11)
	n	37	61	37	61	36	59
Evanston	Mean	2.4	2.3	1.6	2.0	2.9	2.7
	Standard error	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.06)
	n	83	114	83	114	79	114

Table D.2—Continued

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Fairview	Mean	3.0	3.0	1.6	1.5	2.2	2.0
	Standard error	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)
	n	50	30	49	30	48	29
Fay Apartments	Mean	2.5	2.4	2.0	2.1	2.9	2.1
	Standard error	(0.12)	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.31)
	n	21	7	21	7	21	7
Hartwell	Mean	2.8	2.9	1.3	1.4	2.2	2.1
	Standard error	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.12)
	n	44	44	44	44	44	44
Hyde Park	Mean	3.1	3.1	1.2	1.3	2.2	1.9
	Standard error	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.05)
	n	122	158	121	158	120	154
Kennedy Heights	Mean	2.5	2.4	1.7	1.6	2.9	2.5
	Standard error	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)
	n	48	39	48	39	48	39

Table D.2—Continued

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Linwood	Mean	2.9	3.1	1.4	1.6	2.8	1.5
	Standard error	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.11)
	n	9	10	9	10	9	10
Lower Price Hill	Mean	2.6	2.8	1.6	2.1	2.6	2.1
	Standard error	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.14)
	n	12	25	12	25	11	25
Madisonville	Mean	2.7	2.6	1.5	1.7	2.5	2.6
	Standard error	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
	n	98	91	98	91	97	89
Mount Adams	Mean	3.3	3.1	1.2	1.2	2.0	2.1
	Standard error	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.11)
	n	13	27	13	27	13	26
Mount Airy	Mean	2.7	2.9	1.3	1.5	2.5	2.3
	Standard error	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)
	n	86	75	86	75	86	71

Table D.2—Continued

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Mount Auburn	Mean	2.4	2.6	1.6	1.5	2.7	2.4
	Standard error	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.10)
	n	60	72	60	72	60	72
Mount Lookout	Mean	2.9	3.4	1.2	1.2	2.2	1.8
	Standard error	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.07)
	n	29	94	29	94	27	93
Mount Washington	Mean	3.3	3.3	1.3	1.2	1.9	1.8
	Standard error	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)
	n	103	102	104	102	103	102
North Avondale	Mean	2.5	2.7	1.5	1.4	2.9	2.7
	Standard error	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.08)
	n	24	69	24	69	24	68
North Fairmount	Mean	2.3	2.6	1.3	2.0	2.7	2.9
	Standard error	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.17)
	n	40	24	40	24	38	21

**Table D.2—Continued**

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Northside	Mean	2.6	2.6	1.6	1.6	2.6	2.3
	Standard error	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.07)
	n	85	117	85	117	84	115
Oakley	Mean	3.0	3.2	1.2	1.2	2.1	2.0
	Standard error	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)
	n	101	72	101	72	96	70
Over-the-Rhine	Mean	2.2	2.6	2.2	2.3	2.7	2.6
	Standard error	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
	n	69	77	69	77	68	77
Paddock Hills	Mean	2.8	2.6	1.3	1.5	2.6	2.5
	Standard error	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.13)
	n	31	40	31	39	31	39
Pleasant Ridge	Mean	2.8	2.7	1.4	1.3	2.5	2.4
	Standard error	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.09)
	n	80	99	79	100	78	96

Table D.2—Continued

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Riverside	Mean	3.2	3.0	1.4	1.3	1.7	1.9
	Standard error	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.15)
	n	16	24	16	24	15	24
Roselawn	Mean	2.5	2.5	1.5	1.4	2.6	2.8
	Standard error	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)
	n	61	69	61	69	61	68
Sayler Park	Mean	2.9	3.1	1.2	1.2	1.8	1.8
	Standard error	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.11)
	n	29	28	29	28	29	27
Sedamsville	Mean	3.0	3.2	1.5	1.5	1.9	2.1
	Standard error	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.19)
	n	18	12	18	12	18	11
South Cumminsville	Mean	2.2	2.4	1.9	2.1	2.9	3.0
	Standard error	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
	n	35	32	35	32	34	31

**Table D.2—Continued**

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
South Fairmount	Mean	2.4	2.6	2.0	1.8	2.3	2.1
	Standard error	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.10)
	n	29	24	29	24	29	23
Walnut Hills	Mean	2.6	2.6	1.8	1.9	2.5	2.6
	Standard error	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)
	n	71	105	71	105	69	104
West End	Mean	2.3	2.7	2.2	1.9	2.8	2.4
	Standard error	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)
	n	75	100	75	100	75	100
West Price Hill	Mean	2.9	3.1	1.6	1.6	2.1	2.1
	Standard error	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
	n	152	110	152	110	150	109
Westwood	Mean	2.8	2.8	1.5	1.4	2.3	2.2
	Standard error	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
	n	318	135	317	134	310	134

Table D.2—Continued

Neighborhood		Police Professionalism		Active Policing		Racial Profiling	
		2005	2008	2005	2008	2005	2008
Winton Hills	Mean	2.2	2.5	1.8	2.0	2.8	3.0
	Standard error	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.17)
	n	46	28	46	28	46	28
Winton Place	Mean	3.0	2.0	1.5	1.8	2.2	3.2
	Standard error	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.20)
	n	24	16	24	16	24	16
Total	Mean	2.7	2.8	1.6	1.6	2.5	2.3
	Standard error	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
	n	2,949	2,998	2,946	2,996	2,893	2,952



## Details of Propensity-Score Weighting

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We used propensity-score weighting to reweight stops from a comparison group to have the same distribution of features as the stops in a reference group. The choice of reference and comparison groups differs by the analytical question being addressed. For the internal benchmark analysis, the reference stops are those that the officer in question made, while the comparison stops are the stops that other officers made. For the post-stop analysis, the reference stops are those involving a black driver, while the comparison stops are those involving a non-black driver.

Stops in the comparison group are weighted. No stops are explicitly excluded from the sample, but some may receive very small weights. The weights are constructed in such a way that any weighted statistic of the comparison group (e.g., weighted average age, weighted percentage from neighborhood A, weighted percentage stopped between midnight and 4:00 a.m.) will match the same unweighted statistic computed for the reference group.

Let  $\mathbf{x}$  represent the collection of stop features and  $t$  be a binary indicator that the stop is a member of the reference group. The distribution  $f(\mathbf{x} | t = 1)$  represents the conditional distribution of stop features for those stops in the reference group, and  $f(\mathbf{x} | t = 0)$  represents the distribution of features for stops in the comparison group. We want to weight the comparison group's distribution,  $f(\mathbf{x} | t = 0)$ , so that

$$f(\mathbf{x} | t = 1) = w(\mathbf{x})f(\mathbf{x} | t = 0),$$

where  $w(\mathbf{x})$  is the weighting function of interest to us. Solving for  $w(\mathbf{x})$  and applying Bayes' theorem to the numerator and denominator yields

$$w(\mathbf{x}) = K f(t = 1 | \mathbf{x}) / f(t = 0 | \mathbf{x}),$$

where  $K$  is a constant that will later drop out of the analysis. The right side of the expression is proportional to the probability that a stop with feature  $\mathbf{x}$  is in the reference group divided by the probability that a stop with feature  $\mathbf{x}$  is in the comparison group.

This indicates that, for a comparison-group stop with feature  $\mathbf{x}$ , we should apply a weight equal to the odds that a stop with feature  $\mathbf{x}$  was in the reference group. Note that, if reference-group stops rarely occur in neighborhood A, for example, then all comparison-group stops made in neighborhood A will receive a weight near 0. On the other hand, comparison stops with features much like those of the reference group's will receive large weights.

To estimate  $f(t = 1 | \mathbf{x})$ , we use a nonparametric version of logistic regression. See McCaffrey et al. (2004) or Ridgeway (2006) for complete details. We evaluate the quality of the weights by how well the distribution of the features matches between the reference group and the weighted stops in the comparison group.

## Estimating False-Discovery Rates

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Fridell (2004) notes that a popular statistic for measuring the difference between an officer's minority-stop fraction and the officer's internal benchmark is the  $z$ -statistic,

$$z = \frac{p_t - p_c}{\sqrt{\frac{p_t(1-p_t)}{N_t} + \frac{p_c(1-p_c)}{N_c}}}. \quad (\text{E.1})$$

In this measure,  $p_t$  and  $p_c$  are, respectively, the proportion of stops involving nonwhite drivers for the target and the weighted comparison stops. The denominator normalizes this term to have variance 1. This statistic is computed for all officers under consideration. In standard circumstances,  $z$  will have a standard normal distribution, and there will be a 5-percent probability that the absolute value of  $z$  exceeds 2.0 when there is no difference between the officer's stop rate and the internal benchmark. However, in a collection of 294 *independent* comparisons with no racial bias, we should expect about 15 (5 percent of 294) officers to have  $z$ -statistics exceeding 2.0 by chance. Thus, flagging officers with  $z$  exceeding 2.0 is bound to select officers with no racial biases. Further complicating matters is that the 294  $z$ -statistics are *not* independent. They are correlated with each other, since each officer might be used in another officer's internal benchmark. In this case, the empirical distribution of the  $z$ s may be much wider (or narrower) than would be predicted by statistical theory (Efron, 2005).

Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) pioneered the use of the false-discovery rate (fdr) as an alternative methodology for locating truly extreme values in multiple comparison situations. The fdr is the probability of no group difference given the value of an observed test statistic,  $z$  (Efron, 2004).

We can derive the probability of an officer being an outlier as

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(\text{outlier} \mid z) &= 1 - P(\text{not outlier} \mid z) \\
 &= 1 - \frac{f(z \mid \text{not outlier}) f(\text{not outlier})}{f(z)} \\
 &\geq 1 - \frac{f_0(z)}{f(z)},
 \end{aligned} \tag{F.2}$$

where  $f_0(z)$  is the distribution of  $z$  for nonoutlier officers and  $f(z)$  is the distribution of  $z$  for all officers (Efron, 2004). If the fraction of problem officers is small (less than 10 percent), the bound in the last line of Equation F.2 is near equality. We estimate  $f_0(z)$  with the empirical null, assuming normal but with location and variance estimated using only the central data of the distribution.

We used the R package 1.1-6 (Efron, Turnbull, and Narasimhan, 2007) for this analysis' calculations.

## **RAND–Cincinnati Police Department Year 4 2007 Police-Civilian Videotaped Interactions Codebook**

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### **RAND-CPD Identifiers for Contacts**

RAND and CPD use a number of identifiers in order to track interactions—in particular, to track the specific stops that are coded. Some of these include demographic information on the occupants and officers. All of this information is contained on the contact report spreadsheet that we used.

- *coder number*
- *incident-report number (incp)*: This is the random number assigned to all traffic stops. Although we have tapes that contain multiple incidents, we have identified the specific stops that we will investigate, based on incident or contact reports that officers must file for all interactions they have with citizens. In most cases, these numbers will be sequential; at other times, they will not.
- *date of incident (date)*: This records information about the date of the incident, using the standard MM/DD/YYYY format.
- *time of incident (time)*: This records the time of the incident, using military time (0:00 to 24:00).

## Quality-of-Tape Variables

### Poor Video Quality (prvideo)

The quality of the video was such that it rendered many of the variables of interest essentially uncodable. This would include cameras that were not focused properly or were pointed in the wrong direction. In addition, video quality that was hampered because of poor lighting would be included here. As a rule, we will say that, if 20–30 percent of the interaction cannot be seen, we code the interaction as 1.

0 = not poor video quality

1 = poor video quality

### Primary Officer Audible (poaudibl)

To what extent was the primary officer audible on the tape? This would be the percentages of her or his utterances that were understandable *while* interacting with the civilian.

not at all audible 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%  
90% 100% audible

### Driver Audible (draudibl)

To what extent was the driver audible on the tape? This would be the percentages of her or his utterances that were understandable *while* interacting with the primary officer.

not at all audible 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%  
90% 100% audible

### \*\* Camera turn (camera)

Does the officer turn the camera around once he or she is inside the police cruiser?

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not applicable

## Length-of-Time Variables

For each of the following variables, do your best to estimate the time that each took. The best method for undertaking this is to use a stopwatch. You should also feel free to use the time-stamp information provided by the RAND team. Each of the behaviors that should be timed is detailed below.

*Please use standard rounding rules: Anything below 0.49 rounds down; anything above 0.50 rounds up.*

### **Total Time the Civilian Was Detained in Seconds (tltime)**

The beginning of the detention begins once both the civilian and police officer's cars have stopped. This estimate will end when the civilian or officer drives away or leaves the scene. Please use the video time stamp to record the time of this variable.

### **Civilian Wait Time in Seconds (cwaitime)**

How long does the civilian wait in the car before the officer approaches? This estimated count should begin after the civilian and police officer have pulled over and stopped. This time should end when the officer begins to speak. Please use your stopwatch to record the time on this variable.

### **How Many Times the Officer Interrupted the Driver (pointprt)**

An interruption includes when one cannot get his or her thought to completion before someone else begins speaking.

-----  
9999 = not applicable/cannot be coded

*Estimate the length of time for each of the following for the driver, in seconds.*

### How Many Times the Driver Interrupted the Primary Police Officer (drintprt)

An interruption includes when one cannot get his or her thought to completion before someone else begins speaking.

-----  
9999 = not applicable/cannot be coded

## Description-of-Event Variables

### Officer Descriptors or Behaviors

**Officer Loudspeaker System (speaker):** The officer used his or her loudspeaker system while pulling the car over.

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not determinable

**Walking Backward (pobkwalk):** Did the officer walk backward when moving from the civilian car to his or her police cruiser? The officer needs to make a conscious effort to walk backward. We will consider a police officer as walking backward if he or she walked backward to at least the end of the civilian's car.

0 = does not walk backward

1 = walked backward

99 = someone was arrested or you cannot see how the officer walked

**Officer Spotlights (blights):** Does the officer use spotlights during the interaction?

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not determinable

**Officers Who Approach (ofaprch):** How many officers approached the vehicle? This would include all officers who actually got out of their car to assist during the interaction. This would *not* apply to officers who just stopped by the scene and asked other officers whether they needed assistance. It would also *not* apply to officers who responded but never left their police vehicles.



1 = 1

2 = 2

3 = 3

4 = 4+

99 = not determinable

**Total Officers at Scene (tofscene):** How many total officers were at the scene, whether or not they took part in the interaction, including the primary officer? This would include all officers who actually got out of their cars to assist during the interaction or who just stopped by to offer assistance to the officers at the scene. It would also apply to officers who responded but never left their police vehicles. Use the majority rule when determining this variable.

----- (two digits)

99 = not determinable

**Race of Additional Officers (racothof):** Not counting the primary officer who initially approaches the driver, what was the predominant race of the other officers at the scene?

0 = no other officers at the scene

1 = black

2 = white

3 = other

4 = equal number of black and white officers

99 = not determinable/applicable

**Officer Body Commandments (ofbodcom):** Did any of the officers at the scene order any of the passengers out of the car or to move their bodies in a particular fashion (e.g., out of the car, hands on top of the vehicle)? This does *not* include any discussion regarding the occupant's speech or talking. This should be regarding only the occupant's body movements.

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not applicable/determinable (only if the coder cannot see or hear)

### Vehicle- and Occupant-Search Variables

**Probable-Cause Search (pre-search) (presrch):** Do any of the officers at the scene, including the primary officer, attempt to do a preliminary search of the car? Usually, the officers will be close to the car. The search is not simply a glance. It is an attempt to find probable cause for a more in-depth search. The specific behaviors involved in a pre-search would include (1) looking intently through the windows of the car with attention directed to the back seat and (2) use of a flashlight to intently locate any items apparently visible in the vehicle without moving any materials.

0 = no probable-cause search conducted

1 = probable-cause search undertaken

99 = not determinable/applicable

**Consent for search direct (cnsrchd):** Do any of the officers ask for permission to physically search either the vehicle or occupants? This would not refer to situations where the officer asks whether the occupants have illegal materials on them. This is a request to search the occupants or vehicle. [MAKE SURE TO MARK 0 IF CONSENT WAS NOT ASKED]

0 = not asked

1 = occupant was asked and said no

2 = were asked and said yes

3 = asked and was not given adequate time to answer

99 = not determinable/applicable (e.g., there is no sound or tape ends suddenly)

**Consent for Search Implied (cnsrchi):** Do any of the officers indirectly ask for permission to physically search either the vehicle or occupants? At times, officers ask indirectly, whereby the request appears implied (e.g., do you have a latch for your trunk? are you carrying anything in your trunk? are you storing anything underneath your seat?).

0 = occupant not asked indirectly

1 = occupant was asked indirectly and said no

2 = occupant was asked indirectly and said yes

3 = occupant asked indirectly and was not given adequate time to answer

99 = not determinable/applicable (e.g., there is no sound or tape ends suddenly)

**Driver Search (search):** Was the driver personally searched by the primary officer during the traffic stop?

0 = driver not searched

1 = driver searched

99 = not applicable/not determinable

**Any Passengers Searched? (searchpas):** Were any passengers searched during the traffic stop?

0 = no passengers searched

1 = passengers searched

99 = not applicable/not determinable

**Amount of Time Spent Physically Searching the Occupants in Seconds (srchotim):** Estimate how much time officers spend on inspection. This involves a physical search for alcohol, illegal drugs, or weapons. If no time was spent searching the occupants, this variable will be coded as 0. Please use your stopwatch to record the time on this variable.

\_\_\_\_\_ (in seconds)

**Vehicle Searched (vhcserch):** Was the *vehicle* searched during the interaction? This would *not* include the time that occupants are searched. This refers only to physical searches of the vehicle whereby the officer enters the car or opens the trunk and looks for illegal items. This would also *not* include time spent on visual (pre-searches).

0 = no

1 = yes

**Amount of Time Spent Physically Searching the Vehicle in Seconds (srchvtim):** Estimate how much time officers spend on inspection. This involves a physical search for alcohol, illegal drugs, or weapons. If no time was spent searching the vehicle, this variable will be coded as 0. Please use your stopwatch to record the time on this variable.

\_\_\_\_\_ (in seconds)

## Occupant Description and Behaviors

**Number of Occupants (numoc):** Besides the driver, how many other occupants are in the car? If there are clearly none or there is no

indication that there are additional drivers based on what can be seen or heard, then 0 should be indicated \_\_\_\_\_

**Race of Additional Occupants (racothdr):** Not counting the driver, what was the predominant race of the other occupants of the vehicle that is stopped?

0 = no other occupants at the scene

1 = black

2 = white

3 = other

99 = not determinable/applicable

**An Officer Request for Passengers to Leave the Vehicle (lvehclpa):** Did an officer ask any passengers (excluding the driver) to get out of the vehicle?

0 = no

1 = yes

**Other-Occupant License Check (oolicns):** The primary officer or another officer at the scene requested the licenses of other occupants in the vehicle besides the driver.

0 = no other passenger licenses requested

1 = other passenger licenses requested

### Vehicle Descriptors

**Vehicle Age (veage):** Estimate in number of years how old the car seems to be:

1 = 1–3 years old

2 = 4–6 years old

3 = 6 years or older

**Vehicle Type (vetype):** What type of vehicle was stopped?

1 = car

2 = truck

3 = SUV [sport-utility vehicle]

4 = semi-truck

5 = motorcycle

6 = van or minivan

7 = other

## **The Offense (general)**

**The Nature of the Stop (natstop):** What reason eventually emerged as the justification for the stop? Use the entire interaction to make a determination, but much of your decision will rely on what the officer offers as the reason. If the driver was stopped for multiple reasons, code the one that the officer mentions first or the one for which a citation is issued.

- 1 = expired registration or tags
- 2 = “fix it” ticket (e.g., tail lights out)
- 3 = warrant for an arrest or suspicion of committing a crime
- 4 = traffic violation (speeding)
- 5 = traffic violation (all others beside speeding)
- 6 = drunk driving
- 7 = other
- 99 = not determinable

**The Outcome of the Interaction (outcome):** How did the interaction end? What is the end result? Pay special attention here to what happens regarding the driver. If the driver signs something, assume that it is a ticket and not a verbal warning. Also, if the driver receives more than one of the options below, code for the most severe punishment.

- 1 = no warning
- 2 = verbal warning
- 3 = written warning
- 4 = citation (i.e., ticket)
- 5 = arrest
- 6 = expressed concern for driver’s/passenger’s welfare
- 99 = not determinable/applicable (e.g., there is no sound or tape ends suddenly)

**Was the Car Towed (cartow):** Was the civilian’s car towed at any point during the interaction? Use all ways of knowing whether or not the car was towed to determine this outcome. For example, if you hear the officer state to the driver that his or her car is being towed but actually do not see it, code it as being towed. If the officer gives the driver the option of having someone pick the car up instead of it being towed and the driver says that is his or her plan, code that as the car not being towed.

0 = car was not towed

1 = car was towed

**Drugs Mentioned in Relation to the Crime (drugsmen):** Drugs were mentioned in connection with the crime.

0 = Drugs were *not* mentioned.

1 = Drugs were mentioned.

99 = not determinable/applicable (e.g., there is no sound or tape ends suddenly)

**Light Conditions During Stop (light):** Did the stop occur during daylight or at night?

0 = day

1 = night

99 = not determinable

## Primary-Interaction Variables (primary officer and driver)

Some interactions contain multiple officers and civilians, but all interactions contain at least one interaction between the primary officer on the scene and a driver. Therefore, the following variables will attempt to assess the characteristics of such an interaction.

### Primary Police Officer Characteristics and Behaviors

The primary officer is the officer who approaches the car first.

**Phenotypical Race of Primary Officer (phporace):** This is the race of the officer based on how they look to you. Do *not* use the RAND logbook. Instead, base your decision on the appearance of the officer.

1 = black

2 = white

3 = other

99 = not determinable

**Sex/Gender of the Primary Officer (sexof):** Indicate the gender or sex of the primary officer who approaches the vehicle of the car.

1 = male

2 = female

99 = not given/determinable

**Approximate Age of the Primary Officer (agegs<sub>po</sub>):** Use all of the indicators (e.g., visual, voice) in order to make your guess about this.

- 1 = 20s
- 2 = 30s–40s
- 3 = 50s–60s
- 4 = over 60s
- 99 = not applicable/not determinable

**Primary Officer Greeting (greet<sub>po</sub>):** The primary officer greeted the driver at the start of the interaction. A typical greeting would involve an attempt to break the ice with the driver. It is more than a rhetorical question or salutation. In the most typical case, an officer would pause or wait for a response to the greeting before proceeding on with the business surrounding the stop (e.g., “good evening, sir/ma’am”; “how are you doing this evening?”).

- 0 = Officer did not greet.
- 1 = Officer greeted.
- 99 = not determinable

**Primary Officer Addresses Driver by Name (name<sub>po</sub>):** After the driver identified herself or himself, the primary officer addressed her or him by name.

- 0 = Primary officer did not use name.
- 1 = Primary officer used name.
- 99 = not determinable

**Deferential Terms (deftrm<sub>of</sub>):** When asking for compliance, did the officer use any of the following deferential terms?

- 0 = The officer used no deferential terms to address the driver.
- 1 = sir/ma’am/miss
- 2 = other \_\_\_\_\_ (please specify)
- 99 = not determinable

**Primary Officer Reason for Stop (reason<sub>po</sub>):** The primary officer offered the driver a reason for the stop during the interaction.

- 0 = Primary officer did not offer reason.
- 1 = Primary officer offered reason.
- 2 = Do not know whether a reason was offered because coder could not hear the officer.

99 = not determinable

**When Primary Officer Gave Reason for Stop (whnrsnpo):** The primary officer offered the driver a reason for the stop during the interaction.

0 = A reason was offered *before* the officer returned to the police cruiser.

1 = A reason was offered *after* the officer returned to the police cruiser.

99 = not determinable

**Primary Officer Interrogation Question (qustinpo):** Did the primary officer ask the driver, "Do you know why you were pulled over?"

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Primary Officer Interrogation Answer (ansrpo):** If asked, did the primary officer allow the driver to respond to the following question before cutting them off: "Do you know why you were pulled over?"

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Driver Asked Why They Were Pulled Over (drask):** Did the driver ask the officer why he or she was pulled over?

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Primary Officer Incriminating Question (icrmqst):** Does the primary police officer ask the driver whether he or she has any drugs or weapons on them (e.g., "Do you have anything on you that you shouldn't?")?

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = undeterminable

**The Primary Officer Offers a Break (break):** Did the primary officer offer a break to the driver (e.g., lessening a speeding penalty from 40 miles per hour [mph] to 35 mph to avoid a higher fine)?



0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Primary Officer Good Word (goodwrd):** The primary officer left the driver with a good word. This is *not* facetious or sarcastic. The officer appears to offer a sincere, discursive pleasantry to the driver (e.g., “Have a nice day”; “I hope your day gets better”; “I hope the rest of your trip goes well”; “You take care now”).

0 = Good word not left.

1 = Good word was left.

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Primary Officer Name (nameof):** The officer introduces him or herself and provides his or her name to the driver during the initiation of the interaction.

0 = Officer does not introduce him or herself.

1 = Officer introduces him or herself.

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Polite Terms (ofpoltrm):** Did the officer use polite terms while asking for compliance from the driver during the traffic stop? These would include saying thank you, please, and the like.

0 = No polite terms were used during the stop.

1 = Polite terms were used during the traffic stop.

99 = not determinable

## Communication Accommodation Variables: Primary Officer

Communication accommodation theory (CAT) suggests that individuals use communication, in part, to indicate their attitudes toward each other and that, as such, it is a barometer of the level of social distance between them. This constant movement toward and away from others, by changing one’s communicative behavior, is called *accommodation*. Among the accommodative strategies that speakers use to achieve these goals, *convergence* has been the most extensively studied—and can be considered the historical core of CAT (Giles, 1973). It has been defined

as a strategy whereby individuals adapt their communicative behaviors in terms of a wide range of linguistic (e.g., speech rate, accents), paralinguistic (e.g., pauses, utterance length), and nonverbal features (e.g., smiling, gazing) in such a way as to become more similar to their interlocutor's behavior.

FOR EACH OF THE COMMUNICATION VARIABLES (e.g., ACCOMMODATION, NONACCOMMODATION) CHOOSE 99 ONLY IF YOU CAN HEAR OR SEE LESS THAN 50 percent OF THE CONVERSATION DURING THE INTERACTION. OTHERWISE, MAKE A CHOICE USING THE PROVIDED SCALES.

[In general, accommodation variables should be anchored at 5.]

### **Primary Officer Overall Pleasantness (cplstnpo)**

How pleasant did the primary officer seem when he or she interacted with the driver? Overall pleasantness is typically used in an effort to calm and put the driver at ease. It will be evident through both language and paralinguistic. An officer would most likely be rated as pleasant if he or she introduced him or herself and attempted to remain personable throughout the interaction, or perhaps they gave the driver *useful* advice for avoiding future tickets. In addition, officers who are pleasant are very likely to be engaging, nonmonotone, and expressive speakers. Officers who are *not* pleasant are likely *not* to engage the civilian on a personal level. They would distance themselves through the use of commands and a police script. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all pleasant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 pleasant

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Overall Listening (calstnpo)**

Overall, how well do you think that the primary officer listened to the driver during the interaction? An officer would score high on this variable if he or she allowed the driver to tell their own story or side of the events and was attentive to the driver's communication. An officer would receive a score of 10 if (1) he or she tended *not* to interrupt the driver when the driver was speaking, (2) he or she yielded to the driver when the driver was speaking, and (3) they asked thoughtful clarification.

tion questions when they did not follow the driver's rationale. Non-verbally, an officer would receive a 10 if he or she consistently nodded their head in recognition of what the driver was saying and engaged in reflective "back-channeling" (e.g., slow-paced "uh huh," "OK," "yes"), rather than fast-paced back-channeling in an attempt to rush the driver. Officers who are *not* good listeners will frequently interrupt the driver and may *not* give the driver an opportunity to speak. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

did not listen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 listened  
99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Perspective Taking (caviwspo)**

Overall, how well did the primary police officer take into account the views, needs, perspectives, and emotional state of the driver? Police officers would be scored as taking the driver's perspective if they (1) decided not to give a ticket because they saw that a couple was rushing to the hospital for a baby delivery; (2) made statements about how difficult it must be to have to deal with \_\_\_\_\_; (3) offered help to deal with any special factors that might face the driver, including disabilities; (4) having a *mother* step away from her car so that her children would not hear negative information about her. An example of an officer who would be rated high (around 8) on perspective-taking would be one who writes the driver's speed as being less than it actually was so the driver does not have to go to court. Officers who do *not* take perspective will lean heavily on the police script regardless of the driver's unique circumstances. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 took driver's perspective  
99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Respect and Politeness (capolit)**

In general, how respectful and polite was the primary officer toward the driver? Did the officer show regard for the civilian through speech, manners, and behavior? An exceptionally polite officer will attempt to make sure that the driver feels comfortable during the interaction using both verbal and nonverbal messages. For example, a police officer

could say “please” and “thank you” rather than just telling the civilian what he or she needs. The officer could also be seen as polite by using deferential language to refer to the driver (e.g., “sir,” “madam,” first name). Impolite and disrespectful officers will tend to be rude and curt. They will treat the civilian simply as a threat or an “offender.” [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all polite 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 polite

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Helpfulness (helpflpo)**

The primary officer took into consideration the driver’s characteristics (e.g., race, age, disability) in a helpful way. The primary officer who is helpful will tend to offer the citizen directions or some useful information not associated with the stop. An example of an officer who would be high on the scale of being helpful (around an 8) would be one who offered to show a lost driver how to arrive at a destination by actually leading the driver there. In addition, assisting or encouraging the driver regarding the process for taking care of a citation (e.g., no proof of insurance). Actions that make the officer appear to go above the bare minimum should lead to higher ratings on this item. Officers who are *not* helpful will tend *not* to provide any additional assistance to the driver beyond what is required to undertake the stop. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not helpful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 helpful

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Approachability (aprochpo)**

The primary officer appeared approachable while interacting with the driver. An approachable officer will tend to (1) have a relaxed tone in his or her voice, (2) stand where the driver can see his or her face, and (3) allow the conversation to stray momentarily from the specifics of the stop. Officers who are *not* approachable will tend to be rigid in tone and body posture. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not approachable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 approachable

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Courteous (courtypo)**

The primary officer appeared to be extremely courteous toward the driver. An officer who is courteous will remain polite throughout the interaction by minding his or her manners, avoiding interrupting the driver, and overall listening. He or she will tend to take a positive approach to the interaction regardless of the driver's behavior. A primary officer who is *not* courteous will be rude throughout the interaction through the use of (1) frequent interruptions and (2) a general lack of manners toward the driver by ignoring questions posed by the driver. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all courteous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 courteous

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

## **Nonaccommodation Variables: Primary Officer**

### **Primary Officer Is Dismissive (dismispo)**

To what extent did the primary officer dismiss the arguments and communication exhibited by the driver? In many cases, an officer will hear an excuse for the offense and will reject that excuse as invalid. An officer who is dismissive of the driver might say the following: "I've heard that one before" or "That's the oldest one in the book." Another example of dismissiveness might be the reaction of an officer who hears from a new dad that he is rushing to the hospital to see his new baby. The officer might say to the new dad, "I am happy you are a new father, but we want to make sure you get to the hospital in one piece" or "We want to make sure you get to actually be a dad to your child." An officer who is *not* dismissive will be responsive to the excuses or protests of the driver. He or she will listen and at least hear the driver out. He or she may reduce the penalty for what he or she may consider a valid excuse. [In general, nonaccommodation variables should be anchored at 0.]

not dismissive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 dismissive

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Primary Officer Impatience (impatpo)**

To what extent was the primary officer impatient with the driver? A primary officer who is impatient will rush through the interaction with the driver. An impatient officer may be less thorough in his or her explanations and may not listen well to the driver's needs and questions. Officers who are highly impatient may be visibly so through fidgeting or nonverbal gestures to hurry the driver or insistence that the driver facilitate the stop by quickly offering their identification or signature for paperwork. An officer who is *not* impatient will appear quite relaxed and *not* frustrated with the driver regardless of how long the interaction takes. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all impatient 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 impatient

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Primary Officer Rigidity (rigidpo)**

The primary officer appeared to be rigid toward the driver. A primary officer who is rigid will most likely not take any excuse that a driver has to offer. Rigid officers are inflexible. Rigid officers will remain very textbook and rely on the script and laws to mandate the outcome of the interaction. They tend to take on a more rigid posture and tone in their voices. An officer who is *not* rigid will remain more relaxed and receptive to the driver. The nonrigid officer's overall tone tends to be warm and receptive. He or she is also more likely to offer the driver more options instead of simply the most punitive outcome associated with the stop. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not rigid 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 rigid

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Primary Officer Patronizing (patronpo)**

The primary officer spoke to the driver in a patronizing manner. An officer who is patronizing will use his or her position as an officer to belittle and degrade the driver's less authoritative position. This may entail referring to a clearly older male as "boy" or telling a blonde woman that she just must have been suffering "from a blonde moment when you made that turn without seeing the 'No Turn on Red' sign." A patronizing officer may "dumb down" his or her speech or purposely

offer an overly simple explanation, perhaps in a tone as if speaking to a child. An officer may also belittle a driver. An officer who is *not* patronizing will *not* use his or her position of authority to remind the driver that the driver lacks power during the stop. A nonpatronizing officer will speak to the driver as an adult who is fully capable of understanding the situation. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all patronizing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 patronizing

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Air of Superiority (superpo)**

The primary officer spoke to the driver with an air of superiority. A primary officer who speaks with an air of superiority will use his or her tone in a belittling manner. These officers may rely on jargon-filled language when speaking to the driver. Typically, the officer uses both non-verbal and verbal communication to put a hierarchical social distance between him or herself and the driver. An officer who does *not* speak with an air of superiority will *not* use this jargon-filled language when offering explanations and will make an effort to speak to the driver using everyday language that the common layperson would understand. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

no air of superiority 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 air of superiority

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Interruptions (intrptpo)**

The primary officer appeared interruptive of the driver. Interruption includes when one cannot get his or her thought to completion before someone else begins speaking. An officer who is interruptive will frequently not allow the driver to finish his or her thoughts before beginning to speak. Interruptive officers who cut the driver off more than three or four times during an interaction would typically be coded as interruptive. In addition, primary officers who interrupt drivers at crucial times during the interaction (e.g., when the driver is giving an excuse for why he or she was speeding) would also be coded as interruptive. An officer who is *not* interruptive will frequently allow the driver to completely finish his or her thoughts before beginning to speak. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all interruptive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 interruptive  
 99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Disconfirming (dscnfrpo)**

The primary officer appeared disconfirming of the ideas put forth by the driver. An officer who is disconfirming will reject any idea or excuse a driver is attempting to make. Disconfirming officers will not be willing to believe the driver and may show this through statements like, "Sure, whatever you say; you are still getting a ticket," or "I saw you make the illegal turn; anything you say now is just digging yourself deeper." An officer who is *not* disconfirming will be willing to listen to the driver's ideas and comments. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all disconfirming 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 disconfirming  
 99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Sarcasm (sarcpo)**

The police officer expressed sarcasm during the traffic stop. A primary officer who is sarcastic will use ironic comments in combination with tone to purposefully rebut the driver's position (e.g., "So, where's the fire?" or the driver may offer an excuse and the officer may come back with something like, "Right. And I can do a handspring off the hood of my cruiser"). An officer who is *not* sarcastic will remain straightforward in his or her language and paralanguage. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all sarcastic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sarcastic  
 99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

## **Emotional Reactions: Primary Officer**

### **Primary Police Officer Aggravation (poaggrv)**

The primary officer appeared very aggravated during the encounter. A primary officer who appears aggravated may (1) become rushed during his or her speaking, (2) change tone, or (3) pause a lot and start over again, signaling that he or she is becoming frustrated with the way the



interaction is going. An aggravated police officer may be fidgety and make several sighs during the interaction, displaying their aggravation. A primary officer who is *not* aggravated will remain calm throughout the interaction. He or she will typically have a calm tone and demeanor throughout the entire interaction regardless of what happens during the stop. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all aggravated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 aggravated

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Police Officer Apologetic (poapolog)**

The primary officer seemed genuinely apologetic or remorseful during the interaction. This could be expressed by saying something like, “I am sorry I have to give you this ticket, but it is my job” or “I am sorry that I said that you went through a light when I meant to say stop sign.” Nonverbal communication could also indicate an apologetic orientation (e.g., an officer “sounds” sorry for a mistake he makes that causes a ticket to be reissued). An officer who is *not* apologetic will in no way admit fault for anything at any point during the interaction. *Do not* count as apologetic officers who say, “I’m sorry” or “pardon me” as they seek clarification for something said by the driver during the interaction. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all apologetic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 apologetic

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Primary Officer Anxiousness (anxiuspo)**

The primary officer appeared anxious during the interaction. A primary officer who is anxious will seem unable to stand still during the interaction. He or she may fiddle a lot with the equipment on his or her belt. These officers may not have a strong, steady voice, but may waver instead. These officers may seem particularly focused on the *threat* that the driver might pose to them. An officer who is *not* anxious will remain steady and unwavering throughout the interaction. He or she would appear to be rather relaxed during the traffic stop. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all anxious 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 anxious

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Primary Officer Anger (angrpo)**

The primary officer appeared angry during the traffic stop. A primary officer who is angry will raise his or her voice, shout, yell, or become very stern through tone of voice. These officers will demonstrate disgust toward the driver, usually through both verbal and nonverbal behavior. An officer who is *not* angry will most likely *not* yell and appear rather calm during the interaction.

not at all angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 angry

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Primary Police Officer Humor (pohumor)**

The primary police officer showed his or her humorous side during the interaction with the driver. A primary officer who is humorous would show this by laughing, chuckling, or making jokes. For example, a humorous officer may laugh with the driver about something said during the interaction. In this context, humor must remain light-hearted and fun. Humor is not an officer laughing *at* a driver or laughing as a means of dismissing a driver's excuse. The humor will always occur during the interaction with the driver. Comments and laughter made in the cruiser will not be coded as humorous. An officer who is *not* humorous will not joke or laugh during any part of the interaction. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

0 = not at all humorous

1 = humorous

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Nonverbal Measures: Primary Officer**

For the following measures, consider the relationship of the primary officer to the driver.

**Proximity of the Primary Officer Relative to the Driver (poclose)**

How close, in feet, was the primary officer to the vehicle during the interaction with the driver? As an indication of proximity, estimate the distance between the torso of the officer and the driver's door or

window. If the civilian exited the car, this estimate should be based on the time before the civilian exited. This should be an average estimate based on the entire incident.

- 0 = less than 1 foot
- 1 = 1 foot
- 2 = 2 feet
- 3 = 3 feet
- 4 = more than 3 feet
- 99 = not determinable

### **Primary Officer Body Orientation Toward the Driver (pobdor)**

During the majority of the interaction, did the officer position him or herself in front of the driver, beside the driver, or behind the driver? In general, being beside the driver facilitates greater face-to-face interaction. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

- 1 = The officer was standing in front of the driver (behind the side mirror).
- 2 = The officer was standing directly beside the driver and making eye contact.
- 3 = The officer was standing behind the driver.
- 4 = The officer went to the passenger side of the vehicle.
- 99 = not applicable/cannot be coded (in general, only when the camera angle or size of vehicle does not permit)

## **Escalation**

### **Escalation (esclpo)**

If there was any unpleasantness in the interaction, to what extent was the police officer responsible for the escalation of this unpleasantness? If there was no escalation and the interaction was pleasant with no problems, code as 0. Otherwise, use the endpoints to indicate responsibility.

- not responsible for a problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 responsible
- 0 = no problem/not applicable

**Deescalation (desclpo)**

If there was an unpleasantness in the interaction, to what extent was the police officer responsible for the deescalation of this unpleasantness? If there was no escalation and the interaction was pleasant with no problems, code as 0. Otherwise, use the endpoints to indicate responsibility.

not responsible for a problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 responsible  
0 = no problem/not applicable

**Driver Characteristics and Behaviors****Phenotypical Race of the Driver (phdrace)**

This is the driver's race based on how he or she looks to you. Do not use the RAND logbook. Instead, base your decision on the driver's appearance on the videotape.

1 = black  
2 = white  
3 = other  
99 = not determinable

**Sex of the Driver (sexdrv)**

Indicate the driver's gender or sex. Use any possible indicators to determine this variable, including the driver's voice.

1 = male  
2 = female  
99 = not given/determinable

**Age Group of the Driver (agegrpdr)**

What age group would best describe the driver during the interaction? Use all of the indicators (e.g., visual, voice) to make your guess about this.

1 = teen  
2 = adult  
3 = elderly  
99 = not applicable/not determinable

**Driver Valid License (drvlic)**

Does the officer ask the driver for his or her license or identification?

0 = Officer does not ask driver for license or ID.

1 = Officer does ask driver for license or ID.

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Driver Valid Registration (drvreg)**

Does the officer ask the driver for his or her registration?

0 = Officer does not ask driver for registration.

1 = Officer does ask driver for registration.

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Driver Valid Insurance (drvins)**

Does the officer ask the driver for his or her proof of insurance?

0 = Officer does not ask driver for proof of insurance.

1 = Officer does ask for proof of insurance.

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Driver Handcuffed (hand)**

Was the driver handcuffed?

0 = Driver is *not* handcuffed.

1 = Driver is handcuffed.

99 = not applicable/not determinable

**An Officer Requests That the Driver Leave the Vehicle (lvehclpo)**

Did an officer ask the driver to get out of the vehicle?

0 = no

1 = yes

99 = not determinable/not applicable

**Driver Incriminating Answer (icrmansr)**

How does the driver respond to the question of whether he or she is carrying illegal drugs or weapons?

0 = Driver is not asked by the police officer.

1 = Driver admits to carrying something illegal.

2 = Driver denies carrying anything illegal.

3 = Driver avoids responding to the question.

99 = not determinable

### **Deferential Terms Driver (deftrmdr)**

When complying with any officer directions, did the driver use any of the following deferential terms?

0 = No deferential terms were used by the driver to address the officer.

1 = sir/ma'am/miss/officer

2 = other \_\_\_\_\_ (please specify)

99 = not determinable

### **Evidence of Politeness (drpolev)**

Did the driver use polite terms while complying with the officer during the traffic stop? These would include saying thank you, please, and the like.

0 = No polite terms were used during the stop.

1 = Polite terms were used during the traffic stop.

99 = not determinable

## **Communication Accommodation Variables: Driver**

CAT suggests that individuals use communication, in part, to indicate their attitudes toward each other; as such, it is a barometer of the level of social distance between them. This constant movement toward and away from others, by changing one's communicative behavior, is called *accommodation*. Among the different accommodative strategies that speakers use to achieve these goals, *convergence* has been the most extensively studied—and can be considered the historical core of CAT (Giles, 1973). It has been defined as a strategy whereby individuals adapt their communicative behaviors in terms of a wide range of linguistic (e.g., speech rate, accents), paralinguistic (e.g., pauses, utterance length), and nonverbal features (e.g., smiling, gazing) in such a way as to become more similar to their interlocutor's behavior.

FOR EACH OF THE COMMUNICATION VARIABLES (e.g., ACCOMMODATION, NONACCOMMODATION) CHOOSE 99 *ONLY* IF YOU CAN HEAR OR SEE LESS THAN 50 percent OF THE CONVERSATION DURING THE INTERACTION. OTHERWISE, MAKE A CHOICE USING THE PROVIDED SCALES.

### **Overall Driver Pleasantness (caplesdr)**

How pleasant did the driver seem while interacting with the primary officer? Overall pleasantness is typically used in an effort to engage the police officer and keep the interaction deescalated. It will be evident through both language and paralanguage. A driver would most likely be coded as pleasant if he or she introduced him or herself and attempted to remain personable throughout the interaction or perhaps gave the officer a heartfelt excuse and apology. In addition, drivers who are pleasant are also very likely to be engaging, nonmonotone, and expressive speakers. Drivers who are *not* pleasant are likely *not* to engage the officer. They would distance themselves from the officer through avoiding any attempt to be warm. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all pleasant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 pleasant

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver Overall Listening (calistdr)**

Overall, how well do you think that the driver listened to the primary police officer during the interaction? A driver would score high on this variable if he or she allowed the officer to finish before trying to speak. A driver would be scored as listening if (1) he or she tended not to interrupt the officer when the officer spoke, (2) the driver yielded to the officer when he or she spoke, and (3) the driver did not interject with “but I was just. . .” or “but wait, that’s not what I did.” Nonverbally, a driver would receive a 10 if he or she consistently engaged in reflective back-channeling (e.g., “uh huh,” “OK,” “yes”) versus fast-paced back-channeling. Drivers who are *not* good listeners will frequently interrupt the officer and may *not* give the officer an opportunity to speak because he or she is consistently interjecting and trying to get an excuse or

some unique information on the table. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

did not listen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 listened

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver Perspective Taking (caviwdr)**

Overall, how well did the driver take into account the views and job perspective of the officer involved? A driver would be rated as taking the officer's perspective if (1) the driver made statements about how difficult it must be to have to deal with \_\_\_\_\_ when being an officer, (2) the driver told the officer something along the lines of "look, officer, I know you saw me speeding—I can't argue with that. I probably shouldn't have done that." An example driver who would receive a high score (around 8) on perspective taking may tell the officer not to apologize and that he or she was just doing his or her job. Drivers who do *not* take perspective may frequently ask the officer to make exceptions for his or her personalized situation. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 took officer's perspective

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver General Respect and Politeness (carsptdr)**

In general, how respectful and polite was the driver toward the officer? Did the driver show regard for the officer through speech, manners, and behavior? An exceptionally polite driver will attempt to make sure that the officer is aware that he or she is not going to escalate the situation, using both verbal and nonverbal messages. For example, a driver could say "please" and "thank you" rather than seeming harsh or jaded because he or she is getting a ticket. The driver could also be seen as polite by using deferential language to refer to the officer (e.g., "sir," "madam," "Officer Wilson"). Impolite and disrespectful drivers will tend to be rude and curt. They will treat the officer simply as a jerk in uniform. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all respectful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 respectful

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded



**Driver Submissiveness (submitdr)**

The driver was submissive to the primary officer. Drivers who are submissive will tend to be fully compliant with all of the officer's requests and arguments. Submissive drivers are completely accepting of the officer's authority. They will not argue back during the interaction. Drivers who are *not* submissive will tend to challenge the officer's authority and judgment. In addition, they will consistently reiterate their point of view during the interaction. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all submissive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 submissive  
99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Primary Driver Courteous (courtydr)**

The driver appeared to be extremely courteous toward the police officer. A driver who is courteous will remain polite throughout the interaction by minding his or her manners, avoiding interrupting the officer, and overall listening. He or she will tend to take a positive approach to the interaction regardless of the officer's behavior. A driver who is *not* courteous will be rude throughout the interaction through the use of (1) frequent interruptions and (2) a general lack of manners toward the officer by avoiding answering the officer's questions. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all courteous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 courteous  
99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Driver Cooperativeness (coopdr)**

The driver was extremely cooperative with the primary officer. The driver complied with all of the officer's requests. In addition, the driver did whatever he or she could to facilitate the process of the stop. A driver who is cooperative might already have identification ready before the officer approaches the car. A driver who is *not* cooperative will try to resist complying with some or all of the primary officer's requests. He or she will typically be slower when responding. In addition, he or she would be more likely to question the officer or the rationale for the stop. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all cooperative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 cooperative

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver Apologetic (apolgydr)**

The driver seemed genuinely apologetic during the interaction. This could be expressed by saying something like “I am so sorry—I didn’t even see that stop sign” or “I am very sorry for speeding; I don’t usually do things like this.” A driver who is *not* apologetic will in no way admit fault for anything at any point during the interaction. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all apologetic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 apologetic

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

## **Nonaccommodation Variables: Driver**

### **Driver Belligerence (beligdr)**

To what extent did the driver display belligerence toward the primary officer? Examples of belligerence in a driver would be demonstrating adamant hostility toward the primary officer (e.g., “you stupid cop—why did you pull me over?”). Belligerence is often demonstrated through an abrasive tone or verbal jabbing. A nonbelligerent driver will not question the primary officer’s authority or reason for the stop. He or she would not be hostile but will be fully cooperative with the primary officer. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all belligerent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 belligerent

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver Is Dismissive (dismisdr)**

To what extent did the driver dismiss the arguments and communication exhibited by the primary officer? In many cases, a driver will hear the reason for which he or she was pulled over and reject the officer’s reasoning. For example, a driver might say, “I was not speeding; your radar actually clocked a driver who was passing me.” A highly dismissive person will insist throughout the interaction that the officer’s reasoning is flawed. A driver who is *not* dismissive will accept the officer’s

reasoning for the stop and interrogation. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all dismissive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 dismissive  
99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver Impatience (impatdr)**

To what extent was the driver impatient with the primary officer? A driver who is impatient will rush through the interaction with the officer. An impatient driver may be less thorough in his or her explanations and may not listen well to the primary officer's needs and questions. An impatient driver is likely to mention that he or she is late for something or in a rush to get somewhere. The driver might suggest that the officer "hurry up." Drivers who are highly impatient may be visibly so through fidgeting or nonverbal gestures with their hands to hurry the officer, or they may request that the officer write the ticket quickly. A driver who is *not* impatient will appear quite relaxed and *not* frustrated with the officer regardless of how long the interaction takes. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all impatient 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 impatient  
99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver Argumentativeness (arguedr)**

The driver was argumentative with the primary officer. Drivers who are argumentative will tend to escalate the confrontation with the officer (e.g., "I can't believe you pulled me over"). They will tend to raise their voices; be more expressive, animated, and passionate about their argument; and contradict or resist the officer's understanding of the situation or event. Drivers who are *not* argumentative will be much more cooperative and respectful of officers. They will also be more pliable during the interaction. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all argumentative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 argumentative  
99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Driver Overemphasizes Their Excuse (excusedr)**

The driver appeared to spend an excessive amount of time providing excuses for why he or she might have been pulled over and detained. The driver focuses on these excuses because he or she expects the officer to eventually accept as valid. During the course of an interaction, the driver who overemphasizes his or her excuses will continually repeat them and elaborate on them. Drivers who do *not* overemphasize their excuses either (1) offer no excuse for their behavior or (2) mention an excuse in passing *only* once. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

did not make excuses 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 excuses made

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Driver Interruptions (intrptdr)**

The driver appeared interruptive of the primary officer. Interruption includes when one cannot get his or her thought to completion before someone else begins speaking. A driver who is interruptive will frequently not allow the primary officer to finish his or her thoughts before beginning to speak. Interruptive drivers who cut the primary officer off more than two or three times during an interaction would typically be coded as 10. In addition, drivers who interrupt primary officers at crucial times during the interaction (e.g., when the police officer is explaining why the driver was pulled over) would also be coded as interruptive. A driver who is *not* interruptive will frequently allow the officer to completely finish his or her thoughts before beginning to speak. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all interruptive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 interruptive

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

**Driver Sarcasm (sarcdr)**

The driver expressed sarcasm during the traffic stop. A driver who is sarcastic will use ironic comments in combination with tone to purposefully rebut the officer's position. Usually, the driver will use the sarcasm to express suspicion of the officer's motives. In addition, sarcasm is often expressed through the use of paralanguage or sarcastic tone (e.g., saying in a sarcastic tone, "Yeah, I am *sure* that's the reason

I was pulled over”). A driver who is *not* sarcastic will remain straightforward in his or her language and paralanguage. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all sarcastic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sarcastic

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

## Emotional Reactions: Driver

### Driver Aggravation (draggrv)

The driver appeared very aggravated during the encounter. A driver who appears aggravated may (1) become rushed during his or her speaking, (2) change tone, or (3) pause a lot and start over again, signaling that they are becoming frustrated with the way the interaction is going. An aggravated driver may be fidgety and make several sighs during the interaction, displaying their aggravation. A driver who is *not* aggravated will remain calm throughout the interaction. He or she will typically have a calm tone and demeanor throughout the entire interaction regardless of what happens during the stop. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all aggravated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 aggravated

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### Driver Humor (drhumor)

The driver showed his or her humorous side during the interaction with the officer. A driver who is humorous would show this by laughing, chuckling, or making jokes. For example, a humorous driver may laugh with the officer about something said during the interaction. In this context, humor must remain lighthearted and fun. Humor is not a driver laughing *at* an officer or laughing as a means of dismissing an officer’s reasoning for the stop. The humor will always occur during the interaction with the officer. A driver who is *not* humorous will not joke or laugh during any part of the interaction. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

0 = not at all humorous

1 = humorous

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver Expressed Confusion (drconfus)**

The driver expressed confusion during the interaction with the primary police officer. Usually, this confusion occurs at the point at which punishment is meted out to the civilian. Confusion might be represented by the use of multiple clarifying questions during the interaction (e.g., “Can you repeat that again?” or “What am I supposed to be doing with this paperwork?” “Am I going to be arrested?”). A driver who does *not* express confusion will not ask any clarifying questions, especially when being administered a citation. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all confused 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 confused

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **The Driver Appeared Anxious (dranxuos)**

During the interaction, the driver appeared nervous or anxious. Usually, this surrounds the outcome (e.g., citation) associated with the stop. Often, this will be expressed as worry about the implications of the outcome (e.g., tarnished driving record). In many cases, there will be crackling, strained, and unsteady voices coming from drivers who are anxious. A driver who is *not* anxious will remain steady and unwavering throughout the interaction. He or she would appear to be rather relaxed during the traffic stop. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all anxious 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 anxious

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

### **Driver Anger (angrdr)**

The driver appeared angry during the traffic stop. A driver who is angry will raise his or her voice, shout, yell, or become very stern through tone of voice. These drivers will demonstrate disgust toward the officer, usually through both verbal and nonverbal behavior. A driver who is *not* angry will most likely *not* yell and will appear rather calm during the interaction. [Code as 0 if the characteristic is totally absent.]

not at all angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 angry

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

## **Nonverbal Measures: Driver**

For the following measures, consider the relationship of the driver to the primary officer.

### **Proximity of the Driver Relative to the Police Officer (drclose)**

Does the driver remain in his or her seat throughout the interaction, or does he or she ever leave his or her car without being asked by the officer to disembark from their vehicle? If the driver leaves his or her seat without being asked at any point, code this as 1.

0 = Driver never left his or her seat.

1 = Driver got out of his or her seat.

99 = not applicable/cannot be coded

## **Escalation**

### **Escalation (escldr)**

If there was any unpleasantness in the interaction, to what extent was the driver responsible for the escalation of this unpleasantness? If there was no escalation and the interaction was pleasant with no problems, code as 0. Otherwise, use the endpoints to indicate responsibility.

not responsible for a problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 responsible

0 = no problem/not applicable

### **Deescalation**

If there was an unpleasantness in the interaction, to what extent was the driver responsible for the deescalation of this unpleasantness? If there was no escalation and the interaction was pleasant with no problems, code as 0. Otherwise, use the endpoints to indicate responsibility.

not responsible for a problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 responsible

0 = no problem/not applicable





## **Cincinnati Police Department's Response to Year 4 Report**

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This appendix contains the CPD response to this report. We have not edited it in any way.

### **Cincinnati Police Department's Response to RAND's Year Four Evaluation**

The Cincinnati Police Department is pleased with the progress made to date as result of the now expired Collaborative Agreement. That being noted, we acknowledge RAND's recommendations and assert that we will continue to strive to improve our service and responsiveness to the community regarding issues resulting from and contributing to crime.

RAND again reported improvement in the quality of data we provided to them for analysis. We have continuously worked to improve data collection, quality and analysis in our efforts to become more strategically effective. RAND's feedback has helped us in this endeavor and their analysis of our actions provides the transparency necessary to build community trust.

In November 2008, the Cincinnati Police Department received the coveted 17th annual Webber Seavey Award for quality in law enforcement from the International Association of Chiefs of Police and Motorola, Inc. for a macro-problem solving effort entitled the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV). CIRV was selected from a field of 156 world-wide applicants that wanted to share their positive experiences with their peers. The CIRV program is a multi-agency and

community collaborative effort initiated in 2007, designed to quickly and dramatically reduce gun-violence and associated homicides, with sustained reductions over time. Keys to the program include messaging to street gang/group members, strategic law enforcement action, providing streamlined social services, training, education, and employment opportunities to those offenders seeking a more productive lifestyle. During 2008, homicides which involve a street gang or group member as either the perpetrator or victim were reduced by 23.4%. This award recognizes innovative law enforcement programs that can serve as role models for other agencies.

RAND's analysis again shows that crime, calls for service, arrests, and use of force by police are geographically clustered in Cincinnati. As noted in recent reports, Over-the-Rhine has traditionally been an area of concern and received intensive proactive policing via the 2006 Over-the Rhine Task Force<sup>1</sup>. The Over-the-Rhine community has experienced a substantial decrease in crime. While concerns continue to be voiced about such deployments, it is encouraging to note that persons living in Over-the-Rhine reported an improvement in the perception of the level of police professionalism as noted in the community surveys. We attribute this to a comprehensive approach in which enhanced visibility and arrests are just one piece of the puzzle. Chief Streicher continues to advocate that "we cannot arrest our way out of this problem (of crime)." Cincinnati, like most cities, is experiencing declining revenues and shrinking budgets, which call for a more strategic deployment of resources utilizing the empirically driven problem solving methodology. The pilot testing of what has since become Cincinnati's Neighborhood Enhancement Program (NEP) was conducted there.

Likewise, the NEP is a focused effort to address quality of life issues based on analysis of data from numerous city departments. While part of the Police Department's role during these efforts is increased patrols and targeted arrests, it appears this type of effort has not resulted in a negative impression of police professionalism. While the NEP effort

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<sup>1</sup> The Over-the Rhine Task Force now has city-wide responsibilities for focused deployment under the name of the Vortex Unit.

would have occurred or have been active to be considered by survey respondents within the communities of Avondale, Clifton Heights/ University Heights, Fairview, Northside, Westwood, and both East and West Price Hill, responses from all but one community showed either an improvement or no change in regards to perception of police professionalism. Likewise, the NEP has received awards nationally from Neighborhoods U.S.A., statewide from the Ohio Conference of Community Development, and was regionally recognized as the “Most Outstanding Collaborative Effort” by the Community Development Corporations Association of Greater Cincinnati. These collaborative strategic efforts demonstrate our commitment to improvement.

RAND's analysis continues to show no institutionalized department level racial profiling. While it is important to note identification of individual officers is not an indictment of their actions, it is noteworthy that the number of identified officers continues to decline. We appreciate Dr. Ridgeway's efforts in providing us the ability to perform an analysis to identify individual officers stopping drivers of either race at substantially higher rates than we would find in situationally matched stops. Identified officers are reviewed as part of a quarterly risk management assessment conducted at the Command Staff level. Numerous officer activities are reviewed and compared with activity of the officer's respective peer group. Appropriate interventions or corrective action is taken where necessary as part of ongoing risk management.

We are pleased this year's analysis of videos depicting interactions during traffic stops shows improved communication on the part of our officers. As indicated in earlier responses to RAND's findings, we have made a comprehensive and consistent effort to ensure professional traffic stops via enhanced training for officers. The goals of the training include reviewing key findings of RAND Report, outlining how perceptions shape reality, reviewing key components of “Bias-Free Policing” and identifying strategies to overcome perceptions of racial profiling.

While we see improvements in perceptions as reported in the various surveys, we reiterate that we strive for continuous improvement. Anecdotally, officers are reporting persons are more willing to provide information about criminal activity, initiate cordial conversation, and

just stop them to say “thanks for your service.” We recognize relationships are fragile but are encouraged that doors, once bolted shut, have opened. One single incident can reverse much of the gain we have come to see. We are entrusted to keep these persons safe and do not take that commitment lightly. Our members will endeavor to create the reputation of the Cincinnati Police Department, as the best in the world. The awards recognition mentioned earlier along with feedback from attendees at several large national conferences recently held in Cincinnati, are already moving us in that direction.

The Collaborative Agreement has concluded. We appreciate the efforts of the parties and ask them to assist us as we move forward to forge relationships where they have not previously existed. We would appreciate their continued effort in garnering greater participation in problem-solving strategies. Through outreach to engage more citizens to take an active role in their communities we can ensure that public safety involves everyone.

## **American Civil Liberties Union Response to Year 4 Report**

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This appendix contains the ACLU's response to this report. We have not edited it in any way.

### **Appendix by ACLU to Year 4 Rand Report**

Both the final monitor report (December, 2008), [www.cincinnati-monitor.org](http://www.cincinnati-monitor.org) and the Fourth RAND report document progress within the Cincinnati Police Department in use of force and racial bias over the life of the Collaborative. Moreover, these past four years studied by RAND have seen a decline in crime in the City. Further, over the last four years the RAND report finds that African-American perceptions of police professionalism have improved. But African-Americans still trust police much less than do members of the White community. We must acknowledge this improvement but much work clearly remains to be done.

The Collaborative sought to address, among other things, a long legacy of discrimination against African-Americans by police. In the past, police in this country were used to enforce Jim Crow laws and other overt and subtle rules requiring segregation and Black oppression. The Kerner Commission and our own Monitor reports over the years confirmed that much of the negative view African-Americans have of police is earned over generations of brutality toward Black citizens. To see any progress in four years is a good sign. To reduce the energy we apply to this task, however, would miss an important opportunity to continue the progress we have started.

The Rand report states that 73% of the arrests and 75% of the use of incidents of use of force involve African American citizens. Only 44% of the City population is Black. This disparity, which suggest for some the potential for bias in policing, requires further explanation. This Rand Report helps provide some answers to that question and helps us focus on where we can apply dialogue, training and continued evaluation in order to improve trust of police in the African American community.

**1. Traffic Stops.** Rand's analysis of the video taped traffic stops states that African-Americans experience more intrusive stops:

(1) Black drivers were likelier to experience proactive policing (such as asking passengers for identification or searching the vehicle) during the stop, resulting in longer stops that were significantly more likely to involve searches, and (2) white officers were more likely than black officers to use proactive police tactics in incidents involving Black drivers. Report, p. xxvi.

Black drivers experience longer and more-invasive traffic stops, this difference in stop characteristics is attributable largely to those stops involving white officers, and black drivers tend to be more upset and less apologetic than white drivers in similar situations. Report, p. 88.

This videotape analysis does not mirror the other ways in which racial bias is measured in the report. The City explains the differences described in the video analysis by stating that "[t]his analysis does not match stops looking at similar circumstances." City Response to Rand Year Three Evaluation, Year Three Report, p. 72. This dispute over methodology cannot be the whole answer. These findings clearly point out the need for more training. It also suggests that as Rand's contract expires the City should continue to perform these types of analysis by continuing a much narrower contract with RAND in order to solve this problem. Moreover, the parties should resolve any methodology debate to eliminate that from the dialogue.

**2. Individual Officer Traffic Stop Issues.** Three officers were identified as making racially disproportionate traffic stops. The CPD should investigate these officers and take appropriate action if in fact there is no law enforcement reason for their conduct.

**3. Neighborhood Basis for Police Response.** The RAND report identifies the cost-benefit analysis we should pursue regarding proactive policing in high crime neighborhoods with high African-American populations:

Blacks continue to bear a disproportionate share of the impact of policing services by virtue of the clustering of crime, calls for service, and policing in predominantly black neighborhoods. While we found no evidence that the police systematically or deliberately treat blacks differently, blacks nevertheless experience a different kind of policing from that experienced by whites. In particular, blacks experience more policing and, particularly, more of the proactive policing exemplified by Vortex. While it may not be possible to field a proactive enforcement strategy that is racially neutral, much of CPD's interaction with the citizenry comes through vehicle stops. The quality, tenor, and tone of such stops are largely under police control. CPD should continue to evaluate the intensity of traffic stops (both volume and degree of scrutiny), especially in the high-crime neighborhoods, to ensure that the intensity level balances the investigative and public-safety benefits of the stops with the risks of negative interactions with residents. Report, p. xxxi.

According to the report, crime and disorder tends to be more concentrated in African-American neighborhoods. That means that strategies that more directly target that crime will reduce the collateral consequences of other strategies. As set out below, increased implementation of problem solving will reduce these collateral consequences and should improve the experience of African-Americans when police enter these neighborhoods.

**4. False Hits during Discretionary Stops.** RAND also identified the price we pay in police-community relations by the high number of false hits during discretionary stops:

Even though we found no racial disparities in the hit rates, officers conducted 1,318 high-discretion searches of black drivers in 2007 that recovered no contraband. Such stops, which the motorist likely views as being made for no good reason, disproportionately affect the black community, since more than 1,000 black residents experienced such searches in 2007, nearly twice the number for nonblack drivers. This can contribute to blacks' perceptions of unfair policing that were identified in last year's report (Schell et al., 2007). While recovery of contraband from high-discretion searches, such as 29 weapon and 448 drug recoveries, can have a social benefit for the Cincinnati community, there is a societal cost for searches that result in no recovery of contraband. Report, p. 66.

The City needs to decide if this number of false hits is worth the price paid in ill-will by residents who feel falsely accused. At a minimum this issue should be directly addressed before officers are deployed with instructions to continue strategies that will result in this number of false hits.

**5. Problem Solving.** The overall problem posed by RAND and identified through its reports is the price the police must pay when they choose strategies that treat law abiding citizens like criminals (saturation patrols and searches that do not find contraband). This persistent issue is not a surprise. The policy response should be to replace these types of police strategies whenever possible with strategies where the police response better fits the problem to be solved. That is the point behind Problem Solving. See Policy and Procedure No. 12.370 and the recommendations regarding Problem Solving in the Final Monitor Report, December 2008.



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